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 When Claritin (a popular allergy/antihistamine drug) and Prilosec (a popular 
anti-ulcer/anti-acid drug) became available over the counter (OTC), a unique situation 
was created in which a drug was now available OTC while close substitutes remained 
prescription (Rx) only. The OTC/Rx status of a drug should not affect physician 
recommendations for it or others in its class as no chemical change has occurred. The 
theory developed here to model physician incentives suggests, however, that due to 
several institutional features of insurance markets, such as reimbursement methods, 
there may be differences in the incentives faced by physicians that lead to changes in 
which medications are prescribed as drugs switch regulatory status. In this model, 
capitated physicians are expected to use the lowest cost form of treatment since they 
can be held financially responsible for their treatment decisions.  The existence of an 
OTC version of a drug is also hypothesized to alter patient behavior as well.  The 
availability of an OTC is expected to increase the likelihood that patients will self-
medicate and therefore should result in fewer visits to physicians with diagnoses 
related to that condition.  Self-treatment with OTC drugs is likely to be greater when 
symptoms are not very severe.  Consequently, it is also hypothesized that after the 
OTC drug is available those who do see a physician will manifest more severe 
symptoms.  To test the theory empirically the National Ambulatory Medical Survey 
for the years 1997-2004 is utilized.  The analysis shows that when a drug in a class 
becomes available in the OTC market, fewer patients visit physicians for the related 
diagnoses and the severity of ailments of patients visiting physicians does seem to 
   
change somewhat after the availability of OTC medication. There is some evidence 
that physicians change their prescribing behavior, when a drug moves from 
prescription to OTC.  In both the allergy and acid reflux markets, capitated physicians 
are found to utilize the least costly form of treatment.  These physicians are found to 
cost shift away from the insurance company, while FFS cost shift away from the 
patient.  Finally, both the allergy and acid reflux classes show some evidence of brand 
loyalty for drugs amongst patients. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 Significant changes in the prescription (Rx) and over the counter (OTC) drug 
markets have recently developed.  For the first time, drugs that were moved to the 
OTC market were equal in strength and effectiveness to prescription-only 
counterparts.  This study explores how patients and physicians react to such changes 
when deciding treatment options. It also explores the impact of physician 
reimbursement methods on prescribing behavior.   
 The results of the study provide some evidence of a change in the patient case 
mix seen in physician offices after these equally effective medications move to the 
OTC market.  In both the allergy and acid reflux groups, there is an increased use of 
specialist physicians after the availability of an OTC.  In addition, acute patients are 
less likely to be seen in physician offices for acid reflux related conditions, and 
chronic flare-up patients are less likely to be seen for allergy related conditions.  These 
results indicate that the overall severity of patients seen in physician offices increases 
after the availability of an OTC, since those with less severe conditions can self-treat. 
 This study also finds that physicians reimbursed under a capitated health plan 
provide their patients with the least costly form of treatment.  In the allergy group, 
capitated physicians are significantly more likely than fee-for-service to provide 
patients with allergy shots, which are less costly than medications.  After the 
availability of an OTC, however, capitated physicians are less likely to provide these 
shots, as they are no longer the least costly.  OTCs are instead the most cost effective 
form of treatment for an insurance plan, since the patient pays completely out-of-
pocket for them.   
 Similarly, for the acid reflux group, physicians under capitation are more likely 
to provide the older OTC medication Zantac to their patients as this is least costly.  
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Once Prilosec moves to the OTC market, capitated physicians have another option for 
treatment that is just as cost effective for the insurance company since the patient 
remains fully responsible for the cost of the drug. 
 Overall there also seems to be some evidence of brand loyalty amongst 
patients when drugs move to the OTC market.  In both markets, there is a decrease in 
the overall use of prescription medications after the availability of an OTC, indicating 
that patients follow these drugs to the OTC market, even though it may be more 
costly.  
Importance of Study 
 The pharmaceutical industry has recently seen the switch of several top selling 
drugs from the prescription to the over-the-counter drug market.  Traditionally, drugs 
available over the counter were less effective than prescription medications.  Rx-only 
and OTC drugs, therefore, could only be considered as imperfect substitutes for each 
other.  Even those brands that moved their products from the prescription market 
tended to have reduced dosages as OTCs. This changed in 2002 when, for the first 
time, a prescription drug product became available to the public on an over the counter 
basis and was of equal strength and effectiveness as those in the same class that 
remained prescription-only.   
 Little research to date has addressed how the change in prescription status 
affects the use of a drug, or other competing drugs in the same class with equal 
effectiveness, when it moves to the over-the-counter market.  While other researchers 
have studied physician incentives in regards to brand-name versus generic drug 
prescriptions, few have studied the incentives physicians face when deciding between 
prescription and OTC substitutes.  Even those studies that have examined prescription 
versus OTC drugs were done when the two markets were not as comparable.  OTCs 
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and prescriptions drugs for these studies could have been used as compliments rather 
than substitutes for one another. 
 Healthcare resource utilization can potentially be made more efficient with 
access to OTCs that are equal in strength and effectiveness to prescription-only 
counterparts.  The availability of these drugs on the OTC market can create an 
effective sorting system in which those patients with less severe symptoms can self 
treat allowing for quicker, less expensive therapy; and preventing unnecessary 
physician office visits.   
Purpose and Scope of Research  
The purpose of this study is to examine how patients and physicians change 
their behavior after the availability of an OTC drug that is chemically equivalent to its 
prescription counterparts.  Specifically, this study first intends to examine whether 
those patients that have less severe symptoms, utilize OTC drugs to self-treat, as a 
substitute to physician office visits.  This could potentially increase the overall 
severity of the patient case-mix seen in physician offices after the availability of an 
OTC drug.  Second, the study also focuses on whether or not physicians change their 
prescribing behavior when a drug switches from prescription to OTC class, and how 
this varies by the drug class being considered and the reimbursement method to 
physicians.  Patient level data was used from the National Ambulatory Medical Care 
Survey (NAMCS) from the years 1997 – 2004 to study the effects of this switch.  The 
allergy/antihistamine and the acid reflux drug classes are the two categories being 
examined since both have witnessed recent movements of blockbuster medications 
from the prescription-only to the OTC market in 2002 and 2003 respectively.     
Key Issues 
 The following section discusses the important factors that are considered in 
this research.   
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Physician Incentives and Reimbursement 
All players in the health care industry are affected by the switch of drugs from 
prescription to over the counter status. The physician is perhaps in the most important 
position, however, since he/she is integral in determining whether or not a patient 
receives a prescription.  Physicians’ incentives are an important aspect to examine 
when studying the effects of OTC switches as they are in this vital position.  As 
owners and partners of private practices, physicians have a financial incentive to 
maximize their own profits, but at the same time, they must balance their intentions 
with patient welfare.  As an agent for his/her patients, the physician’s choice of a drug 
for a patient’s ailment should not be influenced by its OTC versus Rx status, from a 
chemical perspective, even though physician authorization is required only for 
prescription drugs.  Financial motives, however, may affect the decision between 
prescription and OTC medications as there could be an impact on physician profits.      
 A switch in regulatory status may also entail a change in the cost to the patient 
depending on their insurance coverage.  It is therefore important for patients to 
understand their full range of options for medications and the implications of the 
physician’s choice.   
Pharmaceutical companies must also analyze the incentives of physicians as 
they are the gatekeepers for prescription medications.  The makers of drugs can 
determine the best strategies to promote and sell their products when patent 
expirations near for their own drug or when other drugs in the class move to the OTC 
market by understanding how a physician may change his/her prescribing pattern 
when these changes occur. 
 As providers of health insurance coverage, both government and private 
insurance companies can employ certain techniques to align the incentives of the 
physician with those of the third part payer, especially in regards to prescribing 
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behavior.  In fact, rather than fully reimburse physicians for all costs of care, some 
insurance companies use discounted reimbursements, capitated payments, and other 
controls to monitor the drug consumption decisions made by physicians.  These 
companies also use annual reviews to either reward or penalize physicians based on 
their prescribing behavior.  Figure 1.1 shows the extent to which these measures are 
used to control physician decisions.  As can be seen, almost all companies use at least 
some form of cost control, with most requiring physicians to adhere to some practice 
guidelines or undergo drug utilization review; and over ninety percent requiring 
physicians to get prior authorization for medication choice.  From 2001 onwards, as 
depicted in the figure, all HMO’s implement some form of prescription control.  While 
the use of financial incentives declined after 1998, it steadily remained a control 
method for over twenty percent of HMO’s.  Second opinion is the least used control 
method amongst these managed care organizations. 
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Figure 1.1 
Control Methods Used by HMOs to Influence Physician Prescribing Behavior 
(Kaiser Family Foundation, 2006) 
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Capitation 
 Increases in health care expenditures created a restructuring of the industry that 
was led by cost-conscious managed care organizations (MCOs) beginning in the 
1980s.  In the new environment, these organizations attempted to curb the effects of 
moral hazard, or over utilization, by making physicians financially accountable for 
their decisions. Traditionally, physicians were completely unattached to the third party 
payers since they received full reimbursements without any incentives to reduce costs.  
Physicians made their treatment and health care decisions based on what they thought 
was appropriate for the patient and were not at all financially responsible for providing 
medical care.  This led to an increase in moral hazard since physician revenues 
increased with the higher utilization of resources.   
In order to create a more efficient use of resources, managed care organizations 
created a system in which the physician was now financially responsible for his/her 
treatment decision.  MCOs developed protocols for physicians to follow and even 
began controlling treatment options, thereby decreasing physician autonomy.   
Managed care companies, however, vary in the amount of financial responsibility they 
place on the physician.  It is under capitation that physicians are most financially 
responsible for their treatment decisions.   
According to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, capitation is the 
physician payment method in which a set dollar amount per patient per unit of time is 
paid by insurance companies to cover services without regard to the actual number of 
services provided. That is, an insurance company pays the physician a set amount; all 
services utilized by the physician for the patient during the period are deducted from 
that payment.  While the use of capitation has decreased in recent years, this method 
of payment is most likely to align physician incentives with those of the insurance 
companies, as physicians bear some financial responsibility for their decisions.  This 
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method of reimbursement can vary in the extent to which physicians are held 
responsible.  Some companies allow physicians to only take the administrative costs of 
a patient visit out of the fixed payment, while the company covers the cost of tests, 
medications, and other services.  Other companies require physicians to deduct all 
services from the fixed payment.  Figures 1.2 and 1.3 depict the extent to which 
capitation has penetrated the physician market.  It is possible for a physician to 
reimbursed by both FFS and capitation simultaneously, as he or she could have 
patients under both types of insurance plans. 
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Figure 1.2 
Method of Physician Reimbursement by HMOs in 2001 
(Kaiser Family Foundation, 2006) 
According to Figures 1.2 and 1.3, capitation seems to be relevant for both 
specialists and primary care physicians, but to a lesser extent for specialists.  
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Capitation for both types of physicians is the second most used method of physician 
reimbursement, with over fifty- percent of HMO’s using some form of capitation for 
primary care practices.  The majority of pediatricians face capitation as their method 
of reimbursement, while both general internal medicine and family practice have 
capitation rates for nearly 50% of their field.      
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Figure 1.3 
Percent of Physicians with Capitated Contracts by Specialty in 2001 
(Kaiser Family, 2006) 
Capitation is compared with Fee-for-Service in the work here to examine the 
impact of financial incentives on physician prescribing behavior.  The incentives 
under capitation are to minimize the use of resources in order for the physician to 
maximize profits.  FFS physicians, however, can increase profits by maximizing 
resource use.  Under the context of prescribing behavior, this study examines how 
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capitated and FFS physicians differ in their prescribing behavior.  This analysis is then 
further carried to examine how these physicians differ in prescribing behavior, once a 
low cost OTC becomes available in the market that is of equal strength and 
effectiveness as prescription-only drugs.  By providing an OTC drug to their patient, 
physicians can minimize further office visits for the same illness, since the patient no 
longer has to get physician approval for refills.  Providing a prescription drug, 
however, increases the likelihood that a patient will return to a physician’s office, 
since the patient will need refills and/or physician monitoring.  Using OTCs, therefore, 
can limit the amount of resources used, which may be beneficial to capitated 
physicians. 
Patient Case Mix 
 According to the theoretical model described later, it is predicted that patients 
will have the opportunity to self-treat with an OTC, and therefore the only patients 
seen in physician offices are those who were not successful with the OTC or those 
who were not able to properly diagnose themselves, perhaps because of co-
morbidities.  Also, those patients that have the relevant illness on a long term basis are 
likely to be seen in physician offices for disease management.    
  It is therefore hypothesized that the case mix of patients with a related 
diagnosis seen in physician offices will become more severe after the availability of an 
OTC medication for a particular class of drugs.  Measuring patient severity is difficult 
without knowing the exact nature of a patient’s symptoms or the results of patient 
exams and tests.  Other researchers have utilized measures such as Ambulatory Care 
Groups (ACGs) and Chronic Disease Scores (CDS) to adjust for patient case-mix.  
With ACGs, resource use is predicted using ambulatory visit diagnoses. CDS uses the 
category of drugs prescribed to identify chronic comorbid conditions (Hillman et al, 
1999). 
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Some researchers have used time spent with the physician, defined as the 
number of minutes the physician spends face-to-face with the patient, as a measure for 
severity, where an increased time spent indicates a higher severity of illness.  It has 
often been suggested that a greater amount of time spent with a patient indicates 
greater physician effort (Rice, 2004).  While time spent with the physician could very 
well shed light on the severity of the patient, this measure can be influenced by many 
other factors that are not related to severity.  For example, physicians may spend more 
or less time with a patient simply because of changes in reimbursement methods rather 
than the nature of the patient’s illness.  Also, it is when patients first have symptoms 
that time spent with the physician could be greatest.  It is in these initial visits that the 
physician takes time to understand the patient’s symptoms and educates the patient 
about the illness. Time spent therefore, could be an indication of the start of an illness 
for a patient, in which case the severity may still be low.  Also, those that have chronic 
conditions are thought of having a higher severity.  Time spent with chronic patients, 
however, does not necessarily have to be higher, since these patients are most likely 
being managed, rather than first being diagnosed with the illness.  Time spent with the 
physician is therefore tested here, to simply better understand what happens amongst 
patients and physicians once an over the counter drug is available, rather than to 
predict changes in case-mix severity. 
The number of diagnostic tests ordered could also be an indicator for the 
complexity of a patient’s illness since physicians use these tests as tools in the 
diagnosis process.  When patients have many symptoms that could lead to a variety of 
illnesses, physicians utilize diagnostic tests to help discern between them.  Again, 
however, the most testing could be done when patients first present with symptoms in 
the physician’s office.  It is during this initial time period that the physician could still 
be in the diagnosis process and utilizes testing to help determine the patient’s illness.  
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The total number of diagnostic tests therefore would not necessarily indicate a higher 
severity, but rather the early part of an illness.  Total testing is also examined here to 
better understand the effects of an OTC becoming available in a class, but it is not 
used as a measure of severity. 
 To better understand changes in severity, this study analyzes the use of 
specialist physicians before and after the availability of an OTC medication to indicate 
any changes in patient case-mix.  The use of a specialist indicates that the patient has 
symptoms that can no longer be effectively treated by a primary care physician and 
instead need to be more aggressively handled by a physician trained in the area (Diette 
et al, 2001). 
Finally, this study examines the nature of the patient’s condition to estimate 
severity.  The nature of the illness is categorized by the length of time the patient has 
had symptoms.  Acute patients are defined as those having symptoms for less than 
three months; chronic routine are those patients with symptoms for more than three 
months; and chronic flare-up includes those patients that have had the illness for more 
than three months, but their symptoms have suddenly been exacerbated.  As described 
by Rice (2004), chronic conditions can be considered as more severe and more costly 
than acute ones because they require a greater use of medications and a longer time 
period for treatment.  According to the hypotheses of this study, if acute patients can 
be successfully treated with OTC medications, these patients will no longer see their 
physicians, thereby increasing the overall severity of the patient case mix seen in 
physician offices. Chronic flare-up patients are expected to act similarly to acute 
patients, since their conditions may also be short-term. 
 Regulatory Status of Drugs and Policy Impact 
 The regulatory status of drugs determines the extent of access patients have to 
the medication.  To obtain prescription drugs, patients must first go through 
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physicians, whereas OTC medications can be accessed directly, without prior 
authorization.  As more medications for more illnesses, move to the OTC market, 
patients will increasingly be able to self treat.  This could create an efficient 
mechanism to sort between patients with mild conditions from those with higher 
severity.  If all patients first use OTC medications, some will be treated effectively and 
will not have to see a physician at all.  Others, however, will not be treated 
successfully by the OTC and will have to see a physician for further diagnosis.  The 
availability of OTC medications creates a system in which unnecessary physician 
visits can be avoided, thereby decreasing health care costs.  This could impact the 
decisions of the Food & Drug Administration, when determining which drugs and 
which drug classes should be available without physician approval.  The downside of 
OTC availability is an important factor in this decision making process as well.  With 
increased access, patients could over-utilize medications, or could even take these 
drugs incorrectly if they misdiagnose themselves.          
Significance of Pharmaceutical Market Analysis 
The medical drug market has become an increasingly important component of 
the health care industry, which further provides reason for increased research in this 
area.  In 1999–2000, according to a survey done by the National Center for Health 
Statistics, 44.3 percent of Americans of all ages reported using at least one 
prescription drug during the month in which the survey was conducted. During the 
same period the percent of individuals who reported using three or more drugs in the 
past month was almost 17 percent.  More than 60 percent of adults age 45–64 years 
and more than 80 percent of adults age 65 years and over reported taking at least one 
prescription drug during the month in which the survey was conducted between 1999-
2000.  In 2002, national expenditures on prescription drugs were over $162 billion and 
grew over 15% from the amount spent the year before (National Center for Health 
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Statistics, 2004).  Figure 1.4 shows the percent of National Health Expenditures spent 
on prescription drugs. 
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Figure 1.4 
Percent of per Capita National Health Expenditures Attributable to Prescription Drugs 
(MEPS, 2006) 
These expenditures should progressively increase as the use of drugs continues 
to rise.  As some blockbuster drugs come off patent, there may be a leveling off of 
prescription drug expenditures since the cost of these drugs should decline.  Other new 
drugs, however, will still be introduced at higher prices, off setting the patent 
expiration effect.  Figures 1.5 shows the percent of the U.S. population that has a 
prescription expense.  Figure 1.6 depicts the mean out-of-pocket cost paid by patients 
amongst those that have a prescription expense.  The two figures provide different 
perspectives on the pharmaceutical market and its trends.  
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Figure 1.5 
Percent of Population with a Prescription Expense 
(MEPS, 2006) 
While the percent of the population that has a prescription expense seems to be 
leveling off from 2000 – 2003, and even falling in 2004, the actual out-of –pocket 
expense for patients seems to be on the rise, as depicted in Figure 1.6.  These two 
figures indicate the possibility that drug prices have increased.  Also, these graphs 
could be implying that amongst those patients that have a prescription expense, more 
patients are using multiple drugs in their therapy.  If this were true, an increase in the 
percent of people with a prescription expense would not be seen, but an increase in the 
total cost of medications for each individual would be found.  Figure 1.6 shows that 
amongst those with a prescription expense, individuals spent over $1000 per year on 
medications in 2004 compared to approximately $600 in 2000.   
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Figure 1.6 
Mean Out-of-Pocket Expense for Population with Prescription Expense 
(MEPS, 2006) 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND  
Players in the Health Care Industry 
 The health care market in the U.S. has many players acting with varying 
interests.  Patients are the primary consumers of health care, but physicians often act 
as agents for them in their consumption decisions.  The majority of U.S. patients do 
not pay the full price of all the products and services in the health care industry at the 
point of consumption because of insurance.  Because patients do not necessarily face 
the marginal cost of these services, there can be a moral hazard tendency to over 
consume.   
While physicians are suppliers of health care services, they are consumers as 
well.  Physicians provide their skills and services to patients and charge a fee, but, as 
mentioned earlier, they must simultaneously act as an agent on behalf of patients and 
their interests.  As owners of private practices or even as employees of managed care 
companies, physicians must balance business interests as well, by minimizing costs.  
In this position physicians must provide adequate care at the least possible cost. 
The U.S. government through the services of Medicare and Medicaid and 
private insurance companies are the major providers of health insurance in this 
country.  These organizations do not consume any health care services directly; 
however, they are the major payers of all health care products.  As third party payers, 
the main incentive for insurers is to minimize excess costs.     
 Pharmaceutical companies are players in this industry as well.  Most of these 
companies are public and therefore, in order to meet shareholder goals, they must 
maximize profitability.  To accomplish this, drug companies engage in heavy 
marketing directly to the consumer, but most of all to the physician.  Pharmaceuticals 
also attempt to find the most innovative medication for each type of illness to sell in 
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drug markets with patent protection.  These companies engage in heavy research and 
development efforts to find the newest products, obtain patents, and gain FDA 
approvals.  By getting a patent for the product, these corporations can protect 
themselves from competition and can set their prices in a monopolistic way.  
According to the Congressional Budget Office, as of 1994, the patent for a 
prescription drug lasts 20 years from the date of filing.  The 20 years of exclusivity 
includes the period in which the drug moves through FDA trials, and therefore 
amounts to an average of 11.5 years of marketing time (CBO, 1998). 
 Once a drug loses patent protection, generics are able to enter the market and 
create a great deal of competition, driving down prices.  At times, pharmaceuticals are 
able to extend the profit life of prescription products as they lose patent protection by 
turning to the over the counter market.  As they switch a drug to OTC status, 
pharmaceutical companies can take advantage of the brand name associated with their 
product and can continue to make profits from it.  In addition, the Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman) allows for a 3 year 
patent extension of those drugs switched from prescription only to over-the-counter 
status, if the company has been required to provide additional clinical trials for the 
switch to be evaluated.  This extension is also given to those products in which a 
pharmaceutical firm can find a new indication for use when the drug moves to the 
OTC market (Harrington, 2002). 
 When competing in the OTC market, however, pharmaceuticals must also face 
increased price elasticity.  That is, since patients generally pay for the full cost of OTC 
medications completely out-of-pocket, they will be more sensitive to differences in 
price.  For this reason, pharmaceutical companies are not able to price their 
medications as high in the OTC market as compared to when the drug was 
prescription-only.  
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Insurance companies that provide drug coverage are also in a position to push 
for the switch of prescription drugs to over the counter status.  Traditionally, most 
insurance companies have not covered OTC products within their prescription drug 
plans.  Therefore, as they are looking for ways to reduce costs in the prescription drug 
market, insurance companies can petition the FDA to convert a drug from the 
prescription to the OTC market.  Also the company can save costs when people self-
medicate and thereby decrease their trips to physician offices. 
Policy Analysis and the Pharmaceutical Industry 
There are many public policy issues concerning the pharmaceutical industry as 
well.  In 2003 the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA) was initiated to provide drug 
coverage for the Medicare population to ease the financial burden of prescription drug 
spending, especially for those with low incomes. Under this plan, in January 2006, 
Medicare began paying for outpatient prescription drug coverage through private drug 
plans.  With the recent start, there is considerable interest in understanding how the 
new benefit could affect the out of pocket costs beneficiaries face. According to a 
Kaiser Family Foundation report, in 2006, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
estimates that Part D participants will spend, on average, $792 out of pocket for 
prescription drugs (excluding premiums), which is 37% less than the $1,257 they 
would have spent in the absence of the law. 
 In another area of pharmaceutical policy, in 2004, a group of senators 
introduced a bill that would allow the re-importation of prescription drugs from other 
nations.  The Pharmaceutical Market Access and Drug Safety Act would allow U.S. 
residents to re-import as much as a 90-day supply of prescription drugs from Canada 
for personal use from only Canadian pharmacies that have been approved by the Food 
and Drug Association (FDA).  Those in favor of the bill argue that there is no reason 
why Americans have to pay more for their medications than people in other countries.  
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Those opposed to the bill feel that re-importation will prevent the FDA from being 
able to monitor the quality of drugs entering the U.S. and will thereby open the door 
for unapproved medications that could be potentially harmful to patients.  The bill has 
not been passed into law, and therefore it is still illegal for anyone other than a drug 
manufacturer to bring pharmaceuticals into the US. 
 Advertising has also been at the center of public policy recently.  Before 1997, 
pharmaceutical companies had to provide all of the risk information associated with a 
drug during a television advertisement.  This requirement increased the length of the 
advertisement, making them impractical.  In 1997, the FDA issued a new guidance 
allowing pharmaceutical companies to meet requirements by presenting the major side 
effects, either in audio or in audio and visual form, and by telling consumers where to 
find additional information, including how or where to obtain the approved product 
labeling.  According to the General Accounting Office from 1997-2001 spending on 
advertising increased from $1.1 billion to an estimated $2.7 billion.  Meanwhile, 
spending on total promotion increased from $11.0 billion to an estimated $19.1 
billion.  This rapid increase caused a great deal of debate as to the true effect of 
advertising.  Those in favor of direct-to-consumer advertising claim that these ads 
provide information to consumers by making them aware of conditions and the 
treatments available.  These advertisements encourage patients to see their physicians 
and get proper care in a timely manner.  On the other hand, those opposed to 
advertising claim that these ads create unnecessary demand for pharmaceutical 
products.  People see ads and think they have conditions that they may not in fact 
have; patients then demand these brand name products from their physicians.  
According to the opposition, this wastes valuable physician time and physician 
autonomy, especially when the physician has to explain to the patient why they do not 
need a particular drug. 
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U.S. Drug Approval Process 
 Before a drug can even enter the prescription or OTC markets, it must be 
approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).  According to the FDA, a 
legal drug is a substance used in the diagnosis, treatment, or prevention of a disease or 
as a component of a medication.  In 1938, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act was 
passed, requiring for the first time that drugs be cleared by the FDA before being 
marketed for patient use.  Under this act, all new drugs had to be proven as safe for 
human use and had to have the labeling specifications required by the act.   
 Drug companies formally propose that the FDA approve a new drug for sale in 
the United States with a new drug application (NDA).  An NDA includes data 
collected from various research trials and analyses.  Specifically they must provide 
sufficient results to prove the safety and effectiveness in treating, preventing, or 
diagnosing a specific disease.  Decisions that the FDA must make include:   
• Whether or not the drug is safe and effective for its proposed use. 
• Whether the drug’s proposed labeling is appropriate. 
• Whether manufacturing methods are adequate to preserve the drug’s strength, 
quality, and purity.   
 The research and development process for drug companies is very 
complicated, time-consuming, and expensive.  In addition, it is never guaranteed that a 
successful product will be the end result.  Thousands of chemical compounds are 
made and tested in hopes of finding one that can make it through the approval process.  
According to FDA estimates, it takes approximately eight and a half years to study and 
test a new drug before it can be approved for the general public.  This approximation 
includes laboratory and animal testing, as well as clinical trials on human subjects.  
 Drugs are developed in many different ways.  In some instances, 
pharmaceutical companies themselves decide to develop a new drug for a specific 
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medical condition.  Scientists may choose to investigate an interesting line of research, 
or findings from university and government research may point the way for drug 
companies to follow their own research.  In all cases, new drug research begins with 
an understanding of how the body functions, normally, as well as abnormally.  This 
level of understanding allows researchers to determine how a drug might be used to 
prevent, cure, or treat a medical condition.  Sometimes scientists can find the correct 
compound quickly, but usually thousands must be screened first.   
In the U.S., it is estimated that bringing a prescription drug to market costs 
between $300 million and $600 million, and takes approximately 10-15 years.  One in 
five thousand compounds that enter preclinical testing actually proceeds to human 
testing, and around 20% of those that enter clinical trials actually make it to the market 
(Paul, 2001).   
Pre-Clinical Research 
 Before the approval process even begins, companies are required to first 
undergo pre-clinical research to show that a drug is reasonably safe for initial small 
scale studies.  It is during this stage that sponsors evaluate a drug’s toxic and 
pharmacological effects.  The results of these tests are then used in the Investigational 
New Drug (IND) application required to be submitted to the FDA before testing can 
begin on human subjects.  This application lays out all the information known about 
the drug to date and it begins the official dialogue between the FDA and the 
pharmaceutical company.  According to the FDA, sponsors of drug applications have 
various options for fulfilling these requirements.  Depending on whether a compound 
has been marketed previously or even studied before, companies can compile data 
from past laboratory studies on the compound; they can compile data from previous 
clinical testing or marketing of the drug; or companies can undertake new pre-clinical 
studies.   
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 Animal testing generally begins in this pre-clinical phase to measure the 
toxicity of a drug and examine the chemical breakdown of it in vivo.  Animal testing 
can be short term, lasting a few weeks to a few months.  Long term animal testing, 
however, can even last several years, at times running concurrently with human testing 
in order to learn about the long term effects of a drug.  All of the data in this phase is 
used to determine if it is safe to proceed with human/clinical trials. 
Clinical Trials 
 The goal of clinical trials is to obtain safety and effectiveness data for each 
drug.  The clinical trials part of the process is divided into three phases.  Phase 1 is the 
initial introduction of the investigation.  Here, tests are usually conducted on 
approximately twenty to eighty healthy volunteer subjects to determine the metabolic 
and pharmacologic actions of the drug in humans; any side effects associated with 
increased doses; and gain early evidence on effectiveness.   
 In Phase 2 researchers conduct controlled clinical studies on several hundred 
people to obtain data on the effectiveness of the drug in those patients with the target 
disease.  Many short-term side effects are often found in this phase.  This phase can 
take several years to complete and costs between $20 million and $40 million (Paul, 
2001).  The studies in this phase also determine the dosage levels and frequency of 
administration at which this level of effectiveness is reached safely. 
 Phase 3 includes expanded controlled and uncontrolled trials.  After evidence 
from Phase 2 has been found indicating that a drug is effective, Phase 3 trials begin to 
gather more information about the effectiveness and safety of a drug to create an 
overall benefit-risk relationship.  Physicians monitor patients closely in this phase of 
trials in order to confirm the effectiveness of the product and also to identify and 
adverse reactions.  Because Phase 3 trials are conducted on several hundred to several 
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thousand people, they provide an adequate basis for extrapolating the results to the 
general public.   
 Occasionally, the FDA conditionally approves a product, in which case, it 
requires companies to conduct Phase 4 trials.  This additional research is generally 
conducted to measure the compounds impact on particular patient subgroups or to 
provide a clearer picture of benefits.  Companies can begin marketing their products 
while they are in the process of conducting Phase 4 trials.     
NDA Review 
 After Phase 3 of the Clinical Trials stage is complete and successful, an NDA 
is submitted for review.  After careful review of data from all of the research trials, the 
FDA decides whether or not the drug labeling, or the official instructions for use, is 
acceptable.  The FDA then has an inspection of manufacturing sites and areas where 
significant clinical trials were performed.  If those are found to be in satisfactory 
condition, the NDA is generally approved, after which only the sponsor of the NDA 
can market the drug.  Pharmaceutical companies are still required, after approval, to 
continue to submit periodic reports to the FDA regarding all serious adverse reactions 
and quality control problems (FDA, 2005). 
Prescription & OTC Drugs 
 The distinction between prescription and over-the-counter (OTC) drugs was 
first established in 1951 with the Durham-Humphrey amendments to the Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act which defined the types of drugs that could only be safely used with 
medical supervision (FDA Food and Drug Law History, 2005).  Later, all drugs, both 
those that did and did not require physician authorization, were required to be proven 
safe and effective with the passing of the Kefauver-Harris amendments in 1962.  In 
1972, the OTC Drug Review was started to evaluate OTC product ingredients to 
ensure safety, effectiveness, and labeling standards.  Formally, a prescription drug is 
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any drug or medicine requiring physician authorization before it can be purchased or 
obtained.  OTC drugs on the other hand are available to consumers without a 
prescription from a physician.  Like prescription medications, however, these drugs 
also undergo an approval process and are monitored by the FDA.  According to the 
FDA, OTC drugs generally possess the following characteristics (Mossinghoff, 1999):  
• Benefits outweigh risks. 
• Potential for misuse and abuse is low. 
• Consumers can use them for self-diagnosed conditions. 
• They can be adequately labeled. 
• Health practitioners are not needed for the safe and effective use of the 
product. 
OTC Approval 
 The FDA's review of OTC drugs is primarily handled by Center for Drug 
Evaluation and Research’s (CDER) Division of Over-the-Counter Drug Products.  The 
FDA has been evaluating the ingredients and labeling of some drugs since many OTC 
products have been marketed to the public even before laws were passed requiring 
proof of safety and effectiveness. This FDA project is part of "The OTC Drug Review 
Program" which is intended to establish OTC drug monographs for each class of 
products.   
OTC drug monographs include information on acceptable ingredients, doses, 
formulations, labeling, and testing, and they are continually updated to add additional 
ingredients and labeling as needed. Those products that already conform to a 
monograph can be marketed without pre-approval from the FDA. Those drugs that do 
not conform to the monographs, however, must undergo separate reviews and must 
gain approval through the New Drug Application (NDA) process, which is the same 
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process for approving prescription drugs.   New ingredients that enter the OTC market 
for the first time also must use the NDA process. 
 The OTC Drug Review evaluates OTC product ingredients and initially 
categorizes a drug as Category I, II, or III.  Category I drugs are generally recognized 
as safe and effective for the claims given by the sponsor.  Category II drugs are 
recognized as generally unsafe and ineffective, while Category III drugs are those with 
insufficient data to allow for a final classification.  The FDA evaluates the findings 
from this review to either approve or reject a drug for OTC marketing (FDA, 2005).  
Prescription to OTC Reclassification 
 Thirty percent of new OTC drugs that were put on the market between 1975 
and 1994 were originally prescription-only drugs.  Since the OTC Drug Review was 
initiated, more than 40 product ingredients have been switched from prescription to 
OTC status. 
 According to Mahecha (2006), “The US Food and Drug Administration 
defines an Rx-to-OTC switch as over-the-counter (OTC) marketing of a drug product 
that was once a prescription (Rx) drug for the same indication, with the same strength, 
dose, duration of use, dosage form, population and route of administration”.   There 
are three sponsors that can apply for the reclassification process from prescription to 
OTC.  First, manufacturers can create a supplement to the original New Drug 
Application (NDA) if post-marketing evidence from prescription-only sales shows 
that the drug can be used safely without physician supervision.  Second, after a drug 
has already been sold on the prescription-only market the FDA itself can file a petition 
for reclassification if it has been determined that prescription status is not necessary 
for safe use of a drug.  Third, any interested party (such as patients, physicians, or 
insurance companies) that feels an Rx-to-OTC switch would be appropriate can file a 
citizen petition asking the FDA to consider changing a drug’s status (CDER, 2006).  
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The majority of switches, however, are initiated by the parent company of the drug in 
question since the manufacturer has the most access to data that can determine 
whether or not a switch is appropriate. 
  Drugs must meet certain criteria before the FDA will consider such 
reclassification.  The indications for use as an OTC drug must first be similar to the 
prescription indications, and the OTC drug must allow for easy diagnosis and 
monitoring by the patient.  Next, the drug must have positive adverse-event and drug-
interaction profiles, relatively low toxicity, as well as a low potential for abuse.  
Finally, the drug must not have characteristics that make it impractical for OTC use 
(FDA, 2005).  Figure 2.1 shows the number of OTC approvals and Rx-to-OTC 
switches per year.  According to the figure, 1996 had the most switches/new 
approvals.  This year had high profile switches in products from drug classes 
including:  
• Acid Reflux – (Zantac, Axid) 
• Smoking Cessation – (Nicorette, Nicotrol, Nicoderm)  
• Hair Growth – (Rogaine) 
• Anticandidal – (Femstat, Monistat, Gyne-Lotrimin) (Soller, 2000).   
Financing Drug Development 
Drug manufacturers are faced with increasing costs for drug development.  The 
Southern Medical Association estimates that the cost for developing and marketing a 
single pharmaceutical product has risen from $54 million in the 1970s to greater than 
$800 million in 2000 (Spruill, 2005).Many companies therefore try to extend patent 
life as long as possible to prevent any threats of competition that may drive revenues 
down.  Table 2.1 shows the change in profits after patents have expired for a few 
major drugs.  Drugs such as Claritin have a decrease in profits of nearly ninety – 
percent. 
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Figure 2.1 
OTC New Approvals, Rx-to-OTC Switches, and New Uses by Year 
(CDER, 2005) 
Table 2.2 provides recent revenues for drugs with upcoming patent expirations.  
Many drugs facing patent expiry are switched to the OTC market to protect revenues 
from generic competition.  When a drug patent is about to expire, the company 
submits a switch request in the hopes that brand recognition and loyalty cultivated 
among prescription customers will transfer to the over-the-counter market. As 
mentioned earlier, The Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 added another incentive: granting 
3 additional years of market exclusivity to drug makers if they perform the extra 
clinical trials required to gain over-the-counter approval or if they create new 
indications for use (Reynolds, 2002). Even if a drug does not receive the exclusivity 
extension, it still may be worthwhile for drug companies to move their products to the 
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OTC market to capitalize on their brand name.  In addition, companies can use the 
OTC market for these, older drugs, and open the prescription-only market for other 
new products they may have in the class, that are still under patent protection. 
Table 2.1 
Annual Revenues Before and After Patent Expiration and Generic Drug Entry  
 (Spruill, 2005)                   
Brand Name Manufacturer 
US Sales (pre-
patent expiration) 
US Sales (post-
patent expiration) 
Year 
Expired 
Claritin Schering-Plough > $3 Billion $370 Million 2002 
Prozac Eli Lilly > $2.9 Billion $480 Million 2001 
Pepcid Merck    $755 Million $110 Million 2000 
 
Table 2.2 
Blockbuster Drugs Facing Patent Expiration (Generic Drugs, 2006) 
Brand Name Manufacturer Common Uses 
Revenues in 2003  
(in - billions) 
Year of 
Expiration 
Prevacid TAP 
GERD, Peptic 
Ulcers 
$3.5 2007 
Imitrex 
Glaxo-
SmithKline 
Migraine 
Headache 
$1.1 2007 
Zyrtec and 
Zyrtec D 
Pfizer Allergies $1.4 2007 
Depakene and 
Depakote 
Abbott Seizures $0.7 2008 
Effexor and 
Effexor XR 
Wyeth Depression $2.1 2008 
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 Some manufacturers sell their drugs on both the OTC and prescription markets 
simultaneously, also known as dual status.  According to the FDA, “Dual status is 
defined as having the same molecule and the same brand name simultaneously in the 
Rx and OTC markets, but with a different strength or indication from one to the 
other.”  The three year market exclusivity available in the OTC market would still 
apply to those drugs with dual status, however, according to the FDA, this status is 
still not that well known or practiced by US domestic Rx marketers (CDER, 2006).  
While, dual regulatory status could potentially extend the market exclusivity and allow 
for utilization of brand recognition, it could also cause companies to spread their 
resources too thin over the two markets since competition would exist from both 
prescription and OTC drugs (Goldfarb, 2002). 
OTC Market 
Many patients use OTC drugs as their first attempt at treatment for illnesses. 
Some feel that the switch from prescription to OTC status of drugs drives down the 
cost of healthcare, especially for insurers since they generally do not cover the cost of 
OTC drugs.  Almost all OTC medicines can be purchased for well under $20, while 
the average price of a prescription drug is closer to $40 (CHPA, 2005). 
According to a 2005 AC Nielsen report, in 2004, OTCs accounted for over $15 
billion in sales in the U.S. retail market, excluding Wal-Mart.  Wal-Mart is excluded 
from this figure because of the unavailability of data from the company.   In 2001, the 
Consumer Healthcare Products Association (CHPA) reports, “More than 700 medicine 
products available over-the-counter today use ingredients and dosages that were 
available only by prescription less than 30 years ago.”   In the same year the CPHA 
estimated that there were more than 100,000 OTC products with approximately 1000 
active ingredients used in them in the market.  In 2003, the CHPA stated, “Since 1976, 
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almost 80 ingredients, dosages, or indications have made the ‘switch’ from 
prescription to OTC status” (CHPA, 2005).   
From 1976 to 1989, the FDA approved 39 Rx-to-OTC switches and 20 
switches just between 1990 and 1996.  Some of the switched products during this time 
period include Smoking Cessation products, such as Nicorette; Children's Advil, 
Children's Motrin, Orudis KT, and Actron all for pain relief; Femstat 3 for treating 
vaginal yeast infection; Pepcid AC, Tagamet HB, Zantac 75, and Axid AR for 
heartburn; and Rogaine for promoting hair growth (Ling, 2002).  Figure 2.2 depicts the 
total sales for OTC medications by year. 
Figure 2.2 
OTC Retail Sales by Year (excluding Wal-Mart) (CHPA, 2006) 
The OTC industry, as seen above, accounted for over $18 billion in sales in 
1999 at the peak, but continued to have sales well over $12 billion afterwards. This 
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market, however, is limited to only a few drug categories, as not all are appropriate for 
sale without physician approval.   
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Figure 2.3 
OTC Sales by Category (in Millions) (CHPA, 2006) 
Sales are broken down by drug class in the Figure 2.3.  As this figure shows, 
the cough and cold category had the most sales with a general upward trend from 2002 
– 2005 and over $2.5 billion in sales.  While sales of OTC healthcare products 
continued to be strong in 2004, they were slightly less than that of 2003. The pressures 
to recall certain COX-2 prescription painkillers and the ephedra ban deterred many 
consumers from buying as many medications.  Also, there was a decrease in major 
product innovations which constrained the growth of many types of OTC products.  
Digestive remedies, medicated skin care, eye care, wound treatments, and other 
products, however, continued to increase in 2004 (The-Infoshop, 2005). 
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Key Drug Switches 
 The December 2002 switch of Schering-Plough Corp’s Claritin (loratadine) 
into the OTC market was one of the biggest ever.  In this case, the manufacturer was 
not the one to lobby the FDA for the switch.  Instead, California-based WellPoint 
Health Networks, a third-party insurer, requested the FDA to switch the product 
because they claimed to spend millions on prescription Claritin annually. 
 Claritin, a top prescription performer, was the first non-sedating formula in the 
OTC market. First generation antihistamines, generally caused drowsiness.  The active 
ingredient of Claritin, loratadine, is considered a second generation antihistamine, and 
has non-sedating properties.  The American College of Allergy Asthma and 
Immunology (ACAAI) estimates that 44% of allergy patients using OTC products 
switch medications because of dissatisfaction with first generation antihistamine 
products. Second generation products are, however, more expensive than the first 
generation counterparts.  Generic diphenhydramine (Benadryl’s active ingredient) or 
chlorpheniramine (ChlorTrimeton’s active ingredient) cost $3 to $4 for 24-30 tablets, 
whereas the same number of Claritin tablets, in the OTC market, can cost a patient 
between $18 - $19. 
 Schering-Plough was denied the 3 year Hatch Waxman exclusivity period 
because of the company’s delays and lack of planning.  Therefore, Claritin was soon 
followed to the OTC market by competitors.  Wyeth Consumer Healthcare’s 
loratadine product, Alavert, is on store shelves and has a suggested retail price of $27 
for a 48 count package (www.drugstore.com).    The OTC sales of Claritin have been 
successful with first year sales totaling nearly $400 million and a market share of 50% 
in the allergy market. 
 Prilosec, the world’s most prescribed drug from 1996 – 2000, was also a major 
switch into the OTC market.  H2Antagonists such as Zantac and Tagamet were the 
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antacid products in the OTC market, while the more effective proton pump inhibitors 
(PPIs) were available by prescription only.  The mechanism of PPIs is different from 
earlier products in that they work by shutting down proton pumps in the stomach that 
produce acid.  Prilosec was the first of the PPIs to switch to the OTC market.   
A licensing agreement between Astra-Zeneca and Proctor & Gamble was 
created and the two companies conducted the switch of Prilosec jointly.  A great deal 
of debate took place between these companies and the FDA regarding claims, usage, 
and the risk for more serious conditions, such as ulcers and gastroesophageal reflux 
disease to go undiagnosed.  After collaboration between the two sides, however, 
Prilosec was approved for OTC sales in June 2003.  Prilosec was also given the 3 year 
Hatch Waxman market exclusivity and the first year of OTC sales were nearly $300 
million (Mahecha, 2006).  This extension applies only to the drug moving into the 
OTC market.  All other drugs, under the same name, that have not switched markets, 
are not granted this period of exclusivity. 
In the cases of both Claritin and Prilosec, the parent pharmaceutical company 
had new prescription-only products ready to be launched at the same time as the 
switch of the older drugs into the OTC market.  Both companies shifted their 
advertising expenses towards the promotion of their newer medications in order to 
move patients from the older drug to the new one.  In the case of Claritin, Schering-
Plough attempted to convert patients from using Claritin to their new prescription 
product Clarinex.  Astra-Zeneca had the newer PPI, Nexium, ready to take over the 
prescription market once Prilosec became OTC.  Schering-Plough was not as 
successful at moving patients to the newer medication because neither patients nor 
physicians found any major differences between Clarinex and the over the counter 
Claritin.  Astra-Zeneca was, however, more successful at moving patients to Nexium.  
In fact, in Prilosec’s first advertising campaign the drug became known as the “purple 
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pill”.  After Prilosec’s movement to the OTC market, Astra-Zeneca referred to 
Nexium as the “new purple pill” symbolizing the replacement on the prescription only 
market. 
Areas of Debate 
 There are three classes of drugs in which there is much debate as to whether or 
not OTC status should be approved.  Emergency Contraception was the major topic of 
debate in June 2000, when the FDA had to decide whether to sell emergency 
contraceptives over the counter. Women's-health advocates said that the move is 
overdue since the drug was available without prescription in the United Kingdom and 
Canada.  Opponents, however, argue that over-the-counter emergency contraception 
could discourage use of conventional birth control methods.   The FDA has just 
recently approved the OTC status of this drug, with some restrictions.  Emergency 
contraception will only be available to those individuals 18 years or older.  Also, the 
drug will not be stocked on store shelves, but rather behind pharmacy counters.  
 Antimicrobials were denied OTC status in December 1998 largely because of 
fears of antiviral resistance.  While there were no major concerns for individual safety, 
The Infectious Disease Drug Committee indicated that it would not support the over-
the-counter availability of antimicrobials because of the serious threat of antibiotic 
resistance.   
Statins, used to lower cholesterol levels, were also denied OTC status.  The 
FDA issued a guideline stating that lowering of cholesterol levels is not an appropriate 
indication for over-the-counter approval because physician monitoring is required.  
Most OTC products are for conditions that patients can generally detect easily.  
Hypercholesterolemia, however, may not be a condition patients can diagnose on their 
own, and therefore require physician supervision.  Concern existed in regards to the 
OTC sale of these drugs because of the possibility of improper use.  That is, those 
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individuals that do not need to lower their cholesterol may take these drugs 
unnecessarily.  In addition, these medications are not recommended for use by women 
who are pregnant.  The availability of statins on the OTC market would create the risk 
that women who were unaware of their pregnancy may take the drug and potentially 
harm themselves or their babies.  
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CHAPTER 3 
PREVIOUS LITERATURE  
This study examines how both patients and physicians react to a change in 
prescription status of a drug.   The first section of this chapter examines physician 
incentives, generally, not related to prescribing behavior, but to other physician 
decisions.  The second part of this chapter examines the impact of incentives on 
physician prescribing behavior.  The research to date that has focused on prescribing 
behavior utilizes the standard principal agent model. In terms of the research done 
here, such a model would indicate that the physician’s choice of a drug for a patient’s 
ailment should not be influenced by simple its OTC versus Rx status, but rather the 
effectiveness of the medication for the patient.  The third section examines the 
literature comparing the use of prescription and OTC drugs.   
The model in this study also predicts that patient will also react to the 
availability of an OTC medication.  That is, those patients with less severe conditions 
should choose to self-treat, leaving only those with more severe illnesses in physician 
offices.  The final section of this chapter examines how severity has been measured in 
previous studies.    
Physician Incentives 
 Barros et al (2003) create a model to test hospital production in which they 
define the output produced by the hospital as the health status of the patient. These 
authors also use physicians as the major decision makers of resource allocation.  The 
hospital based physician must balance decisions between acting as a perfect agent for 
the patient and as an agent for the hospital, whose objective is to restrain hospital 
spending.  Their model contains the utility functions of physicians and uses the 
expected health status of patients, resource allocation, and hospital financing policy as 
arguments. Their evidence shows that for physicians employed by hospitals, budget 
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setting methods and possession of third party payers are important predictors of 
resource use.  Also, the authors conclude that resource use is important in predicting 
the final health status of the patient.  
 Both Glied et al (2002) and Melichar (2007) examine the effect of financial 
incentives on physician behavior, with respect to the amount of time a physician 
spends with a patient.  Glied et al use the NAMCS to investigate the effect of managed 
care on physician time spent with the patient, while Melichar distinguishes between 
managed care and capitation.  Glied et al find a negative relationship between the 
percent of patients under HMOs seen by a physician and the average length of time 
that physician spends with a patient.  These authors do find an increased use of other 
services during a visit when there are a greater percentage of managed care patients in 
a practice.  This may indicate that physicians, who have a higher number of managed 
care patients, substitute other services for length of visit time.  Melichar, however, 
finds that it is capitation, and not just HMO status, that affects the amount of time 
physicians spend with patients. 
Physician Prescribing Behavior 
The theoretical framework used in this study models physician behavior as 
resulting from an objective function in which fee-for-service physicians have the 
incentive to provide prescriptions in order to increase the number of repeat patient 
visits which thereby increases physician profit.  The model developed here also 
indicates that capitated physicians can maximize profits by providing OTC 
medications in order to minimize resource use.   
Prescribing incentives are modeled as the outcome of a production function. 
The hypotheses drawn from this are tested by regressions in which indicators for 
providing a prescription are dependent on patient characteristics, insurance status, and 
the availability of an OTC drug for a particular diagnosis.   
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Bradford et al (2004) used a similar model in studying the impact of direct-to-
consumer advertising on physician prescribing behavior.  Their output measure was 
the number of prescriptions for COX-2 inhibitors (used for treatment of osteoarthritis).  
The authors used the flow of patients with osteoarthritis as an input to capture the 
patient demand function for office visits.  Patient demand, as explained by the authors, 
is influenced by the price of office visits, patient characteristics and the exposure to 
advertising.  This study found that direct-to-consumer advertising of certain drugs 
increase prescriptions for that drug as well as others.     
 In another study of prescribing behavior, Iizuka (2004) examines physician-
patient agency in the prescription drug market of Japan.  Doctors in Japan provide 
diagnostic services to patients and dispense drugs as well.  This creates an incentive to 
induce demand since doctors can choose drugs based on the extent of profit they 
obtain, rather than safety or cost.  The data used in this paper indicate that physicians’ 
choices for drugs are significantly affected by the profit margin they earn. 
In a 1998 paper on prescribing behavior, Stern and Trajtenberg use the theory 
of physician agency to examine the implications of physician authority in 
pharmaceutical prescribing decisions.  According to their article physicians’ expertise 
in prescribing relies on two assets: diagnostic skills and information about drugs.  The 
authors define concentration of prescribing behavior as the degree of variation in 
drugs that physicians use.  That is, those physicians that use a wide range of drugs or 
vary their choice of drugs by patient, for a particular illness, are not very concentrated.  
Those that choose their prescriptions amongst the same few medications, for most of 
their patients, are considered to have a concentrated portfolio of drugs.  They find 
substantial variation in the degree to which physician prescribing is concentrated and 
this concentration is correlated with observable drug characteristics.  These authors 
use the NAMCS survey to find that physicians who are concentrated in their 
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prescribing portfolio tend to prescribe those drugs with high levels of advertising, low 
prices, and high market shares.  These features allow highly concentrated physicians 
to invest the minimum required resources to provide care for patients with the least 
overall harm.   
Hellerstein, in her 1998 article, studied how physicians decide to give patients 
either generic or trade-name drugs.  She specifically tests whether or not physicians 
are more likely to give generic drugs, because they are less expensive, to those 
patients without drug coverage.  The author explains that if there were no costs to 
physicians for prescribing drugs, physicians would act as perfect agents for patients.  
There are, however, costs to the physician such as the time cost of learning about new 
drugs.  Therefore, physicians may choose a prescription based on what is more 
convenient for them, rather than what is best for the patient.  This paper utilizes the 
1989 NAMCS survey.  While the author does find that physicians are important agents 
in the prescription decision, she is unable to decipher why some physicians are more 
likely to give generics than others.  The only statistically significant finding regarding 
insurance in this paper showed that physicians with a large proportion of HMO 
patients are more likely to give out generic prescriptions.  As the author explains, this 
may be due to cost control methods implemented by managed care companies which 
make physicians somewhat financially responsible for their prescribing decisions.  The 
author concludes that it is not the individual patient’s insurance type that determines 
the physician’s prescribing behavior, but rather the distribution of insurance types 
across all patients that the physician sees. 
There are many studies that focus on how managed care influences 
prescription choices amongst physicians.  In general, the majority of the studies that 
explore issues with managed care and prescribing behavior focus on the decision 
between brand name drugs and generics. The following articles, examine the financial 
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incentives of physicians to some extent, but they either look at a drug category as a 
whole, when one product in it moves to the OTC market or they examine the financial 
incentives of the patient and the physician in general prescribing, without examining a 
specific drug class.   
Managed Care Incentives 
 Hillman et al (1999) estimated the impact of patient financial incentives on the 
use of prescription drugs while physicians had differing payment mechanisms.  The 
study included some physicians who were compensated fee-for-service through the 
Independent Practice Association (IPA) model, while others were reimbursed by 
capitation under network-model Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO). Under 
IPAs physicians did not bear financial risk for medications, whereas with HMOs 
physicians did bear risk for their prescribing decisions.  The results from this study 
show that higher patient copayments for prescription drugs are associated with lower 
drug spending in models in which physicians are not at risk for drug costs.  Higher 
copays for patients do not, however, have much effect in models where physicians 
bear some financial risk for prescribing behavior.  A limitation of this study is that it 
uses claims data and therefore the authors are not able to determine what the physician 
prescribed and how this may have differed from what was actually provided in the 
pharmacy.  This is especially important since some plans and some states allow the 
pharmacist to fill the prescription with the lowest cost drug.  If this is the case, the 
effect of financial incentives for the physician may be ambiguous.   
 Mortimer (1998) used the NAMCS from 1991 – 1993 and marketing data from 
IMS America to determine the demand characteristics of prescription drugs and how 
they are influenced by types of insurance.  The author uses two therapeutic markets: 
antidepressants and beta blockers; and creates a mixed logit model that estimates the 
probability of a drug being prescribed.  The explanatory variables in this paper include 
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drug characteristics; patient and physician characteristics; and average drug price.  The 
main explanatory variable used here, however, is the interaction of drug price and 
insurance type, such as HMO, Medicaid, or Private Insurance.  The author finds that 
managed care is effective in increasing a physician’s awareness of drug costs.  The 
results of this paper show that demand for drugs in managed care sectors is more price 
elastic than in other sectors.  Interestingly, this author finds demand in the self-paid 
sector to be the least price elastic. 
Prescription to OTC Switch 
The following studies examine changes, once a drug moves from the 
prescription to the OTC market.  While this literature is helpful in guiding the 
hypotheses of this study, little research thus far has examined how physician 
prescribing behavior is affected by OTC switches. In fact, even amongst most of those 
studies in which prescription and OTC drug use is analyzed, the markets for the two 
sets of drugs were different than what is being studied here.  Previously, OTC and 
prescription drugs were not considered as substitutes for one another, as the 
prescription drugs were always stronger.  This study adds to the literature by being 
able to utilize the unique situation in which equivalent drugs exist on the prescription 
and OTC market simultaneously.  In the research here Claritin and Prilosec attained 
OTC status while therapeutic equivalents remained Rx only. 
 Andrade et al (1999) indicate that in the setting of managed care organizations, 
there were reductions in the prescriptions for H2 receptor antagonists given to patients 
with chronic conditions after the availability of some OTC versions of these products.  
This suggests that physicians are under certain pressures in a MC setting to alter 
prescribing behavior when drugs go OTC.  It was during this time, though, that Proton 
Pump Inhibitors entered the market, and therefore the study may fail to capture the 
movement physicians made to the newer, more effective drugs.  Since this study 
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looked only at managed care and did not compare to FFS, the two effects are possibly 
confounded.      
In her 1989 article titled “Substitution Between Prescribed and Over-the-
Counter Medications” Leibowitz became one of the first to research OTC use in an 
experimental setting.  Leibowitz used data from the Rand Health Insurance 
Experiment in which patients were assigned to health insurance plans with varied 
levels of medical cost sharing.  The experimental design allowed the author to not only 
examine patients with different relative out-of-pocket payments for prescription drugs 
compared to OTCs, but she also was able to study areas in which access to physicians 
services were varied.  This article hypothesizes, as do others described later, that OTC 
drugs may be used as a substitute for prescription drugs and/or a substitute to formal 
medical care, i.e. physician office visits.  With the data from this experiment, 
Leibowitz hypothesized that those with less generous health care plans, that is, those 
plans that required higher out-of-pocket copays, would substitute OTC medications 
for prescription ones.  Also, the author hypothesized that OTC drugs would be a 
substitute for physician office visits for those that did not have convenient access to 
physicians, as well as for those with high wages, in order to spend their time at work, 
rather than at a physician office.  Similarly, when medical care is less available, for 
example with uninsured patients, OTC drugs should be used as substitutes as well.   
An interesting finding of this article was that there were infrequent purchases 
of OTC drugs overall: on average less than one purchase per-person per-year.  The 
author suggests that this may be consistent with high levels of OTC use if these drugs 
are purchased in large quantities and stored for later use.  In terms of health insurance 
difference, Leibowitz found that with drug coverage, participants purchased more 
prescription and over-the-counter medications.  Those patients facing cost sharing 
purchased fewer OTC drugs than those in the free plan.  Females, children, and those 
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patients with more education were more likely to buy OTC drugs.  In general, this 
study found no evidence of substitution between OTC and prescription drugs.  While 
this article is an important one because of its key experimental design, it was also 
conducted in a time where the drugs available by prescription were generally not in 
competition with those available OTC.  Prescription drugs were stronger and more 
effective than the OTC products.  Since 2002, however, the situation in some drug 
markets has changed considerably.  The availability of equivalent drugs on the 
prescription and OTC market could potentially lead to a different result if this study 
were conducted today. 
Hollenbeak in his 1999 Health Affairs article used a game theory model to 
determine the optimal time, in relation to generic competition, to switch a drug from 
the prescription to OTC market.  He determines that switching of drugs occur if the 
probability that an application will be approved by the FDA is strictly positive and the 
OTC market is characterized by first-mover advantages.  He shows that firms switch 
their products into the OTC market in response to the threat of generic competition 
when patents are close to expiration. Pharmaceutical firms know that if they do not 
switch into the OTC market first, the generic may initiate the switch and become the 
first mover.     
 Harrington (2002) found that the conversion of prescription products to OTC 
availability can have an impact on prescription drug benefit costs and on total health 
care costs.  According to Harrington, in 2000, the U.S. was estimated to spend $19.1 
billion on OTC drugs expanding from $10.2 billion in 1991.  While approximately 
600 of the currently available OTC products were available only by prescription 20 
years ago, less than 2 cents of every dollar spent annually on health care in the U.S is 
spent on OTC drugs.  Harrington also estimates that almost $13 billion a year is saved 
by consumers when they use medications switched from prescription only to OTC 
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status.  Furthermore, she finds that, 63% of total U.S. OTC sales in 1996 were from 
prescription to OTC switched products.  She illustrates that for those patients with 
drug coverage, out-of-pocket payments for prescription drugs were less than the prices 
for OTC products.  She also found that OTC approval was associated with elevated 
medical service use.   
 In their 2002 review of literature, Shih et al proposed that according to 
economic theory a firm that is protected by a patent will price aggressively in the OTC 
market.  The OTC markets will likely be more elastic, however, due to a lack of 
insurance coverage.  Therefore, drug manufacturers would be likely to charge a lower 
price in the OTC market. 
 In his 1992 article, Temin analyzed data from the cough and cold drug market 
and hypothesized that once a drug in this category moves to OTC, the number of 
people seeing physicians for the common cold should decrease since they can self 
medicate.  In fact, even those that have more serious conditions will be able to ease 
some of their symptoms by using more readily available medications, and will 
therefore delay any trips to the physician’s office.  On average, Temin found that 
physician visits for the common cold fell by 110,000 a year and he estimated the 
savings plus the consumer surplus from this to be $770 million. 
 Shiffman et al (1997) tried to estimate the impact of allowing nonprescription 
sales of nicotine replacement therapies in the U.S. using sales and marketing data 
before and after the OTC switch of these products.  These authors found that since 
1996, when the sale of nicotine medications went to the OTC market, utilization of 
these products increased by 152% compared to when these medications were available 
by prescription only.  They find that the increased availability of nicotine medications 
have significantly increased the number of former smokers. 
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 Thorndike et al (2002) also examined whether or not the change in nicotine 
replacement therapy sales to the OTC market, from prescription only status, affected 
smoking cessation.  These authors found no significant change over time in the 
proportion of smokers who used nicotine replacement therapy.  They did, however, 
find racial and ethnic differences in the use of these products in the OTC market.  
According to these results, fewer non-Whites used nicotine replacement therapy after 
the switch to OTC, while the proportion of Whites using these products did not change 
significantly.  They therefore concluded that there appear to be other barriers to the 
use of nicotine replacement products besides access to a physician among minority 
smokers. 
 Many other papers have looked at the impact of switching drugs from 
prescription only to OTC status in specific product markets.  Temin also examined the 
hydrocortisone market in 1983 and found that the switch of these drugs increased 
consumer surplus in the years immediately after the switch.  Gurwtiz et al (1995) 
examined the vaginal antifungal agent market and found that the number of 
prescriptions fell by 6.42% creating an annual savings of $42,528 in medication costs.  
These authors did not find any significant change in the number of physician visits.   
 Lipsky and Waters (1999) also researched the vaginal antifungal product 
market and found that the use of these agents have increased since their conversion 
into the OTC market.  According to this article, sales of these agents were about 13.7 
million units per year as prescription products and jumped to more than 25 million 
units per year once the agents started moving into the OTC market.  These authors list 
patient autonomy and reduced health care costs as advantages of the switch of drugs 
from prescription to OTC status. The authors include the potential for unnecessary use 
of the agents as well as the development of resistant strains of bacteria causing 
infections as disadvantages of the switch of products into the OTC market. 
  46 
 
 Kalish et al (1997) found negligible differences in health care costs between 
Rx and OTC drugs for treatment in initial episodes of dyspepsia or acid reflux when 
examining the market for H2 receptor antagonists.  Andrade et al (1999) did find an 
annual savings of $187,212 for managed care plans in medications costs for chronic 
treatment of dyspepsia when looking at the same market in 1999.  These authors found 
a decrease in the number of prescriptions by 1.5 prescriptions per chronic user after 
the OTC products were introduced and they did not find significant changes in the 
number of physician visits. 
 Ling et al (2002) examined the impact of direct-to-consumer advertising and 
physician oriented marketing on the sales of prescription and OTC versions of 
antiulcer medications.  These authors find spillover effects of marketing for Rx drugs 
on same brand OTC versions.  They also find that marketing intensity increases with 
order of entry in the OTC market and that demand elasticities are dependant on order 
of entry.  Ling et el also mention that since OTC products are primarily “experience” 
rather than “search” goods, brand loyalty is strong, and therefore, perceived switching 
costs may be high.   
Patient Severity 
 The theoretical model of this study predicts that the severity of patients in 
physician offices should decline after the availability of an OTC medication.  This is 
because those patients with less severe symptoms should be able to successfully self-
treat with the OTC.  Since these patients drop out of the sample in physician offices, 
the overall case mix of patients should become more severe.  Severity is a difficult 
characteristic to measure without knowing the exact nature of the illness, other 
problems the patient may be having, tests results, and other specifics about the patient.  
Nonetheless, other researchers have tried to measure severity using indirect methods.   
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 Severity can be defined differently depending on the discipline of the 
healthcare provider.  Physicians for example may categorize severity based on the 
impact a disease has on physiology, while a therapist may instead use functionality or 
activities of daily living to determine the severity of an illness.  There are three 
components that are most used in the measurement of severity, including: 
1. Functional ability of individual to conduct daily activities of living. 
2. Cost to society 
3. Physiologic, morphologic, and biologic derangements 
 Many computerized programs have been developed in an effort to standardize 
severity measurement.  Some of these programs include Acute Physiology and 
Chronic Health Organization System, the Computerized Severity Index, Disease 
Staging, MedisGroups, and Patient Management Categories.  The basis for all of these 
programs is either physiology or resource use (Petryshen et al, 1995).   
 Many of these measures calculate severity based on the likelihood of a death 
for patients already admitted to hospitals.  MedisGroups uses clinical data to predict 
the probability of an in-hospital death and creates a score based on sixty-four disease 
groups.  Physiology scores also calculate severity using clinical data, but for patients 
in intensive care units.  Disease stating, another measure, predicts the probability of an 
in-hospital death using the discharge summary.  Finally, All Patient Refined Diagnosis 
Related Groups utilizes patient discharge summaries as well, but to estimate total 
hospital charges, rather than the probability of death (Iezonni, 1995). 
 While Rice (2004) examines the differences in quality of care between 
managed care and fee-for-service physicians, she also examines the intensity of 
treatment provided by the physician.  It is assumed here that greater treatment 
intensity is needed for patients with more severe symptoms.  A similar model is 
therefore used here to assess changes in patient case mix after the availability of an 
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OTC.  Rice analyzes the NAMCS data for 1997 – 2000 and uses five instruments to 
measure the intensity of treatment including:  consultation length (measured in 
minutes of physician and patient contact time); number of physical exams; number of 
tests; number of imaging procedures; and prescriptions ordered.  The author finds that, 
compared to FFS physicians, those physicians under managed care spent less time 
with their patients, ordered fewer physical exams, and prescribed fewer medications, 
but they also ordered more tests and imaging procedures.  She finds that overall FFS 
physicians provided slightly more intense treatment.  Rice distinguishes between 
acute, chronic routine, and chronic flare-up patients, and determines that acute are the 
least severe, while chronic patients have a higher severity of illness. 
 Hillman et al (1999), as described earlier, study the impact of patient financial 
incentives on the use of prescription drugs given varying physician payment 
mechanisms.  In their research, the authors adjust for patient case-mix by using 
Chronic Disease Scores (CDS).  The authors compare the use of Ambulatory Care 
Groups (ACGs) and CDS and found that CDS was more appropriate.  ACGs use 
ambulatory visit diagnoses while CDS uses drug categories to identify comorbidities.  
The authors chose CDS because it explained more variation in drug spending for their 
data.  CDS is also based on filled prescriptions indicating that the physician and the 
patient both felt that the illness was serious enough to treat with medication.  In 
addition, CDS identifies comorbid conditions in those patients without ambulatory 
visits since patients can fill prescriptions without actually seeing a provider.  While the 
data used here does not allow for this level of analysis of prescriptions, the article 
provides insight on how case-mix can be measured.   
 Glied et al (2002) also examine treatment intensities in their work studying the 
effects of managed care on physician behavior.  Similar to the model used by Rice 
(2004), these authors use four measures for treatment intensity including: length of 
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visit; number of tests ordered; number of medications ordered; and whether a return 
visit was scheduled by the physician.  Using the NAMCS 1993 – 1996, the authors 
find that on an individual level, patients under managed care receive less intense 
treatment as compared to FFS. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THEORETICAL MODEL 
The following theoretical model is used to draw testable implications about 
how physicians’ prescribing behavior reacts to the movement of prescription 
medication to the over the counter market. The interactions of three main players in 
the health care industry are modeled, including: patients, insurance companies, and 
physicians to anticipate physician prescription behavior under two different 
reimbursement schemes. 
Patients 
 In this model, patients seek care, advice and prescription authorization from 
physicians. There are two main types of patients; Type I has an illness and sees a 
physician for consultation, advice, and treatment.  Type II also has an illness, but it 
may have just occurred recently and may be short term.  These patients would have 
otherwise needed to see a physician, but after the availability of an OTC, they can 
choose to self-treat rather than spend the time or money on a physician office visit.  
When a drug moves from prescription to over-the-counter status, Type II no longer has 
to see the physician.  Since Type II patients may have conditions that are temporary, 
they can bypass the physician and self treat using the OTC market.  Let θ represent 
patient severity and assume that (θ)I > (θ)II since Type I requires physician expertise 
for diagnosis.  The severity of Type I patients is also higher because their illnesses are 
likely to be long term, requiring lengthier periods for treatment and a greater use of 
resources.  In addition, it is possible that Type I patients are also likely to have co-
morbid conditions, making diagnosis more difficult.  Patients with more comorbidities 
or those with symptoms that are more difficult to diagnose may require a greater 
number of health care resources for diagnosis since their conditions may point to 
multiple illnesses.  Some Type I patients may have initially tried to self-treat with 
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OTC medication, but were unsuccessful.  For these patients, their conditions could 
have been complex or severe enough such that OTCs did not work; or they may have 
misdiagnosed their conditions because of other co-morbidities.  After a drug moves to 
OTC status, the probability that Type II patients will see the physician is 0 since they 
can now self-treat.  Therefore only Type I is seen in physician offices and this shifts 
the distribution for the severity of cases seen in physician offices towards the right 
once a drug moves OTC, a testable hypothesis. 
 Given the above assumptions, the movement of a drug to the OTC market 
creates an efficient sorting system for the health care industry. Since those patients 
with less severe conditions should self-treat, only those patients that need to see 
physicians should actually make office visits.  This system can eliminate unnecessary 
physician visits, thereby reducing the cost of care.  If all patients use OTC medications 
as their first method of treatment, those with less severe conditions are successfully 
treated with these drugs, while those with more severe conditions can later see a 
physician.  In addition, the patients with more severe conditions could at least 
accomplish a temporary relief of symptoms until they can directly see their health care 
providers.   
Insurance Companies 
 Insurance companies are profit maximizing entities. Physician prescribing 
behavior enters the per patient profit function for fee for service contracts as follows: 
πi = P – C(q) 
where P is the premium revenue and C is the cost of treatment, which is a function of 
the amount of medical services consumed, q.  In this case, only the use of medications 
as consumed medical services is considered, thus:   
q = z 
where z = the number of medications used.  z is defined as: 
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z = p + otc 
where p is the total number of prescription medications and otc is the total number of 
OTC medications.  Thus, C(z) is the cost of medications; C(p) is the cost of 
prescription medications and C(otc) is the cost of over the counter medications.  
Therefore per patient profits are equal to: 
πi = P – C(p) – C(otc) 
It is assumed that C(otc) = 0 since insurance companies do not cover OTC drugs, 
which gives us per patient profits as: 
πi = P – C(p) 
Some insurance companies create contracts with physicians to align their 
incentives with those of the company by giving only fixed payments per patient per 
year.  This puts the physician at financial risk for all care provided.  In these, most 
extreme cases of capitation, the profit function per patient for the insurance company 
is: 
πi = P – a 
where a is the capitated fixed payment per patient.  This remains unchanged regardless 
of whether a prescription or OTC drug is provided since the payment made to the 
physician is always a.  The incentives of the insurance company will enter into 
understanding physician prescribing behavior in the next section. 
Physicians 
 The physician market is different from any other type of business in a number 
of important ways. For example, while physicians have financial incentives to 
maximize profits, they are also concerned for their patients’ health.  Third party payers 
set prices and try to influence treatment decisions, but yet physicians are able to 
induce their own demand to a certain extent because of the asymmetry of knowledge 
between the physician, patient, and third party payer. 
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 It is assumed that the only care provided by physicians is that of providing 
medications.  Here, physicians are thought to be interested both in their own profits, 
πpz, and the benefits to patients, Bz. Where z is the proportion of medications given to 
patients and is normalized to 1.   
 The physician maximizes the following utility function: 
Max U[πp(z), B(z)] 
assuming:  
z = ∑ (x + (1-x)) 
where x = fraction of OTC drugs and 1-x = fraction of prescription drugs 
 As agents for their patients, and because they are bound by their ethical code, 
physicians typically care about patients and their welfare.  In addition, physicians can 
maximize their own profits when they perform well and create good reputations.  This 
then affects the number of new patients coming in for office visits, the loyalty of 
established patients, as well as the number of referrals from other colleagues, all of 
which directly impact physician profits. 
 The balance between health care utilization and physician profits depends on 
the reimbursement arrangement between the physician and the insurance company.  
With Fee-For-Service arrangements, profits are maximized when maximum health 
services are provided.  Under capitation, however, the minimization of resources leads 
to profit maximization.   
 A physician’s profits per patient visit, assuming Fee-for-Service, are given by: 
πpz = Rz – Cz 
where Rz is revenue per patient visit and Cz is the time cost of providing medications 
per patient visit.  Since no financial burden is placed on the physician for either 
prescription or OTC drugs other than the time cost of seeing the patient, the equations 
for both prescription and OTC medications are the same. 
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 Under capitation the profit equation per patient visit is given by: 
πpz = a – Cp 
where a is the per member per month fixed capitation payment to the provider from 
the insurance company; and Cp is physician costs which can be broken down into costs 
of the visit, C(N), and costs of providing medications, C(z).  
That is: 
Cp = C(N)+ C(z) 
Therefore physician profits are also depicted as: 
πpz = a – C(N)  - C(z) 
 Providing a prescription drug to a patient will count against physician profits 
under a capitated arrangement since the physician will have to deduct these costs from 
his/her fixed payment.  Providing an over the counter drug, however, will not be 
deducted, because they are typically not covered by health plans, and will instead 
allow the physician to keep more of the fixed payment.   
 The cost of medications can be further divided into the costs of prescription 
and the cost of over-the-counter drugs.  Therefore: 
Cz = Cx + C1-x 
 For prescription drugs only, capitated physician profits per patient are: 
πp = a – C(N) – C(1-x) 
The capitated profits from over the counter medications are: 
πpx = a – C(N) – C(x) 
where Cx = 0 for the physician since the cost of OTCs are fully paid for by the patient. 
Therefore: 
πpx = a – C(N) 
 For the purposes of this paper, the utilization of health care services is 
examined by looking at specific drugs in both the prescription and over-the-counter 
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markets.  The incentives for providing either a prescription or OTC drug are also 
determined by the legal characteristics of each.  Since the physician can require future 
office visits with prescription drugs, choosing these medications can directly impact 
revenue.  Physicians can induce demand for office visits by asking patients to come in 
for monitoring or by requiring an office visit to get refills.   
 OTC medications, however, do not require physician authorization.  Therefore 
when a physician advises a patient to take and OTC drug, the patient is not obligated 
to come back to the physician for treatment of the same illness.  Instead, patients can 
purchase OTC drugs on their own and self treat that particular illness.   
 This theory assumes that there is an asymmetry of information between 
physicians and patients.  Physicians know which drugs are appropriate for their 
patients and they also know which drugs are substitutes for one another.  While 
patients may find drugs for their illness sold on the over the counter market, they may 
not know that these drugs are equivalent in strength and/or effectiveness as their 
prescription counter parts.  Even if patients do have this information, they may still 
prefer the prescription drug to the OTC one, if they have insurance.  With drug 
coverage patients could have lower out of pocket costs since they are usually 
responsible for modest copay with a prescription drug while they would instead be 
required to pay the full retail price of an OTC.  
Fee for Service Plans 
 Physicians maximize utility by maximizing the number of office visits, under a 
fee for service reimbursement scheme: 
Max U[πpx, Bx] 
where πp is the physician profit per patient from providing medications, and B is the 
benefit to the patient from medications, and x is the total number of OTC medications. 
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 Physician profits per patient are determined by the revenues, R, per patient 
visit minus the cost of per patient visit, C, times the total number of office visits, N.  
As a physician provides more OTC drugs the likelihood for further visits is less since 
the patient does not have to come in for refill visits.  In addition, the physician does 
not have to induce further visits in order to monitor the patient for adverse effects of 
the prescription drug.  Therefore, assuming 
 
 
where N is the number of office visits and x is the proportion of OTC medications 
provided: 
N = f( x-1) 
dN = - f’(x-2) dx 
 
 
assuming  f’( 1/ x2) >  0  
 
 
The above equations prove N and x to be inversely related.  Therefore, as a 
physician provides more OTC medications, there should be a decrease in patient visits.   
The profits for a FFS physician are as follows: 
πp = N[R – C] 
where, again, the number of patient visits, N; R is the amount of revenues from a visit, 
and C is the cost of a visit.  The derivative with respect to N is: 
πp = N[R – C] 
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assuming [R – C] > 0 
 
  As expected, the above equations show that physician profits and patient visits 
are positively related.  That is, as a FFS physician has more patient visits, s/he should 
expect more profits. 
Claim 1: 
For FFS physicians: 
 
For all patients, the FFS physician is more likely to provide a prescription drug 
in order to bring that patient back into the office and generate more revenue.  Also, 
many insured patients have drug coverage in their insurance plans and not only prefer 
prescription medications, but expect them.  By providing a prescription, physicians 
can satisfy their patients, who may then refer their friends and family to this physician, 
again to generate more revenue.  Therefore, assuming: 
 
and thereby: 
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assuming [R - C] > 0 (With zero fixed costs and zero economies of scale.) 
 
  
 Therefore, as a FFS physician provides more OTC drugs, s/he can expect 
fewer patient visits which will lead to fewer physician profits as well.  It can, 
therefore, be understood that a FFS physician stands to maximize profits, by providing 
patients with prescription drugs, rather than OTC.   
Capitated Plans 
 Physicians under capitation similarly maximize their utility function: 
Max U[πp(x), B(x)] 
Physician profits for the capitated physician are the fixed capitated payment, a, minus 
the cost of office visits, minus the total cost of prescription drugs.  The cost of 
providing OTC drugs is zero, as described earlier, and is therefore not included in the 
following equation.  
πp = a – C(N) - C(1–x) 
where a is the capitated payment and (1-x) is the proportion of prescription drugs; 
When deriving the profit function with respect to N the equation is: 
πp = a – C(N) - C(1–x) 
δπp =(-C )( δN) 
 
assuming C >0 
 
Incentives under capitation are to minimize utilization of resources.  Therefore, 
an increasing number of office visits leads to decreasing physician profits. 
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Claim 2: 
For capitated physicians: 
 
Under capitation, the physicians have the incentive to provide OTC drugs for 
all of their patients, since patients will not have to return to the physician for refill 
authorization.  By providing an OTC drug, the physician can minimize the costs 
deducted from his fixed payment for the patient since the patient can self medicate 
without coming in for an office visit; and the cost of this medication will not be 
deducted from the fixed payment.   
Taking the derivative of the capitated physician’s profit function with respect 
to x, the fraction of OTC medications (with 1 – x equal to the fraction of prescription 
drugs): 
πp = a – C(N) - C(1 –x) 
δπp = – C(-1))δx 
δπp = C(δx) 
 
 
assuming: C > 0 
 
 
 As physicians in a capitated arrangement provide more over the counter drugs, 
they can reduce the number of office visits for each patient.  That will allow 
physicians with this style of reimbursement to maximize utility as resource utilization 
is minimized, and profits are therefore increased.   
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Hypotheses 
 In summary, the following are testable hypotheses from this model. 
1. After a medication in a particular class of drug moves over the counter, the 
overall case mix of patients physicians see in their offices will have higher 
severity. 
2. In an attempt to maximize profits, FFS physicians will provide prescription 
drugs instead of over-the-counter substitutes for patients. 
3. Capitated physicians will minimize costs and patient visits by advising patients 
to take more over-the-counter medications, thereby maximizing profits. 
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CHAPTER 5 
EMPIRICAL MODEL 
The reaction to the availability of an OTC medication of both physicians and 
patients is empirically modeled here.  The first section of this chapter outlines the 
analysis for the physician group, while the second section examines changes in the 
patient case mix seen in physician offices.   
Physicians 
The theory established in the previous chapter portrays physicians as profit 
maximizing entities.  This model provides a link between the likelihood that a 
physician orders a prescription or over-the-counter drug for his/her patients and 
physician profits, depending on how they are reimbursed for their services.  The 
following empirical model studies how physicians differ in their prescribing behavior 
based on capitation versus FFS, both before and after the availability of an OTC. 
How Number of Prescriptions Impacts Revenues 
 When physicians provide patients with prescription drugs, those patients must 
visit the physicians’ offices repeatedly in order to get refills; to be monitored for side 
effects; or to change to another type of prescription medication for that particular 
illness.  Therefore, by advising patients to take a prescription medication, physicians 
increase the number of visits from those patients.  When providing over-the-counter 
medications, however, physicians cannot impact future visits as directly since patients 
do not need physician approval to get these drugs.  Instead, patients can bypass 
physician offices and obtain these medications on their own.   
Capitated Versus FFS Physicians 
 The financial incentives for capitated physicians are very different from those 
of non-capitated physicians.  Non-capitated physicians generally receive payments on 
a fee-for-service scale from third party payers.  Therefore, as the number of services 
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provided increases, the payments these physicians receive increase as well.  Capitated 
physicians, however, receive a fixed payment for their services, generally per member 
per month.  The capitated physician then must deduct any services provided from this 
fixed amount.  This creates financial risk for the physician, and creates the incentive to 
minimize costs.  A capitated physician, thus, will prefer, in terms of profit motives, to 
minimize the number of future patient visits.  By providing more over-the-counter 
drugs, in place of prescription counterparts, the capitated physician can decrease the 
likelihood of repeated patient visits for the same illness.   
 Capitated physicians also face the incentive to minimize the cost of care by 
providing the lowest cost form of therapy.  Amongst medications, these physicians 
would be responsible for the cost of prescription medications. OTC medications, 
however, are paid fully by the patient.  This thereby creates a greater incentive 
amongst capitated physicians, as compared to FFS, to provide these drugs.  
 There are variations in the degree to which physicians are held financially 
responsible under capitated arrangements.  In some cases, only the administrative 
costs for an office visit are deducted from the capitated payment, while the insurance 
company pays for all other treatments.  In other cases, however, the total cost of care 
including: prescription medications, lab tests, and other exams, may be deducted from 
the capitated payment.  For the purposes of making predictions from the model here, 
however, it will be assumed that under capitation physicians are held fully financially 
responsible for their prescription decisions.  Under drug plans for both capitation and 
FFS, patients face copays for their prescription drug use.  It is assumed here that 
patients under both types of plans face similar drug coverage and copays; and 
therefore no differences in these are modeled here. 
 The model used here compares how capitated physicians vary in their 
prescribing decisions from FFS physicians.  The two types of reimbursement methods 
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are also compared before and after the availability of an OTC medication.  Table 5.1 
helps depict how this will be empirically tested. 
Table 5.1 
Capitation vs. FFS Before and After OTC 
  FFS Capitation 
After OTC 
 
A 
 
B 
 
Before OTC 
 
C 
 
D 
 
Where A = FFS After OTC availability 
 B = Capitation After OTC availability 
 C = FFS Before OTC availability 
 D = Capitation Before OTC availability 
The equation that has been set up to estimate physician behavior when a drug 
moves from prescription to over the counter is as follows: 
Y = β0 + β1Capitation + β2AfterOTC + β3 (Capitation * AfterOTC) + β4 Xi + β5 Uj + ε 
Where Y = The likelihood of a prescription in the drug class being examined 
 Capitation = Physician with capitated payments in the Before OTC period 
 AfterOTC = FFS Physicians in the After OTC Period 
 Capitated*AfterOTC = Capitated Physicians in the After OTC Period. 
 Xi = Patient Characteristics 
 Uj = Physician Characteristics 
 Both B and D from the above table include capitation while B and A include 
the after OTC period. The interaction of Capitation and AfterOTC is, therefore, 
depicted by B.  Hence, the only variable missing from the table is C.  The regression 
therefore uses this variable, FFS in the Before OTC, period as the comparison group. 
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Predictions of Physician Behavior 
 For both the allergy and acid reflux class, the above regression is carried out 
such that Y is first equal to the likelihood of any prescription in the drug class.  The 
analysis is further carried where Y is then equal to the likelihood of being prescribed 
one of each of the other competing brand name drugs in the class.  
 Capitated physicians are expected to utilize the least costly form of treatment 
as compared to FFS.  Before the availability of an OTC drug, capitated physicians 
may use prescriptions at least as much as FFS, since medications could be less 
expensive than other forms of treatment, depending on the illness category.   Amongst 
medication choice, it is expected that capitated physicians will use older prescription 
products more than FFS in the before OTC period, as these should be less expensive 
than the newer medications.   
 After an OTC is available, it is expected that those FFS physicians that 
previously utilized the drug that changed status, will now use other medications that 
remain prescription-only, in order to maximize their own profits.  That is, FFS 
physicians will redistribute their patients towards one of the other brands in the 
category that remain on the prescription market, rather than use the new OTC drug. 
 The expectation is that capitated physicians will be more likely than FFS in the 
after OTC period to use the new OTC medication.  OTCs are less expensive and 
therefore, can be used by capitated physicians to minimize costs, especially since 
physicians would not be held financially responsible for providing these drugs to 
patients.  In the after OTC period, it is therefore expected that capitated physicians 
should decrease their usage of all prescription drugs.  Some of these physicians that 
previously used other brand name medications are expected to switch their patients to 
the new OTC.  A decrease in the likelihood of all prescription medications should be 
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expected for capitated physicians, after the availability of an OTC as compared to 
FFS.     
Patient Severity 
 The second part of this study examines how patients change their behavior 
after the availability of an OTC.  That is, this research questions if patients that have 
less severe symptoms choose to self-treat after the availability of an OTC, as a 
substitute to visiting physician offices.  If there is a change in patient behavior, a 
noticeable change should also occur in the case mix of patients seen in physician 
offices.  It is hypothesized in this model that because those with minor symptoms can 
self treat, only those with more severe conditions will be seen in physician offices 
after the availability of an OTC. 
  Severity, here, is measured using the length of time a patient has had 
symptoms.  Acute patients are defined as those that have had symptoms for less than 
three months.  Chronic routine patients include those that have had symptoms for 
more than three months, while chronic flare-up includes those with symptoms that 
have lasted for more than three months, but are suddenly exacerbated.  It is assumed 
that acute patients are the least severe of the three types, since their symptoms have 
been occurring for the shortest time period.  Chronic conditions are thought of as 
being more severe since there is generally a longer time spent on treatment and an 
increased probability of long-term medication use.   
 The likelihood of a visit to a specialist physician is also used as a measure for 
severity.  With an increase in severity of patient case mix, specialists may be utilized 
more after the availability of an OTC.  Primary care physician may also have a 
decreased threshold in referring patients to specialists, since many patients may have 
already tried the OTC drug that is chemically equivalent to the prescription-only 
products, which would have otherwise been used as the first line of treatment.  
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 In the empirical model here, we use the type of patient as the dependent 
variable, and examine the impact on the number of office visits from each of these 
patient types after of availability of an OTC.   
 The model used is as follows: 
Y = β0 + β1AfterOTC + β2 Xi + β3 Uj + ε 
Where Y = Type of patient (Acute, Chronic Routine, or Chronic Flare-up) or  
        Specialist Physician 
After OTC = the period after which an OTC is available in the drug class 
Xi = Patient Characteristics 
Uj = Physician Characteristics 
 This model allows for the comparison of the patient type before and after the 
availability of an OTC.  That is, this model aims to predict the likelihood of a 
physician office visit from an acute, chronic routine, or chronic flare-up patient after 
an OTC is available, to compare with the before OTC time period.  This model is then 
repeated using just specialist physicians, rather than all physicians to determine if 
there are any changes amongst this group. 
Severity Predictions      
 Before the availability of an OTC drug in the class, all patients have to see 
physicians to get treatment for the related illness.  After the availability of an OTC, it 
is expected that those with more minor symptoms can self-treat with OTC 
medications, in place of physician office visits.  Those patients who have severe 
conditions and know of the available OTC treatment may delay a physician’s office 
visit to instead attempt self-treatment first.  Only when self-treatment is unsuccessful, 
should these patients be seen in physician offices.  Therefore, the patients seen in 
physician offices are those that were unsuccessfully treated with the OTC, or those 
that must have physicians manage their illnesses because of higher levels of severity.   
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 The expectations from the above model, therefore, are that acute patients, who 
have the least severe symptoms, should be less likely to come to physician offices 
after the availability of an OTC.  There are no expectations for any changes in the 
likelihood of chronic routine patients in physician offices since these patients may be 
regularly monitored by the physician because of their higher severity.  Chronic flare-
up patients may be also less likely to see a physician when there is an OTC available 
since their conditions are short term and may also be temporary.   
 Specialist physicians are more likely to see patients with more severe 
symptoms than primary care physicians.  It is, therefore, expected that the impact on 
patient severity of an OTC may be less amongst these physicians since they are not 
likely to see patients with minor conditions even before an OTC is available due to 
self-treatment.  There may be an increase in visits to specialists, however, if there are 
more referrals to these physicians from primary care.   
 In summary, it is expected that the AfterOTC variable will have a negative 
impact on the likelihood of acute patient visits, and possibly a negative impact on 
visits from chronic flare-up patients.  If the severity of patient case mix has increased, 
the number of visits to specialist physicians is also expected to increase.   
Additional Empirical Analysis 
 Time spent with the physician, and the total number of diagnostic tests, are 
also examined in this study.  Both of these variables are used as dependent variables in 
regressions similar to those done in the severity section.  That is, both of these 
variables are examined to determine the effects of the availability of an OTC. 
 Therefore the model used for these is as follows: 
Y = β0 + β1AfterOTC + β2 Xi + β3 Uj + ε 
Where Y = Time Spent with Physician or Total Number of Diagnostic Tests 
After OTC = the period after which an OTC is available in the drug class 
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Xi = Patient Characteristics 
Uj = Physician Characteristics 
There are no expectations for these variables since it is not clear as to how 
these variables may be affected by changes in patient case-mix.  While higher levels of 
both time spent and number of diagnostic tests could indicate an increase in patient 
severity, these variables could also be higher during the early diagnosis period of an 
illness when severity may still be low.  In addition, changes in these variables could 
result because of other factors not related to patient severity such as changes in 
reimbursement amounts.  These two variables are, therefore, being used just for 
exploratory purposes to better understand the effects of OTC availability. 
   Potential Limitations 
 The analysis done here does not include models for the actual drug that has 
moved to the OTC market.  Since over the counter drugs are available without 
authorization from physicians, there should be a general decline in observations of 
those drugs that have changed status.  In addition, while the NAMCS instructs 
physicians to include all types of medications on the survey form, physicians may feel 
that since OTC drugs are available without a prescription, that they do not need to 
include them in their survey.  Because of these factors, it may not be possible to 
determine if capitated physicians actually move towards the OTC since these 
observations may not be recorded.   
 While severity is attempted to be measured here, it is very difficult to actually 
determine patient severity without knowing further details of the patient’s condition.  
In fact it may be possible that a patient comes to a physician’s office with severe 
symptoms even during the early part of the illness, i.e. when the patient would still be 
considered acute.  In general, however, even when an acute patient becomes a chronic 
one, the early stages of the illness are thought to be the least severe. 
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CHAPTER 6 
DATA  
In order to fully examine the effect on patients and physicians of drugs moving 
from the prescription to over the counter market, the data used would ideally provide 
information about all drugs prescribed and the severity of patients before and after the 
change in regulatory status.  This would allow for the examination of whether 
physicians are making their decisions based on profit motives or simply because 
severity of patients is different in each time period.  Also, it would be ideal to have 
data that included the extent of detailing (pharmaceutical advertising to physicians) 
and direct-to-consumer advertising for each drug and how that changes when a drug 
moves from prescription to over the counter status.  Data that followed patients from 
the physician’s office to the drug store would be helpful as well since it would be 
possible to directly examine not only what physicians recommend, but also what 
patients actually purchase.  Finally, ideal data would follow both patients and 
physicians over time to adequately see long-term effects. No such ideal data set exists, 
thus the data source used is now described, along with its relative strengths and 
weaknesses. 
National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NAMCS) 
 The National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NAMCS) for the years 1997 
– 2004 is used to test the implications of the theoretical model proposed here.  The 
NAMCS is a national survey conducted through the CDC’s National Center for Health 
Statistics annually from 1973 to 1981, in 1985, and every year since 1989. The survey 
was administered to physicians, rather than patients. Physicians were randomly 
assigned to a 1-week reporting period, during which data for a random sample of visits 
were recorded by the physician. Data were obtained on patients' symptoms, 
physicians' diagnoses, and medications ordered or provided. The survey also provides 
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statistics on the demographic characteristics of patients (e.g. gender, age, race, 
insurance type) and services provided, including information on diagnostic 
procedures, patient management, and planned future treatment.  The NAMCS focuses 
on outpatient care since hospital-based physicians are excluded from the sample.  The 
survey allows physicians to list up to six medications prescribed to a patient during an 
office visit, including both prescription and OTC drugs.  Later years actually allow for 
eight drugs to be recorded, but for comparison purposes these last two drug entries 
were dropped from analysis.  In total, before any exclusions, each year of data (1997-
2004) contains over 20,000 patient records. 
Advantages of Using NAMCS 
• The NAMCS provides data from physicians directly.  This is an important 
feature when examining physician incentives, since physician decisions and 
intentions are recorded and do not have to be extrapolated from other sources. 
• The NAMCS collects data on health insurance status of patients.  This creates 
data that can be used to compare utilization rates for patients enrolled in 
managed care plans versus other types of health insurance. 
• The NAMCS contains detailed information on demographics, diagnoses and 
laboratory testing which can be used to examine the change in the case mix of 
patients after drugs move to OTC status.   
Descriptive Statistics 
Restricting the data to only those patients with any insurance coverage allows for 
the clean comparison of the effects of Fee-for-Service against those of capitation, 
regardless of whether the patient is publicly or privately insured.  This limits the data 
to only those patients with either: Private Insurance, Medicare, or Medicaid.  In some 
of the specifications, the data are further restricted to only those patients with the 
diagnosis relevant to the drug class being examined.  Before limiting the data by 
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diagnosis, however, the summary statistics show that the insured NAMCS sample 
averages slightly over 20,000 patient visits per year.  The data consists of 57.5% 
females and 87.1% white patients, with an average age of 46.1 years.  The majority of 
the insured patients (63.7%) have private insurance, while 26.5% have Medicare and 
9.8% have Medicaid.  Approximately 26.3% of physicians accept capitated payments 
and the majority of capitation is seen through private insurance (as opposed to 
Medicare or Medicaid). 
 The summary statistics show that 58.1% of patients see a specialist and 85.1% 
are established patients (i.e. not new patients).  Physicians provide medications for 
their patients in over 62% of visits.  Prescription drugs are provided in 56.1% of visits, 
while OTC medications are provided in 10.4%.  It should be noted that prescription 
and OTC medications can be provided both as substitutes and as compliments.  
Therefore, a person receiving a prescription drug could also receive an OTC drug at 
the same time and vice versa.   
 Physicians spend an average of just over 19 minutes with each patient.  It 
should be noted, however, that physicians bill insurance companies using a tiered 
structure of time spent with the patient.  Therefore a skew in the reported amount of 
time spent with the patient that follows the billing schedule for reimbursement can be 
expected. 
 In terms of severity, as measured here, 32.8% of patients reported having acute 
conditions.  Chronic routine patients made up 33% of physicians office visits and 
9.5% were from chronic flare-up patients.        
 The following figures provide further insight into the nature of physician office 
visits amongst the insured population in the NAMCS 1997 – 2004 data for the entire 
sample, as well as for the two drug classes considered here: allergy and acid reflux.  
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For all of the figures, it should be noted that Claritin, in the allergy class, is an OTC in 
2003 and 2004; while Prilosec, in the acid reflux class, is an OTC in 2004.   
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Figure 6.1 
Percent of Patients with Diagnosis – Total Insured NAMCS Sample 1997 – 2004 
 Figure 6.1 shows the percent of patients in the insured NAMCS sample for 
each of the diagnoses analyzed here.  According to this figure there is an increase in 
the percent of patients with an allergy diagnosis after 2001 and then a decline after 
2003.  The decrease in visits for those patients in the allergy sample, after 2003, could 
be an indication of patients using Claritin OTC as a substitute to physician visits. 
 Prilosec moves to the OTC market at the end of 2003, but this graph does not 
provide any indication of a decrease in visits from this market.  From 1997 – 2001 
there seems to be very few changes in the number of patients coming in to physician 
offices for an acid reflux related diagnosis.  While, an increase in the acid reflux group 
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is seen after 2001 but then declines after 2002 and then levels off.  These changes, 
however, are slight, providing little conclusive evidence of a change due to the OTC 
status of Prilosec.    
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Figure 6.2 
Type of Patient Visit – Total Insured NAMCS Sample 1997 – 2004 
Figure 6.2 depicts the type of patient (acute, chronic routine, or chronic flare-
up) per year for the general population.  The figure shows a slight increase in acute 
patients after 2001, but then levels off.  Chronic routine has a slight increase after 
2002, but no major changes are seen in any of the groups.  This is as expected since 
these trends are for the general population and not the specific class associated with 
the drug moving to the OTC market.  The number of visits from chronic flare-up 
patients seems to change only slightly over the years from 1997 – 2004.  Again, while 
this graph is shown for descriptive purposes, no changes are expected in the severity 
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of the entire sample, since they should not be influenced by the availability of an OTC 
in one specific drug category. 
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Figure 6.3 
Percent of Patients Seeing a Specialist Physician by Diagnosis – Insured NAMCS 
1997 – 2004 
In the analysis of patient severity, the use of specialist physicians is also used.  
Figure 6.3 depicts the percent of patients seeing a specialist physician, under both the 
allergy and the acid reflux diagnosis categories, as well as for the entire insured 
population. 
The Allergy group does have an increased percentage of specialist visits in 
2003, the year following the Claritin OTC switch, but then this decreases in 2004.  
Similarly, the Acid Reflux group has an increased percentage of specialist visits in 
  75 
 
2004, the year after the Prilosec OTC switch.  There is, however, a general increasing 
trend of seeing a specialist, as seen with the Total Insured Population line, after 2002. 
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Figure 6.4 
Average Number of Diagnostic Tests per Patient by Diagnosis – Insured NAMCS 
1997 - 2004. 
Figure 6.4 depicts the average number of diagnostic tests ordered per patient 
for the entire insured NAMCS sample.  This graph provides the average number of 
tests for the entire NAMCS sample as well as by diagnosis group (allergy or acid 
reflux).  The average number of tests could provide insight into the severity of patients 
if one assumes that as the number of tests increases, a patient is likely to have more 
severe conditions.  This is not the assumption utilized here.  Instead, the average 
number of tests is only used to help examine what happens, in general, after a drug in 
a category moves to the OTC market.  The only expectation for this variable is that no 
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changes should be seen amongst the entire insured NAMCS sample, since the entire 
population should not have any changes when a drug in a specific class is given a 
different regulatory status.  The only changes, therefore, should be seen amongst those 
populations that are related to the drug class in which an OTC is newly available.   
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Figure 6.5 
Average Time Spent (in minutes) with Physician by Diagnosis Group – Insured 
NAMCS 1997 – 2004 
Figure 6.5 depicts the average amount of time spent with the physician, in 
minutes, by year.  As mentioned earlier, some studies indicate that an increase in time 
spent indicates an increase in severity of patients.  While, this is not used as a measure 
of severity in this research, time spent is included in the analysis just as an exercise to 
see if there are any changes after the availability of an OTC.  There is a peak in time 
spent with acid reflux patients in 2003 after which there is a decline.  There is a slight 
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increase in time spent with the allergy group also after 2002.  The total population 
remains unchanged as expected.  These trends overall do not depict any major changes 
in time spent after the availability of an OTC. 
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Figure 6.6 
Average Number of Tests per Patient by Diagnosis Group Specialist Physicians – 
Insured NAMCS 1997 – 2004 
Figure 6.6 depicts the average number of tests ordered by specialist physicians.  
There is a peak of tests done in 2001 for acid reflux patients, and then this trend levels 
off.  Others remained relatively unchanged indicating no real effect of OTC 
availability. 
 Due to the possibility that primary care physicians are more likely to refer 
patients to specialists after the availability of an OTC because of an increase in patient 
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severity, visits to specialist physicians are further analyzed as well.  Figure 6.7 depicts 
the average time spent with a specialist physician. 
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Figure 6.7 
Average Time Spent (in minutes) with a Specialist Physician by Diagnosis Group - 
Insured NAMCS 1997 – 2004 
No conclusions can be formulated for the allergy or total population groups 
from Figure 6.7.  Acid reflux patients have an increase in time spent with a specialist 
physician from 2002 – 2003, and then a decrease in 2004.  While this could imply a 
change in patient severity, it could also indicate other changes, such as a different 
reimbursement schedule for the amount of time physicians spend with patients.   
In terms of drug use, the percentages of patients receiving medications by 
population are examined in Figures 6.8 and 6.9.  Figure 6.8 shows the percent of 
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patients receiving a prescription medication by diagnosis group while Figure 6.9 
depicts the usage of OTC medications. 
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Figure 6.8 
Percent of Patients Receiving a Prescription Medication – by Diagnosis Group 
NAMCS 1997 – 2004 
 There are no major changes in prescription drug use over the years from Figure 
6.8.  The majority of physicians are FFS and therefore, overall, physicians are not 
expected to change their prescribing habits drastically after the availability of an OTC.  
Instead only those FFS physicians that prescribed the medication that is now OTC are 
expected to switch to another prescription-only product.  In the allergy group, there is 
a slight decrease in the use of prescriptions after 2002, which may indicate that some 
physicians are using the OTC drug instead of prescription-only ones.   
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Figure 6.9 shows that there is a decrease in OTC use for acid reflux patients 
from 2001 – 2003, but then levels off in 2004.  OTC use increases in the allergy group 
after 2002. 
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Figure 6.9 
Percent of Patients Receiving an OTC Medication - by Diagnosis Group NAMCS 
1997 – 2004 
 Table 6.1 provides the summary statistics for the NAMCS data used.  In the 
regressions conducted, the samples consisted of insured patients only from 1997 – 
2000, and 2003 – 2004.  The years 2001 and 2002 were dropped from the analysis 
because the capitation variable is missing for these years.  The capitation variable is 
the one indicating whether or not the physician is under any influence of a capitated 
reimbursement system.    
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Tab1e 6.1 
Descriptive Statistics - Entire Insured Sample NAMCS 1997-2000, 2003-2004 
 
  Frequency Percentage Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
Year             
1997 19869 16.37         
1998 19219 15.84         
1999 17252 14.22         
2000 23030 18.98         
2003 21252 17.51         
2004 20741 17.09         
Total Obs. 121363           
Gender             
Female 69791 57.51         
Male (omitted 
group) 51572 42.49         
Age     46.12 25.10 0 100 
Race             
White 105682 87.08         
Black 11260 9.28         
Asian 3775 3.09         
Other (omitted 
group) 646 0.53         
Hispanic Ethnicity             
Yes 9157 7.51         
No 112206 92.45         
Paytype             
Private Insurance 77311 63.70         
Medicare 32130 26.47         
Medicaid (omitted 
group) 11922 9.82         
Primary Care 
Physician?             
Yes 42228 34.79         
No 79135 65.21         
Specialist?             
Yes 70525 58.11         
No 50838 41.89         
Allergy Specialist?             
Yes 898 0.74         
No 120465 99.26         
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Table 6.1 (Continued) 
Gastro Specialist?             
Yes 1452 1.19         
No 119911 98.81         
Patient Referred for 
this visit?             
Yes 27790 22.90         
No 93573 77.10         
Has patient been 
seen here before?             
Yes 103257 85.08         
No 17493 14.41         
Missing 613 0.51         
Were Any 
Medications 
Provided?             
Yes 75186 61.95         
No 46177 38.05         
Total Number of 
Medications     1.36 1.57 0 6 
Were any 
Prescription Drugs 
Given?             
Yes 68045 56.07         
No 53318 43.93         
Were any OTC 
Drugs Given?             
Yes 12635 10.41         
No 108728 89.59         
Were any Allergy 
Prescriptions Given?             
Yes 3011 2.48         
No 118352 97.52         
Was Allegra Given?             
Yes 900 0.74         
No 120463 99.26         
Was Zyrtec Given?             
Yes 871 0.72         
No 120492 99.28         
Was Clarinex 
Given?             
Yes 121226 99.89         
No 137 0.11         
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Table 6.1 (Continued) 
Were Allergy Shots 
Given?             
Yes 120803 99.54         
No 560 0.46         
Allergy OTC 
Available             
Yes 41801 34.44         
No 79562 65.56         
Claritin OTC Market 
Share     0.03 0.04 0 0.098 
Were any Gastro 
Prescriptions Given?             
Yes 2233 1.84         
No 119130 98.16         
Was Nexium Given?             
Yes 256 0.21         
No 121107 99.79         
Was Prevacid 
Given?             
Yes 785 0.65         
No 120578 99.35         
Was Protonix 
Given?             
Yes 196 0.16         
No 121167 99.84         
Was Zantac Given?             
Yes 716 0.59         
No 120647 99.41         
Gastro OTC 
Available             
Yes 20540 16.90         
No 100823 83.08         
Prilosec OTC 
Market Share     0.03 0.07 0 0.185 
Major Reason For 
Visit             
Acute Problem 39792 32.79         
Chronic Problem, 
Routine 40101 33.04         
Chronic Problem, 
Flareup 11557 9.52         
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Table 6.1 (Continued) 
Preventive Care  
(omitted group) 16785 13.83         
Pre/Post Surgery 10742 8.85         
Missing 2386 1.96         
Region             
Northeast 25027 20.62         
Midwest 27190 22.40         
South 41915 34.54         
West (omitted 
group) 27231 22.44         
Metro. Stat. Area             
MSA 101645 83.75         
Non-MSA 19718 16.25         
Solo Practice?             
Yes 47157 38.86         
No 74206 61.14         
Employment Status 
of Physician             
Owner  89870 74.05         
Employee 25465 20.98         
Contractor (omitted 
group) 4602 3.79         
Missing 1426 1.17         
Capitation Payment 
Accepted?             
Yes 31889 26.28         
No 89474 73.72         
Capitation by 
Insurance 
Breakdown (Percent 
are of total Capitated 
Pop.)             
Private Insurance 
Capitation 21630 67.83         
Medicare Capitation 6815 21.37         
Medicaid Capitation 3444 10.80         
Total 31889           
Total Number of 
Tests     0.70 0.92 0 7 
Total Number of 
Tests with Allergy 
Specialist     0.42 0.58 0 4 
  85 
 
Table 6.1 (Continued) 
Total Number of 
Tests with Gastro 
Specialist     0.81 0.76 0 7 
Time Spent with 
Physician (in 
minutes)     19.11 12.60 0 240 
Time Spent with 
Allergy Specialist     18.89 17.47 0 120 
Time Spent with 
Gastro Specialist     23.93 14.60 0 120 
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 CHAPTER 7 
ALLERGY CLASS ANALYSIS 
Allergies are a condition in which one’s immune system overreacts to a 
substance in the environment. This disease is one of the most common in the United 
States, affecting more than 50 million people. Allergies rank sixth in leading causes of 
chronic disease and approximately $18 billion are spent annually in treatment and 
diagnosis.  Common allergies include:  plant pollens, mold spores, foods, insects, and 
animal products.  The symptoms associated with allergies can greatly affect patients’ 
life styles and can be a concern for employers as well.  According to a previously 
mentioned study, productivity losses associated with a diagnosis of allergic rhinitis 
were estimated to be $601 million (Crystal-Peters, 2000). 
 Antihistamines are medications used in the treatment of allergies.  While no 
cure exists for allergies, antihistamines are used to relieve patients of allergy 
symptoms such as itchy, watery eyes; sneezing; and congestion.  These medications 
are available on both the OTC and prescription drug markets.  Examples of 
antihistamines include: 
• OTC Market: Benadryl, Claritin, Chlor-Trimeton, Dimetane and Tavist 
• Prescription Market: Clarinex, Allegra, and Zyrtec 
Allergy Shots 
Allergy shots, also known as immunotherapy, are another form of treatment for 
allergy symptoms.  With immunotherapy, patients are injected with a serum 
containing the substances they are specifically allergic to so that their immune 
response and tolerance can be built.  While allergy shots are not available for all types 
of allergies or patients, they are considered as one of the most effective forms of 
treatment for severe allergies (Haines, 2006).  Allergy shots are, however, time 
intensive for the patient as they have to, at least initially, receive weekly injections.  In 
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order to build immunity, the patient later receives shots once per month in a 
maintenance cycle, which can last for several years.  Because of the time requirements 
for allergy shots and because it often takes several months before any relief is realized 
from these injections, this therapy is most appropriate for chronic patients. 
 The cost of allergy shots is less than that of medications for both patients and 
insurance companies.  A study in the April 2000 issue of Research Reviews showed 
that patients generally pay $1200 in out-of-pocket costs for year-round drug treatment 
of allergic rhinitis. Another study, however, shows that a patient would pay only $800 
for the first year of allergy shots.  Because the first year has the most number of shots 
in order to build up the patient’s tolerance, it is also the most expensive.  This study 
calculates that in later years, once the patient had reached maintenance and shots were 
given less frequently, the costs drop to between $170 and $290 per year.  Since 
allergies are a chronic condition, the cost difference between drug therapy and 
immunotherapy can add up to significant amounts in the long term (Kirchheimer, 
2003).     
Antihistamine Market 
 There are two main categories of antihistamines: first generation and second 
generation.  First generation antihistamines, such as Benadryl, are effective in the 
treatment of allergy symptoms; they are widely available and are generally 
inexpensive. Second generation antihistamines, such as Claritin, are also effective, but 
are more expensive than the first generation counterparts.  For example, generic 
diphenhydramine (Benadryl’s active ingredient) or chlorpheniramine 
(ChlorTrimeton’s active ingredient) cost $3 to $4 for 24-30 tablets, whereas the same 
number of Claritin OTC tablets can cost a patient $20 or more (Drug Store, 2005).   
The main differences between these two types of drugs, other than prices, 
however, are in their side effects.  While, first generation antihistamines are effective, 
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they also contain very strong sedating effects.  This is due to their lack of selectivity 
for the proper chemical receptors in the body.  This reaction is so effective, it is a 
characteristic used in many OTC sleeping aid medications (Gleason et al, 1998).  In 
fact, a study testing the driving capabilities of subjects showed that taking common, 
over-the-counter antihistamines can impair a person's ability to drive, even more so 
than being legally drunk (Tracey, 2000).   
In addition to the driving concerns that result from the use of first generation 
antihistamines, there are productivity concerns as well.  Other authors have found that 
when first generation allergy medications were used and an assessment of productivity 
was considered, the estimated loss in productivity ranged between $2.4 billion to $4.6 
billion.  The results from the 1995 National Health Interview Study showed that “the 
most significant productivity losses resulted not from absenteeism but from reduced 
at-work productivity associated with the use of sedating OTC antihistamines” 
(Crystal-Peters, 2000).  Therefore, while first generation antihistamines have lower 
retail prices for consumers, the costs of taking these medications can be far greater to 
patients, employers, and society. 
Second generation antihistamines are far more effective at locating the proper 
receptors and therefore, have greatly improved sedation effects of their earlier 
counterparts.  Consumers can gain greater access to these medications, at possibly 
lower prices, with the movement of these drugs to the OTC market.  This could allow 
for dramatic reductions in the productivity losses and driving hazards that are caused 
by the use of first generation anti-histamines.   
Claritin 
 As described in Chapter 2, the December 2002 switch of Schering-Plough 
Corp’s Claritin (loratadine) into the OTC market was initiated by the third part payer, 
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Wellpoint, who argued that the drug was just as safe as other OTC antihistamines 
(Goldfarb, 2002). 
 Claritin’s patent was to expire on December 19, 2002, and on November 27th 
of the same year, the FDA approved Claritin, a top prescription performer, as the first 
non-sedating formula for the OTC market (FDA Orange Book, 2006).  Schering-
Plough was denied the 3 year Hatch Waxman exclusivity period because of the 
company’s delays and lack of planning.  Therefore, after Claritin’s December 2002 
OTC launch, it was soon followed to the market by private-label and value versions of 
loratadine in January and April 2003, respectively.  The OTC switch of Claritin was 
successful with first year sales totaling nearly $400 million and a market share of 50% 
in the allergy market (Mahecha, 2006).  
 Schering-Plough attempted to keep their place in the prescription-only second 
generation antihistamine market by launching their new drug, Clarinex in January 
2002.  This new drug was designed to work faster and last longer than the older 
Claritin.  However, the company had little time, less than one-year in fact, to convert 
the Claritin patients to Clarinex because of delays in Clarinex approval (IMS Health, 
2003).     
 When Claritin made the switch into the OTC market, many insurance 
companies dropped their drug coverage for all antihistamines.  These third party 
payers argued that there was an effective, low price antihistamine in the OTC market, 
and therefore patients should utilize that drug, rather than the more expensive, 
prescription counterparts (Kirchheimer, 2003).   
 According to the magazine Drug Topics, “total sales of antihistamines dropped 
28.5% in 2003 following a 9.7% increase for 2002”. While the top performing drugs 
still had some growth in sales from the previous year, this change had dropped 
  90 
 
substantially.  Allegra grew 21.5% in 2002, but only 4.3% in 2003. Zyrtec has a 
10.4% increase in sales in 2002, with only 6.5% in 2003 (Gebhart, 2004).  
Figure 7.1 depicts the percent of worldwide sales for each of these drugs.  
Much of the decrease in antihistamine sales described above seems to be stemming 
from Claritin according to Figure 7.1.  When Claritin moved to the OTC market, its 
price dropped also, decreasing total sales dollars and percent market share.  The other 
three drugs in the class increase in percent market share over the years.  Claritin’s 
market share begins to fall rapidly even 2001, before the OTC movement. 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Year
P
e
r
c
e
n
t 
o
f 
W
o
r
ld
w
id
e
 S
a
le
s
Claritin Allegra Zyrtec Clarinex  
Figure 7.1 
Percent of World Wide Sales per Year – Antihistamine Class 
Allegra initially emerges as the market leader after Claritin’s decline.  By 
2004, however, Zyrtec catches up and seems to have equal market share.  Clarinex 
remains in the third position with less than twenty-percent market share. 
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The companies that produced second generation antihistamines engaged in 
heavy marketing efforts directly to consumers.  Figure 7.2 shows the dollar amount 
spent on direct-to-consumer advertising, using Competitive Media Reports (CMR) 
data for the years 1997 – 2002  and Neilsen data collected from Med Ad News for 
2003 and 2004. 
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Figure 7.2 
Advertising Dollars Spent per Year by Drug – Antihistamine Class 
The data from Med Ad News does not include advertising information for most 
OTC.  Therefore, the advertising data for Claritin is missing for the years 2003 and 
2004, when it is sold in the OTC market.  It is in 2002, however, when Claritin is still 
prescription that the advertising drops to nearly zero.  In fact, Schering-Plough begins 
to slow down the advertising of Claritin from 1998.  Also in 2002, the advertising for 
Clarinex, the new second generation antihistamine from Schering-Plough, is initiated.   
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Allergy/Antihistamine NAMCS Data 
 For the analysis of the allergy/antihistamine market, the NAMCS 1997 – 2000, 
2003 – 2004 is used.  The entire data set is examined, first, to study the use of allergy 
drugs because approximately half of the prescriptions for these medications were 
given to patients with non-allergy diagnoses.  Due to the nature of the NAMCS, in that 
diagnoses are very specifically defined, it was not possible to find any one non-allergy 
diagnosis that dominated these prescriptions.   
The data was then limited to only those patients with an allergy diagnosis.  The 
data was also restricted, both for the entire population as well as the allergy 
population, to just those with some form of health insurance.  This is done so that the 
effects of capitation and FFS can be clearly compared, without drawing in 
comparisons with the uninsured group.   
 This data, when restricted to the insured allergy group, provides a total sample 
of 9,692 allergy patient visits, averaging slightly over 1600 allergy patient visits per 
year.  Nearly 58% of the allergy sub-population is female, while over 86% is white, 
and the average age is 37.5 years (somewhat younger than the average age for the 
entire NAMCS sample).  Private insurance covers 74.4% of the patients, while 15.1% 
are covered by Medicare, and 10.5% by Medicaid.  Capitated reimbursement is 
accepted by 27.7% of physicians and nearly 86% of allergy patients received a 
medication at their visit.  While 77.4% received a prescription drug, 12.6% received 
an OTC, and fewer than 18% of the patients were given an allergy prescription.  When 
describing their major reason for visit, 47.4% claimed to have an acute problem 
(symptoms occurring for 3 months or less); nearly 29% had chronic routine problems; 
and 13.3% had flare-ups of chronic conditions.   
 The following figures are first used to examine the allergy diagnosis in the 
NAMCS sample.  Figure 7.3 shows the number of prescriptions for each allergy drug 
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for the total NAMCS population.  Figure 7.4 shows the number of prescriptions for 
each allergy drug as well, but for the group diagnosed with an allergy condition. 
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Figure 7.3 
Number of Prescriptions by Allergy Drug – Total Insured NAMCS Sample 
 As was depicted in the figure showing the market share of world wide sales, 
this figure also shows that Claritin dominates the market until 2001.  In 2002, Allegra 
takes over as market leader, with the most number of prescriptions, but Zyrtec soon 
catches up in 2002.  Allergy shot use was found to increase steadily after 2001 and 
then declines in 2004.  In this last year of data, however, allergy shots are still used 
more than either Claritin or Clarinex. 
In both Figures 7.3 and 7.4, Claritin is classified as an OTC medication in the 
years 2003 and 2004; in all others it is a prescription.  The two graphs provide the 
number of prescriptions by allergy drug; the first being for the entire insured sample 
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and the second is for the insured sample with an allergy related diagnosis.  The two 
figures follow nearly the same patterns, with more prescriptions overall for the total 
insured sample. 
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Figure 7.4 
Number of Prescriptions by Allergy Drug – Allergy Sample 
To measure severity in the allergy group the use of allergy shots is examined. 
This treatment is most often used for patients with severe allergies since the full 
benefits from this treatment are normally realized only after many months.  Therefore, 
as the case-mix of patients becomes more severe and the patients seen in physicians’ 
offices possess chronic symptoms, a greater utilization of allergy shots should be 
noticed.  Figure 7.5 shows the percent of patients receiving allergy shots, for the entire 
NAMCS population and for the allergy related diagnosis sample. 
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Figure 7.5 
Percent of Population Receiving an Allergy Shot – NAMCS 1997 – 2004 
An increase in the use of allergy shots is found in both groups after 2001.  The 
allergy group peaks its use of allergy shots in 2003, the year following the Claritin 
OTC switch.  The percent of patients getting an allergy shot then declines in 2004.  
Between 2001 and 2003, the percent of patients receiving allergy shots more than 
doubled amongst those with an allergy related diagnosis.  Physicians may have felt the 
need to use allergy shots increasingly after 2001 because the types of patients coming 
into their offices may have become more severe.  Also, after the switch of Claritin to 
the OTC market, many insurance companies dropped coverage of all antihistamines.  
For this reason, there may have been an increase in the use of allergy shots amongst 
allergy patients, since this form of treatment was still covered under most insurance 
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plans.  Later, there was a backlash against insurance companies and many returned 
antihistamines to their drug coverage plans.  
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Figure 7.6 
Percent of Patients Seeing an Allergy Specialist - NAMCS 1997 – 2004 
 In another attempt to examine severity the use of allergy specialists is 
examined.  Figure 7.6 depicts the percent of patients in both the total insured 
population and the insured allergy population who see an allergy specialist. 
While a peak in the use of allergy specialists is found in 2003 (the year after 
the Claritin switch) the percent of visits to allergy specialist begins to decrease there 
afterwards.  It is expected that the use of an allergy specialist should increase with an 
increase in the use of allergy shots, since these physicians provide the injections in the 
majority of cases.  Severity is not expected to change for the entire population, as the 
availability of an OTC in a drug class should only affect the relevant diagnosis group. 
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In order to analyze patient severity, the nature of the patient’s illness is used, 
which categorized as acute, chronic routine, and chronic flare-up.  Figure 7.7 depicts 
the trend in visits for each of these types of patients for the allergy sample. 
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Figure 7.7 
Percent of Visits by Type of Patient – Allergy Sample 
NAMCS 1997 – 2004 
While the number of visits from chronic routine patients seems to decrease 
after 2003, visits from acute and chronic flare-up patients seem to have minimal 
changes.  The number of acute patients increases slightly, while the number of chronic 
flare-up patients seems to change only slightly. 
 In Figure 7.8 the type of patient seen in the offices of allergy specialists is 
depicted.  This figure shows an increase in chronic routine patients amongst specialist 
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and a decrease in both acute and chronic flare-up patients, especially after 2002, the 
year in which Claritin moves to the OTC market. 
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Figure 7.8 
Percent of Visits by Type of Patient amongst Specialist Physicians– Allergy Sample 
NAMCS 1997 - 2004 
As expected, there is a decline in visits from acute and chronic flare-up 
patients that may be due to self treatment.  Their conditions could be temporary, thus, 
they may be substituting Claritin OTC for a physician’s office visit. 
Table 7.1 provides the descriptive statistics for the allergy group.   The 
capitation variable was only available for the NAMCS survey in the years 1997 – 
2000 and then again in 2003 – 2004.  Therefore, 2001 and 2002 are dropped from the 
actual regression analysis done later.   
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Table 7.1 
Descriptive Statistics - Allergy Insured Sample NAMCS 1997-2000, 2003-2004 
  Frequency Percentage Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
Year             
1997 1464 15.11         
1998 1555 16.04         
1999 1473 15.20         
2000 1700 17.54         
2003 1993 20.56         
2004 1507 15.55         
Total Obs. 9692           
Gender             
Female 5605 57.83         
Male (omitted 
group) 4087 42.17         
Age     37.45 24.41 0 100 
Race             
White 8343 86.08         
Black 906 9.35         
Asian 385 3.97         
Other (omitted 
group) 58 0.59         
Hispanic Ethnicity             
Yes 789 8.14         
No 8903 91.86         
Paytype             
Private Insurance 7207 74.36         
Medicare 1471 15.18         
Medicaid (omitted 
group) 1014 10.46         
Primary Care 
Physician?             
Yes 4449 45.90         
No 5243 54.10         
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Table 7.1 (Continued) 
Specialist?             
Yes 4726 48.76         
No 4966 51.24         
Allergy Specialist?             
Yes 722 7.45         
No 8970 92.55         
Patient Referred for 
this visit?             
Yes 1587 16.37         
No 8105 83.63         
Has patient been 
seen here before?             
Yes 8247 85.09         
No 1405 14.50         
Missing 40 0.41         
Were Any 
Medications 
Provided?             
Yes 8311 85.75         
No 1381 14.25         
Total Number of 
Medications     1.98 1.49 0 6 
Were any 
Prescription Drugs 
Given?             
Yes 7504 77.42         
No 2188 22.58         
Were any OTC 
Drugs Given?             
Yes 1217 12.56         
No 8475 87.44         
Were any Allergy 
Prescriptions Given?             
Yes 1699 17.53         
No 7993 82.47         
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Table 7.1 (Continued) 
Was Allegra Given?             
Yes 488 5.04         
No 9204 94.96         
Was Zyrtec Given?             
Yes 526 5.43         
No 9166 94.57         
Was Clarinex 
Given?             
Yes 80 0.83         
No 9612 99.17         
Were Allergy Shots 
Given?             
Yes 462 4.77         
No 9230 95.23         
Allergy OTC 
Available             
Yes 3467 35.77         
No 6225 64.23         
Claritin OTC Market 
Share     0.03 0.04 0 0.098 
Major Reason For 
Visit             
Acute Problem 4596 47.42         
Chronic Problem, 
Routine 2848 29.39         
Chronic Problem, 
Flareup 1286 13.27         
Preventive Care  
(omitted group) 501 5.17         
Pre/Post Surgery 282 2.91         
Missing 179 1.85         
Region             
Northeast 1934 19.95         
Midwest 2186 22.55         
South 3564 36.77         
West (omitted 
group) 2008 20.72         
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Table 7.1 (Continued) 
Metro. Stat. Area             
MSA 8145 84.04         
Non-MSA 1547 15.96         
Solo Practice?             
Yes 3830 39.52         
No 5862 60.48         
Employment Status 
of Physician             
Owner  7063 72.87         
Employee 2186 22.55         
Contractor (omitted 
group) 352 3.63         
Missing 91 0.94         
Capitation Payment 
Accepted?             
Yes 2616 26.99         
No 7076 73.01         
Capitation by 
Insurance 
Breakdown (Percent 
are of total Capitated 
Pop.)             
Private Insurance 
Capitation 2008 76.76         
Medicare Capitation 284 10.86         
Medicaid Capitation 324 12.39         
Total 2616           
Total Number of 
Tests     0.49 0.74 0 7 
Total Number of 
Tests with Allergy 
Specialist     0.39 0.51 0 2 
Time Spent with 
Physician (in 
minutes)     16.48 11.05 0 240 
Time Spent with 
Allergy Specialist     19.21 17.97 0 120 
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Antihistamine Results 
 As mentioned earlier, in the theoretical model chapter, the case mix of patients 
is expected to become more severe after the availability of an OTC drug.  Also, 
capitated physicians are hypothesized to provide OTC medications to minimize costs, 
and thereby maximize profits.  For the allergy group, only the second generation 
antihistamine market is examined. Claritin is the drug that moves to the OTC market 
in 2002, while Allegra, Zyrtec, and Clarinex are the drugs in the prescription-only 
market.  Also included are allergy shots as an alternative therapy to antihistamines.   
 The following cross tabulations are used to help frame the predictions of the 
effect of an OTC medication for the allergy group, using the means calculated from 
the NAMCS data. 
 In the first table (7.2), the probability of receiving each drug, before and after 
the availability of Claritin OTC, is shown.  The second table (7.3) also depicts the 
probability of receiving each drug, before and after Claritin OTC, but broken down by 
reimbursement type.  Both of these tables are for the entire, insured NAMCS sample.  
Tables 7.4 and 7.5 repeat the probabilities shown in tables 7.2 and 7.3, but for the 
allergy diagnosis sample.   
Tables 7.2 and 7.4 show that there is an increase in prescriptions for each 
brand of antihistamine.  There is also an increase in the use of allergy shots amongst 
patients from both the entire NAMCS insured population, as well as the allergy 
population.  Amongst the allergy group, there is an overall decrease in the use of 
allergy prescriptions in general.  When broken down to individual drugs, however, the 
tables show that there are increases in the use of Allegra, Zyrtec, Clarinex, and allergy 
shots.  This could indicate that even though the use of other drugs increases, other 
patients have followed Claritin to the OTC market.  For the entire insured population, 
there is also an increased use of allergy prescriptions.   
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FFS physicians are expected to continue providing prescription medications to 
their patients to ensure repeat visits.  Once Claritin moves to the OTC market, it is 
expected that FFS physicians will be more likely to move away from prescribing this 
drug, and will instead provide Allegra, Zyrtec, or Clarinex.  If the case mix of patients 
does become more severe, as predicted, it is also expected that FFS physicians will be 
more likely to prescribe allergy shots since this therapy is used on more severe cases 
of allergies.  In both the entire insured sample, as well as the allergy diagnosis sample, 
the tabulations above show an increased probability that FFS physician will provide 
each of the brand name prescriptions.  These physicians are also more likely to 
provide allergy shots after the availability of Claritin OTC for both samples. 
Capitated physicians, before the availability of an OTC, are expected to 
provide the least costly form of treatment.  Other studies have shown that using allergy 
shots can amount to lower costs per year than using medications.  Because of this, it is 
expected that cost-minded capitated physicians will be more likely than FFS 
physicians to utilize allergy shots as opposed to prescription medications.  Once 
Claritin moved to the OTC market, insurance companies generally dropped coverage 
for Claritin and in some cases, all antihistamines.  Hence, it is expected that capitated 
physicians will be more likely than FFS physicians to move from providing allergy 
shots to their patients, to instead providing the OTC medication.  That is, while no 
OTC’s are available, capitated physicians choose the lowest cost of treatment by 
providing allergy shots since these are less expensive than prescription medications.  
Once Claritin moves to the OTC market, and insurance companies no longer pay for 
Claritin, or even all antihistamines, capitated physicians choose the lower cost 
treatment for the insurance provider which, in this case, is antihistamines.  It is also 
expected that the capitated physician will be less likely to provide Allegra, Zyrtec, or 
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Clarinex than FFS physicians, as these drugs are more expensive for insurance 
companies when they are included under drug coverage. 
The difference in differences columns in Tables 7.3 and 7.5 allow for the 
comparison of the effect of OTC availability on capitation versus the effect on FFS.  If 
the effect of the availability of an OTC is the same for both groups, the difference in 
the change between these two will be zero.  The results are not zero and therefore, 
indicate that one group is more affected by the availability of an OTC than the other. 
The tables mentioned above show that under capitation there is a decreased 
likelihood that physicians will provide allergy prescriptions and allergy shots to the 
total insured NAMCS sample.  For the allergy sample, the tables show a decreased use 
of allergy prescriptions amongst capitated physicians. 
Table 7.6 provides the prescription drug regression results for the entire 
insured NAMCS population.   The first three independent variables will be the focus 
in the analysis of the results.  The results in Table 7.6 show that before the availability 
of an OTC, for the entire insured population, capitated physicians are more likely than 
FFS to provide allergy shots.  This is as expected since allergy shots are the least 
costly form of treatment.  After the availability of an OTC, FFS physicians are more 
likely to use allergy shots, than before.  This could be a result because FFS physicians 
are shifting costs from the patient to the insurance company.  Because many 
companies dropped coverage for antihistamines, FFS physicians are alleviating 
patients from paying the full cost of prescriptions, and are instead providing allergy 
shots, which would be covered under insurance plans as an office visit and, thus, 
would have lower copays. 
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Table 7.6 
Allergy OLS Regression Results for Entire Insured Sample NAMCS 1997 – 2004 
(Note - Regressions exclude years 2001 and 2002) 
Standard Errors in Brackets 
*significant at 10%  **significant at 5%  ***significant at 1% 
 1 2 3 4 5 
  
Allergy 
RX  Allegra Zyrtec Clarinex 
Allergy 
Shots 
Capitated Visit 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0 0.003*** 
  [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
AllergyOTC -0.018*** -0.004** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.009*** 
  [0.003] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Capitated Visit 
* AllergyOTC -0.003 -0.002* 0.001 -0.001 -0.008*** 
  [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
Private 
Insurance 0.008*** 0.004*** 0.001* 0 0.003*** 
  [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
Medicare 0.001 0.002 0 0 0.002* 
  [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
Female 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0 0.001** 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
White 0.005 0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
  [0.006] [0.003] [0.003] [0.001] [0.003] 
Black 0.005 0.004 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 
  [0.006] [0.003] [0.003] [0.001] [0.003] 
Asian 0.009 0.008** -0.002 0 0 
  [0.007] [0.004] [0.004] [0.001] [0.003] 
Hispanic -0.001 0 -0.002* 0 0 
  [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
Age 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Age^2 -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000** -0.000*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Acute 0.024*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.001*** -0.003*** 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
Chronic 
Routine 0.013*** 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.001* 0.007*** 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
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Table 7.6 (Continued) 
Chronic Flare-
up 0.024*** 0.005*** 0.008*** 0.001*** -0.002** 
  [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
Pre/Post 
Surgery -0.004** -0.002* 0 0 -0.004*** 
  [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
Northeast 0.003** 0 0 0 0.003*** 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
Midwest 0.005*** 0.001 0.002** 0 0.008*** 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
South 0.011*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0 0.005*** 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
New Patient -0.006*** -0.001* -0.001 0 -0.004*** 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
Physician 
Owner 0.007*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003*** 
  [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
Physician is 
Employee 0.010*** 0.003*** 0.001 0.001 0 
  [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
MSA 0.001 0 0 0 0.001 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
Time Trend 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0 -0.001*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Observations 121363 121363 121363 121363 121363 
R-squared 0.01 0 0 0 0.01 
FFS physicians in the after Claritin OTC period are less likely to provide 
prescriptions in general and less likely to provide Allegra, but are more likely to 
provide Zyrtec and Clarinex than before an OTC.  Because of the decreased likelihood 
in overall prescription use, after OTC availability, the results indicate that some 
physicians are shifting their patients to other, prescription only drugs, while others are 
perhaps utilizing Claritin OTC. 
 After the availability of an OTC, capitated physicians are less likely than FFS 
to provide allergy shots.  This i0s also along with the expectations stated earlier, since 
allergy shots are no longer the least costly form of treatment. 
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 Because the dependent variables in this analysis are all binary, probits were 
also conducted.  The results of these estimations are found in Table A.1. in the 
Appendix section.  Marginal effects were also found for these estimations with results 
in Table A.3.  Both the probit results and the marginal effects follow along the same 
lines as the OLS regressions above with similar significant results and the same signs 
of the coefficients.  The marginal effect results show that under capitation, physicians 
are less likely to provide Zyrtec, by 0.1%, but more likely to provide allergy shots, 
than FFS by 0.1% before Claritin OTC.  After the availability of an OTC, FFS 
physicians are 1.5% less likely to provide prescriptions and 0.4% less likely to provide 
Allegra to patients.  FFS phys0icians are, however, more likely to provide allergy 
shots in the post OTC period by 0.4%.  Capitated physicians are 0.2% less likely than 
FFS to provide Allegra and 0.1% less likely to provide allergy shots, after the 
availability of an OTC.       
 In other results, private insurance patients are more likely than Medicaid to get 
any allergy prescription, as well as Allegra, Zyrtec, and allergy shots for the entire 
population.  Medicare is more likely than Medicaid to get allergy shots.  Females were 
more likely to get allergy prescriptions, Allegra, Zyrtec, and allergy shots as well.  
Acute patients are less likely than preventive care patients to get allergy shots, as 
expected since this form of treatment is normally used for those with more severe 
conditions.  Chronic routine patients are more likely to get allergy shots, while those 
with flare-ups are less likely to get shots than preventive care patients. 
 The regression results found in Table 7.7 repeat the same analysis as from 
Table 7.6.  These results, however, are for the insured sample with an allergy related 
diagnosis. 
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Table 7.7 
Allergy OLS Regression Results for Insured Allergy Sample NAMCS 1997 – 2004 
(Note - Regressions exclude years 2001 and 2002) 
Standard Errors in Brackets 
*significant at 10%  **significant at 5%  ***significant at 1% 
 1 2 3 4 5 
  
Allergy 
RX  Allegra Zyrtec Clarinex 
Allergy  
Shots 
Capitated Visit 0.005 0.014* -0.006 0 0.005 
  [0.014] [0.008] [0.009] [0.003] [0.008] 
AllergyOTC -0.120*** -0.033*** 0.027** 0.022*** 0.071*** 
  [0.022] [0.013] [0.013] [0.005] [0.012] 
Capitated Visit * 
AllergyOTC -0.013 -0.020* 0.007 -0.005 -0.054*** 
  [0.019] [0.011] [0.011] [0.005] [0.010] 
Private Insurance 0.022 0.011 0.003 0.001 0.013* 
  [0.013] [0.008] [0.008] [0.003] [0.007] 
Medicare 0.014 0.009 -0.007 -0.001 0.017* 
  [0.019] [0.011] [0.011] [0.005] [0.010] 
Female 0.012 0.006 0.012** 0 0.002 
  [0.008] [0.005] [0.005] [0.002] [0.004] 
White 0.054 0.028 0.018 -0.024** -0.011 
  [0.050] [0.029] [0.030] [0.012] [0.027] 
Black 0.067 0.034 0.005 -0.02 -0.027 
  [0.051] [0.029] [0.031] [0.012] [0.027] 
Asian 0.064 0.052* 0 -0.015 -0.002 
  [0.053] [0.031] [0.032] [0.013] [0.028] 
Hispanic 0.001 0.005 -0.012 -0.003 0.007 
  [0.014] [0.008] [0.009] [0.003] [0.008] 
Age 0.004*** 0.003*** -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 
  [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Age^2 -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000** -0.000** -0.000*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Acute 0.021 0.016* -0.013 0.002 -0.106*** 
  [0.015] [0.009] [0.009] [0.004] [0.008] 
Chronic Routine 0.014 0.011 -0.012 -0.001 0.009 
  [0.016] [0.009] [0.010] [0.004] [0.009] 
Chronic Flare-up 0.053*** 0.016 0.003 0.003 -0.098*** 
  [0.018] [0.010] [0.011] [0.004] [0.010] 
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Table 7.7 (Continued) 
Pre/Post Surgery -0.094*** -0.023 -0.037** -0.004 -0.120*** 
  [0.027] [0.015] [0.016] [0.006] [0.014] 
Northeast 0.009 -0.01 -0.003 0 0.031*** 
  [0.012] [0.007] [0.007] [0.003] [0.007] 
Midwest 0.018 0 0.008 0.002 0.074*** 
  [0.012] [0.007] [0.007] [0.003] [0.006] 
South 0.063*** 0.013** 0.016** 0.003 0.048*** 
  [0.011] [0.006] [0.006] [0.003] [0.006] 
New Patient 0.014 0.007 0.017*** 0.001 -0.047*** 
  [0.011] [0.006] [0.007] [0.003] [0.006] 
Physician Owner 0.025 0.005 -0.001 0.001 0.023** 
  [0.019] [0.011] [0.011] [0.004] [0.010] 
Physician is 
Employee 0.032 0.018 -0.007 0.002 0 
  [0.020] [0.011] [0.012] [0.005] [0.011] 
MSA 0.021* 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.009 
  [0.011] [0.006] [0.006] [0.003] [0.006] 
Time Trend 0.024*** 0.015*** 0.004* 0.001 -0.003 
  [0.004] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] 
Observations 9692 9692 9692 9692 9692 
R-squared 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.11 
In the allergy diagnosis sample, capitated physicians are more likely than FFS, 
in the before OTC period to provide Allegra.  After the availability of an OTC, FFS 
physicians decrease their overall use of allergy prescriptions and Allegra, but increase 
the use of Zyrtec and Clarinex.  Again, because of the decreased likelihood in overall 
prescription use, after OTC availability, the results indicate that some physicians are 
shifting their patients to other, prescription only drugs, while others are perhaps 
utilizing Claritin OTC. 
FFS physicians are also more likely to provide allergy shots after the 
availability of an allergy OTC.  Again, this could be due to FFS physicians shifting 
costs away from the patient and towards the insurance company.  As described before, 
since many companies dropped coverage for antihistamines, FFS physicians provide 
allergy shots to patients, since these are still covered under their health plans.  The 
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patient, hence, does not have to bear the full cost of a prescription, but can instead pay 
the copay amounts associated with shots. 
 Capitated physicians are less likely than FFS to provide allergy shots for this 
population, after the availability of an OTC.  Again, this is as expected since allergy 
shots are no longer the least costly form of treatment.  After the availability of Claritin 
OTC, capitated physicians are also less likely than FFS to provide Allegra. 
 The probit and marginal effects results for the allergy sample are found in 
Tables A.2. and A.4., respectively.  According the table from the marginal effects 
estimations, none of results for the pre-OTC capitation variable are significant.  In the 
post-OTC period, FFS physicians are 10.8% less likely to give out prescriptions and 
are 3.6% less likely to prescribe Allegra; however, these physicians are more likely to 
give allergy shots by 1.9%.  After the availability of Claritin OTC, capitated 
physicians, compared to FFS, are less likely to prescribe Allegra by 1.5% and less 
likely to provide allergy shots by 0.6%.   
 Both private insurance and Medicare patients are more likely than Medicaid to 
get allergy shots.  Females are more likely to get Zyrtec in the allergy group and 
whites are less likely to get Clarinex.  With this sample as well, acute patients are less 
likely than preventive care to get allergy shots, as are chronic flare-up patients. 
Severity Results 
 It is expected that after the availability of an OTC, the overall case-mix of 
patients seen in physician offices will be of higher severity.  The measures used to 
examine severity include: seeing a specialist physician; and the nature of the condition 
(acute, chronic routine, and chronic flare-up).  Both time spent with the 
physician/specialist as well as total number of diagnostic tests are also examined, but 
are not used as measures of severity.  The severity of patient case-mix is expected to 
change only for the allergy diagnosis sample, since the drug moving to the OTC 
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market is relevant to this group only.  Therefore, the analysis done for severity is only 
conducted on the allergy group.  The following cross tabulations are used to frame the 
expectations from the severity analysis. 
Table 7.8 
Probability of Patient Type/Severity Indicators Before and After Claritin OTC Event - 
Insured Allergy Sample 
Note: Sample consists of all patients in NAMCS 1997-2000, 2003-2004, limited to those 
with insurance but not limited to those with an acid reflux indication 
    
  Pre-Claritin OTC Post-Claritin OTC Difference 
Allergy Specialist Seen 7.16% 7.96% 0.80% 
Acute 47.74 46.84 -0.90 
Chronic Routine 28.53 30.92 2.39 
Chronic Flare-up 13.94 12.06 -1.88 
Time Spent with Physician 16.86 15.80 -1.05 
Total Number of Diag.Tests 0.50 0.46 -0.05 
Time Spent with Allergy 
Specialist 22.12 14.49 -7.63 
Total Number of Diag.Tests 
Allergy Specialist 0.40 0.37 -0.03 
 According to the above table, allergy specialists are more likely to be seen 
after the availability of an OTC.  Acute patients and chronic flare-up are less likely to 
make physician office visits as expected, since these patients can self-treat.  Chronic 
routine patients have an increased likelihood to make a physician office visit after the 
availability of Claritin OTC.  Time spent and total number of diagnostic tests decrease 
amongst all physicians as well as amongst specialists, after the availability of an OTC.  
While there were no expectations for these two variables, they are included to examine 
the effects in physician offices after the availability of an OTC. 
 Table 7.9 provides the results for the variables used in the patient severity 
regressions from only the allergy sample since severity of the non-allergy group is not 
expected to change after the availability of an OTC in the allergy drug class.
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         The main variable of interest from these equations is allergy OTC.  This variable 
is an indicator for when Claritin moves to the OTC market.  The above results show 
that there is an increased likelihood, after the availability of an OTC, for allergy 
patients to see a specialist physician.  There is also a decreased likelihood of chronic 
flare-up patients making a physician office visit.  This is consistent with the earlier 
hypothesis that these patients may try to self-treat their temporarily exacerbated 
symptoms rather than see a physician.  It was expected that acute patients would be 
less likely to make physician office visits in the after OTC period.  The resulting 
coefficient is positive, which is not as expected, but this result is not significant. 
 It was also found that specialists are less likely to be seen under capitation than 
FFS.  Acute patients are more likely to be seen and chronic routine are less likely to be 
seen under capitated plans than under FFS.  Acute patients are less likely to be seen by 
specialists, as expected since this group is thought to have less severe symptoms.   
 Tables A.5 and A.6. show the results from the probit and marginal effect 
estimations for severity.  According to these results, after the availability of an OTC, 
there is a 2.5% increase in the likelihood of seeing a specialist physician and a 3.2% 
decrease in the likelihood of a Chronic Flare-up patient seen in the physician’s office. 
Table 7.10 provides the results of the regressions examining time spent with 
the physician and the total number of diagnostic tests ordered.  Again, because the 
effect of OTC is only expected on the allergy diagnosis, only this group is being 
studied. 
 The results for allergy OTC in these regressions are not significant for 
physicians in general, nor are they significant for specialist.  Interestingly, capitated 
physicians are likely to spend less time with patients than FFS and are more likely to 
order tests.  This perhaps indicates that capitated physicians substitute time spent with 
diagnostic testing. 
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Table 7.10 
Time Spent and Diagnostic Tests Regressions NAMCS 1997 – 2004 Allergy Sample 
Note – 2001 and 2002 are excluded from these regressions. 
Standard Errors in Brackets 
*significant at 10%  **significant at 5%  ***significant at 1% 
 
 1 2 3 4 
  
Time 
Spent 
with 
Physician 
Total 
Number of 
Diag. Tests 
Time 
Spent 
with  
Specialist 
Physician 
Total 
Number 
of Diag. 
Tests 
Specialist 
Physician 
AllergyOTC -0.525 -0.03 -4.187 -0.146 
  [0.611] [0.040] [3.155] [0.108] 
Private Insurance 0.313 -0.100*** 1.263 0.071 
  [0.381] [0.025] [1.871] [0.064] 
Medicare 0.199 -0.048 -2.42 -0.103 
  [0.548] [0.036] [2.894] [0.099] 
Capitated Visit -0.765*** 0.078*** 1.244 -0.101* 
  [0.276] [0.018] [1.569] [0.054] 
Female -0.462** 0.017 -2.045* -0.015 
  [0.223] [0.015] [1.086] [0.037] 
White 0.185 -0.139 5.557 0.438 
  [1.417] [0.092] [13.892] [0.476] 
Black 0.831 -0.038 6.401 0.495 
  [1.459] [0.095] [13.987] [0.479] 
Asian -1.055 -0.08 5.8 0.414 
  [1.514] [0.098] [14.088] [0.483] 
Hispanic -1.103*** 0.021 -3.567** -0.100* 
  [0.412] [0.027] [1.758] [0.060] 
Age 0.046*** 0.024*** 0.034 0.011*** 
  [0.017] [0.001] [0.092] [0.003] 
Age^2 0 -0.000*** 0 -0.000** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] 
Acute -2.153*** -0.441*** -3.342 0.063 
  [0.442] [0.029] [2.972] [0.101] 
Chronic Routine -2.289*** -0.566*** -5.290* 0.019 
  [0.463] [0.030] [2.713] [0.092] 
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Table 7.10 (Continued) 
Chronic Flare-up -0.188 -0.494*** 3.355 0.268*** 
  [0.512] [0.033] [2.922] [0.100] 
Pre/Post Surgery -1.322* -0.808*** -7.346 0.371 
  [0.766] [0.050] [10.176] [0.349] 
Northeast -0.872** -0.006 -6.030*** -0.393*** 
  [0.346] [0.023] [1.682] [0.058] 
Midwest -3.564*** -0.018 0.536 -0.002 
  [0.341] [0.022] [1.983] [0.068] 
South -1.290*** -0.006 -4.802*** -0.161*** 
  [0.307] [0.020] [1.496] [0.051] 
New Patient 5.906*** -0.128*** 25.516*** 0.311*** 
  [0.313] [0.020] [1.572] [0.054] 
Physician Owner -1.369** -0.018 -6.462 0.008 
  [0.536] [0.035] [3.971] [0.134] 
Physician is Employee -0.466 0.128*** 2.146 0.099 
  [0.566] [0.037] [4.404] [0.149] 
MSA 0.228 -0.063*** 7.295** -0.138 
  [0.306] [0.020] [3.311] [0.113] 
Time Trend -0.011 -0.007 0.332 0.056** 
  [0.114] [0.007] [0.642] [0.022] 
Observations 9690 9692 721 722 
R-squared 0.06 0.11 0.44 0.19 
Allergy Market Discussion 
 The change in regulatory status of Claritin from prescription-only to OTC 
spurred many changes in the antihistamine drug class.  While Clarinex was launched 
by Schering-Plough as an attempt to capture the prescription market share of Claritin, 
it was unable to fully accomplish this.  Both Allegra and Zyrtec had increased market 
shares after the Claritin switch, as expected.      
 One of the most interesting results of this analysis came with the Allergy Shots 
regressions.  Allergy shots, before the availability of any OTC products, were the 
lowest cost of treatment according to other studies.  After the movement of Claritin to 
the OTC market, insurance companies no longer covered this drug and in fact many 
stopped coverage for antihistamines altogether.   
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 As was proposed, capitated physicians had the incentive to reduce the cost of 
care in order to maximize their profits.  For this reason, according to these results, 
capitated physicians were found to be more likely to provide allergy shots than FFS 
before the availability of an OTC.  After the availability of an OTC, capitated 
physicians were less likely than FFS to provide allergy shots, while FFS was more 
likely in the after OTC period to provide shots than before. Capitated physicians, 
therefore, seem to reduce the use of allergy shots once an OTC becomes available 
because these are no longer the lowest cost treatment.  From these results, capitated 
physicians seem to act as an agent for the insurance company by shifting costs away 
from the payer, to the patient.  FFS physicians, however, act as an agent for patients, 
by protecting them from the full cost of prescription medications when providing 
allergy shots in the after OTC period. 
 The results for the severity regressions indicate that specialists are more likely 
to be used after the availability of an OTC.  This measure indicates that perhaps 
severity has increased, as specialists are more likely to deal with severe patients than 
primary care physicians.  Also, the results indicate that, in the post OTC period, those 
patients with chronic conditions are likely to self-treat, as opposed to visiting a 
physician’s office when their symptoms are exacerbated.
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CHAPTER 8 
ACID REFLUX CLASS ANALYSIS 
Acid reflux, or heart burn, is characterized by a burning discomfort in the throat or 
chest, caused by the presence of acid in the esophagus.  Infrequent acid reflux is 
typically caused by various types of foods or drinks.  Frequent or chronic heart burn is 
generally due to permanent changes in the barrier between the esophagus and the 
stomach.  Gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD) can be defined as heartburn that 
occurs more than twice a week, and can lead to more serious health problems 
(NDDIC, 2005).  These complications include:  
• Esophageal Narrowing – In this condition, cells in the lower esophagus are 
damaged due to acid exposure which leads to the formation of scar tissue. 
The scar tissue then narrows the food pathway and can interfere with 
swallowing.  
• Esophageal Ulcer – With this condition, stomach acids create an open sore by 
eroding tissues in the esophagus.  
• Barrett’s Esophagus - Although uncommon, this disease is caused by repeated 
and long-term exposure to stomach acid and causes a cellular change 
associated with an increased risk of esophageal cancer (Mayo Clinic, 2005). 
 Treatments for acid reflux or GERD range from simple lifestyle changes to the 
use of medications, and even surgery in more extreme cases.  Physicians often initially 
recommend patients to adjust particular parts of their lifestyle in order to alleviate 
symptoms of acid reflux.  These changes include: avoiding alcohol; avoiding 
cigarettes; losing weight; eating smaller meals; wearing loose fitted clothing; and 
raising the head of a bed 6-8 inches so that the patient is not lying flat, but rather at an 
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angle.  Physicians also advise patients to make dietary changes and avoid certain 
foods.  These foods include: citrus products, such as oranges and lemons; chocolate; 
drinks with caffeine; fried foods; garlic and onions; mint flavorings; spicy foods; and 
tomato-based products (NDDIC, 2003).   
 Surgery is not a common treatment for acid reflux or GERD, but it remains an 
option for those who have other complications; for those who do not want to remain 
dependent on medications; or for those who cannot tolerate these drugs.  
Fundoplication is the most common of surgeries and involves tightening the lower 
esophageal sphincter to prevent stomach acid from moving into the throat/esophagus.  
Endoluminal gastroplication is another form of surgery in which stitches are sewn into 
the stomach, near the weakened sphincter to strengthen it and prevent the flow of acid 
into the esophagus.  Finally, the stretta procedure uses radiofrequency energy to melt 
tissues within the esophagus that contain the weakened valve (Mayo Clinic, 2005).   
Acid Reflux Medications 
 The use medication is the most common form of treatment for acid-
reflux/GERD.  Drugs in this category are widely available and include both over-the-
counter and prescription-only products.  Antacids, one of the oldest acid reflux 
medications, neutralize stomach acids and usually provide quick-relief.  These are 
OTC products and are generally used by those with mild or occasional heart burn 
problems.  Some familiar antacids include: Maalox, Mylanta, Rolaids, and Tums.   
 Histamine-2 (H-2) Antagonists, also known as H-2 Receptor Blockers, reduce 
the production of acid, instead of acting as neutralizing agents like Antacids.  These 
drugs do not act as quickly as their earlier counterparts; however they do provide 
longer relief.  Some brand names included in this category are: Tagamet, Pepcid AC, 
Axid, or Zantac.  H-2 Antagonists are readily available in the OTC market.           
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 Proton pump inhibitors (PPIs) are the youngest of acid-reflux medications; 
they are long-acting; and the most effective.  These drugs work by blocking the 
production of acid and thereby allow time for the esophageal tissue that has been 
damaged by stomach acids, to heal.  Common brands of PPIs include: Prilosec, 
Nexium, Prevacid, and Protonix (Mayo Clinic, 2005).  
Prilosec 
 Prilosec, the world’s most prescribed drug from 1996 – 2000, was a major 
entrant into the OTC market in 2003.  H-2 Antagonists such as Zantac and Tagamet, 
along with antacids were the products already in the OTC market, while the more 
effective proton pump inhibitors (PPIs) such as Prilosec and Prevacid were available 
by prescription only.  Because the drug was approaching patent expiration, Astra-
Zeneca made Prilosec the first of the PPIs to switch to the OTC market (Goozner, 
2004).   
Rx-to-OTC switches can be less profitable for companies that are solely 
involved in the prescription-only market. Therefore, some of these companies create 
partnerships for OTC marketing with companies that have the infrastructure and 
expertise to market the drug as a consumer product. In order to ensure a successful 
switch, Astra-Zeneca, the parent company of Prilosec, created a licensing agreement 
with Proctor & Gamble and the two companies conducted the switch of Prilosec 
jointly (Mahecha, 2006).  Both companies worked closely to develop the clinical data 
needed for the Rx-to-OTC switch and because of Procter & Gamble’s success in 
bringing consumer health care products to market, it handled the marketing and 
distribution of Prilosec OTC in the U.S. and Puerto Rico (National Heartburn 
Alliance, 2002).   
A great deal of debate took place between these companies and the FDA 
regarding claims, usage, and the risk for more serious conditions, such as ulcers and 
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gastroesophageal reflux disease to go undiagnosed.  Eventually Prilosec was approved 
for OTC sales on June 20, 2003.  Prilosec was also given the 3 year Hatch Waxman 
extension, giving it market exclusivity until June 20, 2006 (FDA Orange Book, 2006).  
The first year of Prilosec OTC sales were nearly $300 million (Mahecha, 2006).   
Astra-Zeneca attempted to transition patients off from Prilosec, even before it 
was moved to the OTC market, to their younger prescription-only PPI, Nexium, which 
still had patent protection.  The parent company of both these drugs had intensive 
DTC and detailing promotions to move people to the “new purple pill”.   These 
advertising efforts were successful as can be seen by the market shares of these 
medications.  Prilosec had 40% of the market share for worldwide sales of PPIs in 
2002, the year before it moved into the OTC market.  Nexium took over some of this 
by claiming a 30% market share in 2003.  Although it had switched to the OTC 
market, Prilosec still maintained nearly 20% of the market even after 2003. 
Overall, PPIs performed well in terms of sales, even after the switch of 
Prilosec.  Total sales for this category were up by 11.6% and made PPIs the top selling 
drug class for 2003.  Individually, drugs also performed well: Prevacid was up 9%; 
Nexium was up 54%; and Protonix was up 52% (Gebhart, 2004).  
Figure 8.1 shows the percent of market share of worldwide sales for each PPI 
and for Zantac, an H2 Antagonist.  Zantac is included because, even though it is an 
OTC for all years included, it is one of Prilosec’s major competitors, especially in the 
earlier years of the graph.  The percent market share of Prilosec peaks in 1999.  After 
2001, Prilosec’s percent market share declines substantially per year.  This is the same 
year in which Nexium is introduced.  By 2003, Nexium becomes the market leader, 
followed by Prevacid.  While Protonix is the newest of the Proton Pump Inhibitor 
class, its market share remains below 20% for the entire time period depicted in the 
figure.  
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Figure 8.1 
Percent of Worldwide Sales by Drug - Acid Reflux Class 
The companies that make these medications are well known for their heavy 
advertising efforts.  Figure 8.2 shows the direct-to-consumer advertising amounts for 
each of the PPIs, along with the advertising for Zantac.  Since Zantac is an OTC 
medication throughout the time period of this analysis, the regulations for advertising 
of this drug are different from those of prescription medications.  In addition, it is 
generally less expensive to advertise OTC medications because of these more relaxed 
rules for advertising.  The data from Figure 8.2 was collected through CMR and Med 
Ad News, which does not include most OTC drugs.  Therefore, the advertising amount 
for Prilosec OTC in 2004 is missing from the data.  Astra-Zeneca seems to begin the 
complete phase out of Prilosec between 2000 and 2001.  The company reduces its 
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advertising of Prilosec to nearly nothing in this time period and instead begins its 
promotion for Nexium in 2001.  Interestingly, this replacement occurs two years 
before Prilosec actually moves to the OTC market.       
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Figure 8.2 
Advertising Dollars Spent per Year by Drug – Acid Reflux Class 
Acid Reflux NAMCS Data 
For the analysis of the acid reflux/GERD market, the NAMCS 1997 – 2000, 
2003 - 2004 is used again.  As was done with the allergy group, the entire data set was 
first used to examine the use of acid reflux drugs because approximately half of the 
prescriptions for these medications were given to patients with non-acid reflux 
diagnoses.  Because of the nature of the NAMCS, in that diagnoses are very 
specifically defined, it was not possible to find any one non-acid reflux diagnosis that 
dominated these prescriptions.   
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The data was then limited to only those patients with an acid-reflux or related 
diagnosis.  The data was also restricted, both for the entire population as well the acid-
reflux population, to just the insured.  This is done so that the effects of capitation and 
FFS can be compared clearly, without drawing in comparisons with the uninsured 
group.   
 This data, when restricted to the insured acid reflux group, provides a total 
sample of 5,386 acid reflux patient visits, averaging over 800 acid-reflux patient visits 
per year.  Nearly 57.8% of the acid reflux sub-population is female, while over 85.4% 
is white, and the average age is 49.5 years, slightly older than the average for the 
entire population.  Private insurance covers 60% of the patients, while 29.2% are 
covered by Medicare, and 10.8% by Medicaid.  Capitated plans were accepted by 
27.4% of physicians.  Over 70% of acid-reflux patients received a medication at their 
visit.  While 65.3% received a prescription drug, 14.4% received an OTC, and 
approximately 17% of the patients were given an acid reflux prescription.  When 
describing their major reason for visit, 45.1% claimed to have an acute problem 
(symptoms occurring for 3 months or less); over 30% had chronic routine problems; 
and 13% had flare-ups of chronic conditions. 
 The following figures are first used to examine the acid reflux diagnosis in the 
NAMCS sample.  Figure 8.3 shows the number of prescriptions of each acid reflux 
drug for the total NAMCS population.  Figure 8.4 shows the number of prescriptions 
for each acid reflux drug as well, but for the group diagnosed with an acid reflux 
condition.  For each of these graphs, it should be noted that Prilosec is classified as an 
OTC drug only in 2004. 
 Prescriptions for Prilosec peak in 2000 and then begin to fall in 2001, the same 
year Nexium enters the market.  Nexium overtakes Prilosec in number of prescriptions 
in 2002.  Prevacid has the most number of prescriptions in the NAMCS from 2002 – 
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2004.  Prescriptions for Zantac fall in 2004, as expected since this is when Prilosec is 
OTC and creates direct competition with Zantac, in the same market. 
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Figure 8.3 
Number of Prescriptions by Drug NAMCS 1997 – 2004 Total Insured Sample 
Both Figures 8.3 and 8.4 seem to follow similar patterns.  Physicians are found 
to decrease the use of Prilosec for acid reflux patients earlier than they do for all other 
patients, as the prescriptions for Prilosec for the acid reflux group peak in 1999, while 
they peak in 2000 for the total sample.  Just as with the entire insured NAMCS 
sample, Prevacid has the most prescriptions from 2002 – 2004 for the group with an 
acid reflux related diagnosis.  All prescriptions decrease from 2003 – 2004, but Zantac 
has the steepest decline, after having reached a peak in 2003 for the acid reflux 
diagnosis group.  Amongst both populations, Protonix continues a steady increase in 
number of prescriptions after its introduction in 2000.   
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Figure 8.4 
Number of Prescriptions by Drug NAMCS 1997 – 2004 Acid Reflux Sample 
To examine severity for this market the percentage of patients that see a 
gastrointestinal specialist are analyzed.  These percentages are for both the entire, 
insured NAMCS sample, as well as for the acid reflux sample, and are depicted in 
Figure 8.5. 
The percentage of patients seeing a gastrointestinal specialist for the general 
insured NAMCS population does not seem to change much.  This percentage for the 
acid reflux/GERD population, however, fluctuates over the years.  An increase in the 
use of gastrointestinal specialists is found in 2004, the year after Prilosec moved to the 
OTC market, an indication that perhaps severity has increased.  This is the only year 
of data after the switch takes place, however, making it difficult to formulate any 
concrete conclusions from this result. 
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Figure 8.5 
Percent of Patients Seeing Gastrointestinal Specialist by Diagnosis Group – NAMCS 
1997 – 2004 
Severity is also measured using the nature of the patient’s illness, which 
includes acute, chronic routine, and chronic flare-up.  Acute patients are assumed to 
have the least severe conditions since their conditions are short term and may in fact 
be temporary.  Chronic routine patients are assumed to be more severe because their 
conditions have lasted over a longer time period and they are likely to have utilized 
more resources in diagnosis and treatment.  While chronic flare-up patients are 
expected to have severe conditions, they may act more similarly to acute patients since 
their conditions are also likely to be short term or temporary.   
Figure 8.6 depicts the trend in visits for each of these types of patients for the 
acid reflux group.  This graph indicates an increase in the number of visits from 
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chronic routine patients between 2003 and 2004.  Also, Figure 8.6 indicates a decrease 
in the number of visits from acute patients after 2002, and especially after 2003, when 
Prilosec moves to the OTC market, while chronic flare-up remains unchanged.   
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Figure 8.6 
Percent of Visits by Patient Type – All Physicians – NAMCS 1997 – 2004 Acid 
Reflux Sample 
Figure 8.7 also depicts office visits by patient type, but for specialist 
physicians.  Office visits to specialists by patient type in the above graph vary greatly 
year by year.  While it is difficult to make any conclusions from this figure, there is a 
decrease in acute patients seen in specialist offices after 2003, when Prilosec becomes 
available on the OTC market.  There is also a leveling off of chronic flare-up patients 
after this time period as well, following an increase between 2002 and 2003. Visits 
from chronic routine patients increased in 2004. 
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Figure 8.7 
Percent of Visits by Patient Type – Gastrointestinal Specialists – NAMCS 1997 – 
2004 Acid Reflux Sample 
Table 8.1 provides the descriptive statistics for the acid reflux group.  The data 
used for these statistics reflect the same data used in the regression analysis conducted 
later.  The capitation variable asks whether or not the physician accepts capitated 
payments.  This variable was only available in the NAMCS survey for the years 1997 
– 2000 and then again for the  2003 – 2004 surveys.  The capitation variable was not 
included in the 2001 and 2002 surveys, and therefore these years are dropped from the 
actual regression analysis done later.  For this reason, these two years are also not 
included in the descriptive statistics table.   
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Table 8.1 
Descriptive Statistics - Acid Reflux Insured Sample NAMCS 1997-2000, 2003-2004 
  Frequency Percentage Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
Year             
1997 815 15.13         
1998 803 14.91         
1999 720 13.37         
2000 962 17.86         
2003 1047 19.44         
2004 1039 19.29         
Total Obs. 5386           
Gender             
Female 3112 57.78         
Male (omitted group) 2274 42.22         
Age     49.45 23.61 0 100 
Race             
White 4601 85.43         
Black 517 9.60         
Asian 236 4.38         
Other (omitted 
group) 32 0.59         
Hispanic Ethnicity             
Yes 430 7.98         
No 4956 92.02         
Paytype             
Private Insurance 3233 60.03         
Medicare 1570 29.15         
Medicaid (omitted 
group) 583 10.82         
Primary Care 
Physician?             
Yes 2701 50.15         
No 2685 49.85         
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Table 8.1 (Continued) 
Specialist?             
Yes 2514 46.68         
No 2872 53.32         
Gastro Specialist?             
Yes 527 9.78         
No 4859 90.22         
Patient Referred for 
this visit?             
Yes 1318 24.47         
No 4068 75.53         
Has patient been seen 
here before?             
Yes  4442 82.47         
No 922 17.12         
Missing 22 0.41         
Were Any 
Medications 
Provided?             
Yes 3778 70.14         
No 1608 29.85         
Total Number of 
Medications     1.79 1.80 0 6 
Were any 
Prescription Drugs 
Given?             
Yes 3517 65.30         
No 1869 34.70         
Were any OTC 
Drugs Given?             
Yes 777 14.43         
No 4609 85.57         
Were any Gastro 
Prescriptions Given?             
Yes 918 17.04         
No 4468 82.96         
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Table 8.1 (Continued) 
Was Nexium Given?             
       
Yes 109 2.02         
No 5277 97.98         
Was Prevacid Given?             
Yes 339 6.29         
No 5047 93.71         
Was Protonix Given?             
Yes 75 1.39         
No 5311 98.61         
Was Zantac Given?             
Yes 256 4.75         
No 5130 95.25         
Gastro OTC 
Available             
Yes 1036 19.24         
No 4350 80.76         
Prilosec OTC Market 
Share     0.04 0.07 0 0.185 
Major Reason For 
Visit             
Acute Problem 2430 45.12         
Chronic Problem, 
Routine 1635 30.36         
Chronic Problem, 
Flareup 702 13.03         
Preventive Care  
(omitted group) 314 5.83         
Pre/Post Surgery 193 3.58         
Missing 112 2.08         
Region             
Northeast 952 17.68         
Midwest 1285 23.86         
South 2043 37.93         
West (omitted group) 1106 20.53         
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Table 8.1 (Continued) 
Metro. Stat. Area             
MSA 4390 81.51         
Non-MSA 996 18.49         
Solo Practice?             
Yes 1956 36.32         
No 3430 63.68         
Employment Status 
of Physician             
Owner  3891 72.24         
Employee 1261 23.41         
Contractor (omitted 
group) 170 3.16         
Missing 64 1.19         
Capitation Payment 
Accepted?             
Yes 1478 27.44         
No 3908 72.56         
Capitation by 
Insurance Breakdown 
(Percent are of total 
Capitated Pop.)             
Private Insurance 
Capitation 986 66.71         
Medicare Capitation 340 23.00         
Medicaid Capitation 152 10.28         
Total 1478           
Total Number of 
Tests     1.04 1.02 0 7 
Total Number of 
Tests with Gastro 
Specialist     0.76 0.68 0 6 
Time Spent with 
Physician (in 
minutes)     20.52 12.93 0 240 
Time Spent with 
Gastro Specialist     24.47 15.23 0 120 
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Acid Reflux Results 
 As mentioned earlier in the theory section, the case mix of patients is expected 
to become more severe after the availability of an OTC drug and capitated physicians 
are hypothesized to provide OTC medications to minimize costs, thereby maximizing 
profits.  For the acid reflux group, Proton Pump Inhibitors, as well as one H2 
Antagonist, Zantac, are examined. Prilosec is the drug that moves to the OTC market 
in 2003, while Nexium, Prevacid, and Protonix are the drugs in the prescription-only 
market.  Zantac, an OTC in all years of data, is included because of its strong market 
share and competition with Prilosec. 
 The following cross tabulations are used to help frame the predictions of the 
effect of an OTC medication for the acid reflux group. 
 Table 8.2, the probability of receiving each drug, before and after the 
availability of Prilosec OTC, is shown.  Table 8.3 depicts the probability of each 
prescription, before and after Prilosec OTC, but broken down by reimbursement type.  
Both of these tables are for the entire insured NAMCS sample.  Tables 8.4 and 8.5 
repeat these analyses, but for the insured acid reflux population. 
Table 8.2 indicates that there is a decreased likelihood of acid reflux 
prescriptions in general, after the availability of Prilosec OTC.  This table also shows a 
decreased likelihood of Zantac being prescribed in the post OTC period.  This is 
expected, since once Prilosec is on the OTC market, it competes more directly with 
Zantac and may take some of its market share.  Table 8.4 also shows that there is a 
decrease in the likelihood of receiving any acid reflux prescription or Zantac after the 
Prilosec OTC period for the acid reflux group.  This table also indicates that Prevacid 
is less likely to be prescribed after the availability of an OTC amongst those patients 
with an acid reflux related diagnosis. 
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            FFS physicians are expected to continue providing prescription medications to 
their patients to ensure repeat visits.  Once Prilosec moves to the OTC market, it is 
expected that FFS physicians will be likely to move away from prescribing this drug, 
and will instead provide more Nexium, Prevacid, or Protonix.  In the entire insured 
sample, the tabulations in Table 8.3 show an increased probability that FFS physicians 
will provide each of the brand name prescriptions, except Zantac.  FFS physicians are 
likely to provide less Zantac in the post OTC period, as expected, since Prilosec OTC 
may be used as a substitute.   
Amongst the acid reflux sample, as shown in Table 8.5, FFS physicians are 
more likely to provide Nexium and Protonix to patients in the post OTC period.  The 
table shows that the use of Prevacid decreases after the availability of an OTC, as does 
the use of Zantac and acid reflux prescriptions in general. 
Capitated physicians, before the availability of a Prilosec OTC are expected to 
provide the least costly form of treatment.  Amongst the drugs analyzed here, it is 
expected that in the before Prilosec OTC period, these physicians will be more likely 
to provide patients with Zantac since this is an OTC drug already, and is likely to be 
the least expensive.   
Once Prilosec moves to the OTC market, it is also expected that the capitated 
physician will be even less likely to provide Nexium, Prevacid, or Protonix.  Also, 
these physicians are likely to decrease their use of Zantac, since they can now 
substitute with Prilosec OTC. 
 Tables 8.3 and 8.5 above show that under capitation, there is a decreased 
likelihood of acid reflux prescriptions, in general, after the availability of Prilosec 
OTC for both groups.  Capitated physicians are likely to increase their use of Nexium 
and Protonix in the after OTC period, while they are likely to decrease their use of 
Prevacid and Zantac. 
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The difference in difference columns in Tables 8.3 and 8.5 allow for the 
comparison of capitation before and after Prilosec OTC with FFS before and after 
Prilosec OTC.  If there are no differences in their reaction to the availability of an 
OTC, the change between the two groups should be zero.  The table shows that the 
difference is not zero, indicating that the two groups are reacting to the availability of 
an OTC differently. 
Table 8.6 provides the prescription drug regression results for the entire 
insured NAMCS population.   The first three independent variables will be the focus 
in the analysis of the regression results.   
The results show that before the availability of an OTC, for the entire insured 
population, capitated physicians are more likely than FFS to provide Zantac, as 
expected since this the least costly form of treatment amongst these medications. 
Capitated physicians, however, are also more likely than FFS to provide Nexium and 
Protonix than FFS before the availability of Prilosec OTC.  This was unexpected since 
Protonix is the youngest of the PPI medications, and is likely to be the most 
expensive. 
After the availability of an OTC, it was expected that FFS physicians would be 
more likely to use any of the other prescription medications, since they should 
transition patients from Prilosec to one of the other prescription-only products.  The 
results show that FFS physicians in the after Prilosec OTC period are less likely to 
provide prescriptions in general and less likely to provide Prevacid.  These physicians, 
however, are more likely to provide Nexium and Protonix than before Prilosec OTC.  
Because of the decreased likelihood in overall prescription use, after OTC availability, 
the results indicate that some physicians are shifting their patients to other, 
prescription only drugs, while others are perhaps utilizing Prilosec OTC. 
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Table 8.6 
Acid Reflux OLS Regression Results for Entire Insured Sample NAMCS 1997 – 2004 
(Note - Regressions exclude years 2001 and 2002) 
Standard Errors in Brackets 
*significant at 10%  **significant at 5%  ***significant at 1% 
 1 2 3 4 5 
  Gastro RX Nexium Prevacid Protonix Zantac 
Capitated Visit 0.001 0.001* 0 0.001** 0.002*** 
  [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
GastroOTC -0.006*** 0.001* -0.002** 0.002*** 0.001 
  [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Capitated Visit 
* GastroOTC 0.001 0 0 0 -0.002* 
  [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Private 
Insurance -0.003** 0 -0.001* 0 -0.002** 
  [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
Medicare -0.001 0 -0.001 0 -0.001 
  [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Female -0.001 -0.001** 0 0 -0.001 
  [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
White 0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.004 
  [0.005] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] 
Black 0.002 -0.001 0.002 0 0.005* 
  [0.005] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] 
Asian 0.008 0 0.005 0.001 0.006* 
  [0.006] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] 
Hispanic 0.002 0 0.001 0.001*** 0 
  [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
Age 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Age^2 -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000*** 0 0 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Acute 0.006*** 0.001 0.003*** 0 0.001** 
  [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
Chronic 
Routine 0.008*** 0.001** 0.003*** 0.001 0.002** 
  [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
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Table 8.6 (Continued) 
Chronic Flare-
up 0.010*** 0.001 0.005*** 0 0.002** 
  [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
Pre/Post 
Surgery -0.005*** 0 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002** 
  [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
Northeast 0.003** 0.001 0.001 0 0 
  [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
Midwest 0.003** 0 0.002*** 0 0.001 
  [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
South 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.001** 0 0.001** 
  [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
New Patient -0.006*** -0.001*** -0.001** 0 -0.002*** 
  [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
Physician 
Owner 0 0 0.001 0 -0.003*** 
  [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Physician is 
Employee 0.004** 0 0.003*** 0 -0.001 
  [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
MSA -0.003*** -0.001** 0 0 0.001** 
  [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
Time Trend 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Observations 121363 121363 121363 121363 121363 
R-squared 0.01 0 0 0 0 
 After the availability of an OTC, capitated physicians are less likely than FFS 
to provide Zantac to their patients.  This was as expected, since capitated physicians 
can now choose the lowest cost of treatment with either Zantac or Prilosec, as both 
OTCs are usually not covered under most drug policies. 
 The probit and marginal effects estimations for this sample are found in Tables 
A.7. and A.9., respectively.  According to the marginal effects, capitated physicians 
are 0.2% more likely to provide Zantac to their patients than FFS in the pre-OTC 
period.  After the availability of Prilosec OTC, FFS physicians are 0.4% less likely to 
provide prescriptions and 0.2% less likely to prescribe Prevacid.  Also, capitated 
physicians are 0.2% less likely to provide Zantac in the post-OTC period.    
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 In other results, private insurance patients are less likely to get acid reflux 
prescriptions than Medicaid.  Patients with private insurance are also less likely to 
receive Prevacid or Zantac.  Females are less likely to get Nexium, while black and 
Asian patients are more likely to get Zantac than Native Americans.  Acute patients 
are more likely to get acid reflux prescriptions, Prevacid, and Zantac as compared to 
preventive care patients.  Chronic routine patients are more likely that preventive care 
to receive all drugs except Protonix.  Chronic flare-up patients are more likely to 
receive acid reflux prescriptions as a whole.  They are also more likely get Prevacid 
and Zantac. 
 Table 8.7 provides the results of the prescription drug regressions for the acid 
reflux diagnosis group.  These results show that before the availability of an OTC, for 
the entire insured population, capitated physicians are more likely than FFS to provide 
Zantac.  Again, this is as expected since this the least costly form of treatment amongst 
these medications. 
The Gastro Rx regression results in both tables 8.6 and 8.7 show no evidence 
that capitated physicians are less likely to provide prescription drugs overall after the 
availability of an OTC.  This is not as predicted from the theory proposed earlier. 
However, since these physicians are more likely to utilize Zantac, they are already 
more likely to provide an OTC product to their patients, and therefore the availability 
of Prilosec OTC is not expected to change their behavior in regards to other 
prescription drugs.  Instead Prilosec provides more competition to Zantac, and 
capitated physicians should be found choosing between these two. 
 None of the results for the after OTC period are significant for FFS or 
capitated physicians.  It is hypothesized that for those already diagnosed with acid 
reflux, physicians may not be as motivated by profit with patients in this class because 
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the illness and complications associated with acid reflux and GERD can be more 
serious.   
Table 8.7 
Acid Reflux OLS Regression Results for Insured Acid Reflux Sample NAMCS 1997 – 
2004 
(Note – Regressions exclude years 2001 and 2002) 
Standard Errors in Brackets 
*significant at 10%  **significant at 5%  ***significant at 1% 
 1 2 3 4 5 
  Gastro RX Nexium Prevacid Protonix Zantac 
Capitated Visit 0.004 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.018** 
  [0.015] [0.006] [0.010] [0.005] [0.009] 
GastroOTC -0.034 0.007 -0.013 0.008 -0.019 
  [0.023] [0.009] [0.015] [0.007] [0.013] 
Capitated Visit * 
GastroOTC -0.032 -0.003 -0.016 -0.012 -0.018 
  [0.028] [0.010] [0.018] [0.009] [0.016] 
Private Insurance 0 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.007 
  [0.017] [0.006] [0.011] [0.005] [0.010] 
Medicare -0.007 -0.004 -0.009 -0.007 0.007 
  [0.021] [0.008] [0.014] [0.007] [0.012] 
Female -0.024** -0.005 -0.004 0.002 -0.002 
  [0.010] [0.004] [0.007] [0.003] [0.006] 
White 0.032 0.004 0.032 0.026 0.035 
  [0.066] [0.025] [0.043] [0.021] [0.038] 
Black 0.021 0.004 0.031 0.025 0.04 
  [0.068] [0.025] [0.044] [0.021] [0.039] 
Asian 0.078 -0.003 0.058 0.022 0.062 
  [0.070] [0.026] [0.046] [0.022] [0.040] 
Hispanic -0.006 0.005 -0.009 0.009 -0.008 
  [0.019] [0.007] [0.013] [0.006] [0.011] 
Age 0.007*** 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.001** 0.001 
  [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] 
Age^2 -0.000*** -0.000* -0.000*** 0 -0.000* 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Acute -0.002 0.001 -0.004 0.006 -0.036*** 
  [0.020] [0.007] [0.013] [0.006] [0.011] 
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Table 8.7 (Continued) 
Chronic Routine 0.060*** 0.005 0.017 0.012* -0.022* 
  [0.020] [0.008] [0.013] [0.006] [0.012] 
Chronic Flare-up 0.039* 0.01 0.017 0.003 -0.031** 
  [0.023] [0.009] [0.015] [0.007] [0.013] 
Pre/Post Surgery -0.025 0.004 -0.032 0.004 -0.043** 
  [0.032] [0.012] [0.021] [0.010] [0.018] 
Northeast 0.031* 0.005 -0.003 0.006 0.009 
  [0.017] [0.006] [0.011] [0.005] [0.010] 
Midwest 0.008 -0.004 0.002 -0.004 0.004 
  [0.016] [0.006] [0.010] [0.005] [0.009] 
South 0.035** 0.014** -0.008 0.002 0.007 
  [0.014] [0.005] [0.009] [0.005] [0.008] 
New Patient -0.054*** -0.013** -0.001 -0.004 -0.023*** 
  [0.014] [0.005] [0.009] [0.004] [0.008] 
Physician Owner -0.036 -0.005 0.026 -0.006 -0.036** 
  [0.025] [0.009] [0.017] [0.008] [0.015] 
Physician is Employee -0.022 -0.009 0.027 -0.003 -0.031** 
  [0.027] [0.010] [0.018] [0.008] [0.015] 
MSA -0.011 -0.001 -0.007 0.001 0.012 
  [0.013] [0.005] [0.009] [0.004] [0.008] 
Time Trend 0.004 0.009*** 0.003 0.006*** -0.003* 
  [0.003] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] 
Observations 5386 5386 5386 5386 5386 
R-squared 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 
Acid reflux/GERD, as described earlier, can lead to more serious problems 
such as ulcers and even cancer.  Hence, it is expected that physicians will be more 
cautious with the acid reflux/GERD patients, and will in fact prefer to monitor them 
closely.  Physicians may choose to maintain the treatments that have been successful 
for their patients rather than move them to other medications that may not work as 
well for them, simply for profit reasons. 
The results from the probit and marginal effects estimations for the acid reflux 
sample are found in Tables A.8. and A.10.  These tables show that capitated 
physicians are 1.4% more likely to provide Zantac to their patients than FFS in the 
pre-OTC period.  After the availability of an OTC, FFS physicians are 2.5% less likely 
to provide Zantac. 
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In the acid reflux sample, the results show that females are less likely to get a 
prescription.  Acute patients are found to be less likely to get Zantac than preventive 
care, as are chronic routine and chronic flare-up.  Chronic routine patients are more 
likely to get prescriptions in general and are more likely to get Protonix.  Chronic 
flare-up patients are more likely to get acid reflux prescriptions than preventive care. 
Severity Results 
 It is expected that after the availability of an OTC, the overall case-mix of 
patients seen in physician offices will be of higher severity.  The measures used to 
examine severity include: seeing a specialist physician; and the nature of the condition 
(acute, chronic routine, and chronic flare-up).  It is assumed that if conditions become 
more severe in the patient population seen in physician offices after the availability of 
an OTC, there may be a greater use of specialists.  This is because these physicians 
may be more equipped to handle complicated cases than primary care.  
 Acute patients are defined here as having the least severe conditions, since 
their symptoms have only been present for a short time period (i.e. less than three 
months).  Chronic routine patients have had symptoms for a longer time and have 
most likely used more resources in their diagnosis and treatment.  These patients are 
therefore considered to be more severe.  Chronic flare-up patients, while they may 
have severe conditions, they are expected to act similarly to acute patients since their 
symptoms could also be temporary.      
 Time spent with the physician/specialist as well as total number of diagnostic 
tests is also examined.  These two variables are not used as measures for severity, but 
rather to provide insight into the changes in physician offices, if any, after the 
availability of an OTC.  The severity of patient case-mix is expected to change only 
for the acid reflux diagnosis sample, since the drug moving to the OTC market is 
relevant to this group only.   
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Table 8.8 
Probability of Patient Type/Severity Indicators Before and After Prilosec OTC 
Event - Insured Acid Reflux Sample 
Note: Sample consists of all patients in NAMCS 1997-2000, 2003-2004, limited to 
those with insurance and those with an acid reflux indication 
  
Pre-Prilosec 
OTC 
Post-Prilosec 
OTC Difference 
Gastro Specialist Seen 9.84% 9.56% -0.2800% 
Acute 45.22 44.69 -0.53 
Chronic Routine 30.21 30.98 0.77 
Chronic Flare-up 13.22 12.26 -0.96 
Time Spent with 
Physician 20.75 19.55 -1.20 
Total Number of 
Diag.Tests 1.05 0.99 -0.05 
Time Spent with Gastro 
Specialist 26.38 16.21 -10.16 
Total Number of 
Diag.Tests Gastro 
Specialist 0.82 0.51 -0.31 
Table 8.8, used to frame the expectations for severity results, indicates that 
there is a decreased likelihood of specialist visits after the availability of Prilosec 
OTC.  Both Acute and Chronic Flare-up patients are less likely to be seen in physician 
offices after the availability of Prilosec OTC, which is in line with the expectation that 
these patients will self-treat.  Chronic routine patients have an increased likelihood of 
an office visit in the post OTC period according to the table above. Time spent and 
total number of diagnostic tests decrease amongst all physicians as well as amongst 
specialists, after the availability of an OTC.  Table 8.9 provides the results for the 
variables used in the patient severity regressions.  Only the acid reflux class of patients 
is used since a change in severity is only expected amongst patients with a diagnosis 
relevant to the class in which an OTC has become available. 
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The main variable of interest from these equations is gastro OTC.  This 
variable is an indicator for when Prilosec moves to the OTC market.  The above 
results show that there is an increased likelihood, after the availability of an OTC, for 
acid reflux patients to see a specialist physician.  There is also a decreased likelihood 
of acute patients making a physician office visit.  This is consistent with the earlier 
hypothesis that these less severe patients may try to self-treat.  Also, from the probit 
and marginal effects tables (A.11. and A.12.) it can be seen that acute patients are 
0.41% less likely to visit a physician’s office in the post-OTC period. 
In other results, private insurance patients are more likely to be acute patients 
than Medicaid and less likely to be chronic routine. Medicare patients are also less 
likely to be chronic routine than Medicaid, but are more likely to be chronic flare-up.  
Under capitation, patients are more likely to be acute and less likely to be chronic 
flare-up. 
Table 8.10 provides the results of the regressions examining time spent with 
the physician and the total number of diagnostic tests ordered.  Again, because the 
effect of OTC is only expected on the acid reflux diagnosis, only this group is being 
studied. 
The results show that time spent with the physician decreases after the 
availability of Prilosec OTC.  The decrease in time spent after Prilosec OTC is 
especially strong amongst specialist physicians.  Specialists are also found to be less 
likely to use diagnostic tests after Prilosec OTC.  Under capitation, there is less time 
spent with the physician than under FFS.  This is true for both physicians in general, 
as well as specialists.  Both private insurance and Medicare patients are more likely to 
spend time with the specialist than Medicaid. 
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Table 8.10 
Time Spent and Diagnostic Tests Regressions NAMCS 1997 – 2004  
Acid Reflux Sample 
Note – 2001 and 2002 are excluded from these regressions. 
Standard Errors in Brackets 
*significant at 10%  **significant at 5%  ***significant at 1% 
 1 2 3 4 
 
Time 
Spent with 
Physician 
Total Number of 
Diag. Tests 
Time Spent with 
Specialist 
Physician 
Total Number 
of Diag. Tests 
Specialist 
Physician 
GastroOTC -1.459** -0.009 -15.222*** -0.249** 
 [0.572] [0.045] [2.115] [0.107] 
Private Insurance 0.714 0.005 3.771* -0.078 
 [0.574] [0.045] [1.937] [0.098] 
Medicare 0.722 0.024 4.567** -0.004 
 [0.700] [0.055] [2.249] [0.114] 
Capitated Visit -0.818* 0.044 -2.565* 0.036 
 [0.421] [0.033] [1.488] [0.076] 
Female -0.045 -0.026 -1.315 0.066 
 [0.339] [0.027] [1.124] [0.057] 
White 0.346 -0.065 -32.360*** -0.226 
 [2.183] [0.172] [7.297] [0.371] 
Black -0.181 0.077 -33.745*** -0.025 
 [2.244] [0.177] [7.656] [0.389] 
Asian -2.279 -0.109 -35.801*** -0.012 
 [2.315] [0.182] [7.623] [0.387] 
Hispanic -1.242* 0.057 4.565** -0.138 
 [0.635] [0.050] [2.126] [0.108] 
Age 0.153*** 0.037*** 0.378*** 0.021*** 
 [0.027] [0.002] [0.132] [0.007] 
Age^2 -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.003*** -0.000** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] 
Acute -3.919*** -0.578*** 0.697 -0.202 
 [0.644] [0.051] [2.864] [0.146] 
Chronic Routine -3.119*** -0.728*** 0.067 -0.406*** 
 [0.671] [0.053] [2.791] [0.142] 
Chronic Flare-up -3.109*** -0.688*** -2.786 -0.353** 
 [0.755] [0.059] [2.907] [0.148] 
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Table 8.10 (Continued) 
Pre/Post Surgery -5.620*** -1.077*** -3.987 -0.492** 
 [1.066] [0.084] [3.780] [0.192] 
Northeast 0.995* 0.094** -4.672** 0.487*** 
 [0.553] [0.044] [2.068] [0.105] 
Midwest -2.917*** 0.023 -11.719*** 0.154 
 [0.526] [0.041] [2.143] [0.109] 
South -1.367*** 0.01 -9.053*** 0.436*** 
 [0.476] [0.038] [1.695] [0.086] 
New Patient 9.449*** 0.007 12.215*** -0.008 
 [0.450] [0.035] [1.328] [0.067] 
Physician Owner -1.803** 0.065 -0.498 0.096 
 [0.837] [0.066] [3.083] [0.157] 
Physician is 
Employee -1.14 0.086 1.982 0.026 
 [0.885] [0.070] [3.281] [0.167] 
MSA 0.387 0.055 -1.107 0.157** 
 [0.444] [0.035] [1.570] [0.080] 
Time Trend 0.149 -0.009 2.008*** -0.019 
 [0.092] [0.007] [0.325] [0.017] 
Observations 5383 5386 527 527 
R-squared 0.11 0.12 0.37 0.19 
 Amongst gastrointestinal specialists, the results show strong differences in 
time spent with the physician between races.  White, black, and Asian patients are all 
likely to spend less time with the specialist than Native Americans, while Hispanics 
are likely to spend more time.  According to Stancioiu (2005), as well as other 
researchers, H – pylori infections, associated with ulcers and cancer, are highly 
prevalent in both Native American and Hispanic communities.  Thus, there is likely to 
be an increased amount of time spent with the specialist physician for these two 
groups. 
 Acid Reflux Market Discussion 
 With the switch in prescription status of Prilosec, the acid reflux/GERD market 
saw the gradual phasing out of one drug, with the replacement of a newer one.  Years 
before Prilosec was to lose patent protection, Astra-Zeneca began to transition patients 
off of the older drug and over to Nexium, the “new purple pill” in order to maintain 
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the market share it had with Prilosec.  Prevacid, Protonix, and Nexium all begin to 
take over market share from Prilosec as it gets closer to the OTC switch.  Surprisingly, 
Zantac, the oldest of these drugs and an OTC, maintains a steady market share 
throughout the years.   
The analysis found that capitated physicians are more likely than FFS to use 
Zantac and this is consistent with the hypothesis that these physicians utilize the 
lowest cost treatment.  Not all of the changes in prescribing behavior that were 
expected after Prilosec moved to the OTC market, however, were found.  As 
mentioned earlier, this may be due to the serious complications that can potentially 
occur in patients with acid reflux related illnesses.  Physicians may choose to provide 
prescription drugs for the purpose of being able to monitor patients and prevent any 
serious complications that can occur when the illness is untreated.  There is an overall 
decrease in the use of prescriptions for the total insured sample, indicating that some 
physicians are just shifting patients from Prilosec to one of the other medications, 
while others increase their usage of Prilosec after it is OTC.  Amongst capitated 
physicians, strong changes may not have been seen because they were already 
utilizing the OTC drug Zantac.  Therefore, the effect of Prilosec’s change in regulatory 
status was not as much on other prescription medications, as it was on Zantac. 
When examining severity the results indicate that there is a decrease in 
physician office visits from acute patients, who are less severe, as was expected.  This 
result indicates that these patients perhaps choose to self treat, rather than make a 
physician office visit.  It was also found that there is an increased likelihood of 
specialist visits after Prilosec OTC, which supports the hypothesis of an increase in the 
severity of patient case mix after the availability of an OTC. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONS 
The goal of this study was to examine the reaction of physicians as well as 
patients to the availability of an OTC medication that is chemically equivalent to its 
prescription-only counterparts. Amongst physicians, the differences in prescribing 
decisions between fee-for-service and capitated were studied.  These physicians were 
then compared by reimbursement type before and after the availability of an OTC.  
Patient reactions were also examined by analyzing the change in case mix of patients 
seen in physician offices after the availability of an OTC.  
The main findings from this study were: 
• Capitated physicians choose the least costly form of treatment and shift 
the responsibility of costs towards patients. 
• FFS physicians cost shift away from patients by providing treatments 
that are covered by third party payers. 
• There is an increased use of specialists after the availability of an OTC, 
indicating a higher severity of the patient case-mix. 
• Patients with less severe conditions make fewer physician office visits 
after the availability of an OTC, causing the overall patient case-mix in 
offices to become more severe. 
• There is a decreased use of prescriptions overall after the availability of 
an OTC, indicating brand loyalty as patients follow drugs to OTC 
market. 
 The results show some evidence of physicians under capitated plans cost 
shifting towards the patient, and away from the insurance company and/or themselves.  
Capitated physicians are found to utilize the least costly form of treatment before the 
availability of these new OTCs, and then shift away from those treatments after the 
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new OTCs are available, as these become the least costly form of care.  In the acid 
reflux class, these physicians are significantly more likely than FFS to provide Zantac, 
an OTC and the least costly form of treatment, to their patients.  By providing Zantac, 
the physician puts the responsibility of payment solely on the patient, in most cases, 
thereby reducing costs for the insurance company.   
 In the allergy market, capitated physicians are found to be significantly more 
likely to provide allergy shots to their patients before the availability of an OTC, as 
these are the least costly form of treatment.  Once an OTC becomes available, 
capitated physicians decrease their usage of allergy shots, perhaps because the OTCs 
are of even lower cost.  As mentioned earlier, FFS physicians significantly increase 
their use of allergy shots after Claritin moves to the OTC market, perhaps because of 
an increase in severity.  This may also have been the result of FFS physicians 
attempting to cost shift away from patients.  By providing allergy shots, these 
physicians save their patients the total out-of-pocket costs associated with OTCs, since 
shots are still covered under most health plans.  
 There is also some evidence of patients with less severe conditions decreasing 
physician office visits after the availability of these new OTC drugs. This indicates 
that perhaps these patients are using the medications as a substitute to physician care.  
Amongst the acid reflux group, those patients with acute conditions have a statistically 
significant decrease in the likelihood of making a physician office visit after Prilosec 
moves to the OTC market.  In the allergy group there is a significant decrease in the 
likelihood of seeing chronic flare-up patients in physician offices. There is also 
evidence of an increase in the use of specialist physicians after the availability of an 
OTC.  In both the allergy as well as the acid reflux group there was a significant 
increase in the use of specialist physicians.  Both sets of these results indicate that the 
overall severity of the patient case mix seen in physician offices, after the availability 
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of an OTC, is higher.  In addition, amongst the allergy group, FFS physicians are 
found to be more likely to provide allergy shots after the availability of an OTC, also 
indicating that severity may have increased. 
 Finally, in both the allergy and acid reflux groups, overall prescriptions for the 
class decrease after the availability of an OTC medication.  This indicates that patients 
are brand loyal to medications in these groups and follow the drugs to the OTC 
market.  That is, those patients on Claritin or Prilosec prefer to continue with these 
drugs, even though they are on the OTC market, rather than switch to another 
prescription-only medication. 
Patient Case Mix 
 The theoretical model developed here shows that the patient case mix seen in 
physician offices should be more severe after the availability of OTC medications, 
since those patients with milder conditions can self-treat.  Empirically, changes in 
severity are measured by examining the use of specialist physicians; and the nature of 
the patient’s illness, based on the length of time the patient has had symptoms.  It was 
hypothesized that if the patient case mix worsens, more patients will be seen by 
specialists since these physicians are better equipped to manage more severe patients.  
 Acute patients were defined as those having symptoms for less than three 
months.  Both chronic routine and chronic flare-up patients are considered to have 
more severe symptoms than acute because their illnesses are long term and require 
more time and medication for treatment.  Once an OTC becomes available, it was 
expected that acute patients will self treat and will no longer need to see the physician. 
This would drive up the severity of the patient case mix in physician offices.  Chronic 
flare-up patients are also less likely to make physician office visits after the 
availability of an OTC because they may recognize that their symptoms are temporary.  
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These patients may, therefore, choose the OTC treatment rather than make an office 
visit. 
 As mentioned earlier, there was some evidence of an increase in patient 
severity seen in physician offices from both the allergy and acid reflux analyses.  In 
both result sections, there was an increased use of specialist physicians.  Acute 
patients were less likely to make physician office visits when Prilosec moved to the 
OTC market.  In addition, chronic flare-up patients were less likely to make an office 
visit after the OTC switch of Claritin.  
Capitation vs. FFS 
    The theoretical model developed here also provides the differences in 
financial incentives faced by fee-for-service physicians versus those under capitation.  
Under this model it can be seen that fee-for-service physicians have the most to gain 
with the repeated visits of patients.  As the number of visits increases, so does the FFS 
physician’s profits since they are not financially liable for any costs.  These physicians 
are most easily able to induce these visits by providing prescription drugs to their 
patients.  That is, when a prescription-only drug moves to the OTC market, the model 
suggests that FFS physicians that formerly provided that drug will instead switch to 
another competitor medication that remains on the prescription-only market.  These 
physicians choose prescription drugs because patients must return to the office for 
refills and physicians can further increase the number of return visits by asking 
patients to come back for monitoring reasons.  
 The capitated physician, on the other hand, sees a decrease in profits with an 
increased number of office visits.  These physicians become financially responsible 
for the care of patients because of the prepaid method insurance companies utilize.  
Therefore, as the capitated physician sees patients more, a greater amount is deducted 
from the prepaid amount, decreasing profits.  In order to minimize costs, it was 
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expected that capitated physicians will utilize the least costly form of care and limit 
the number of repeat visits.  When a drug becomes available in the OTC market, it 
was hypothesized that capitated physicians could decrease patient office visits by 
providing this drug instead of prescription-only ones.  By advising patients to take an 
OTC medication, the physician can reduce the number of repeat visits since these 
patients can self-treat in the future.  These patients also do not have to come back for 
refills or monitoring since the FDA deems these medications as safe.   
 The major finding of this study shows that capitated physicians, amongst both 
drug classes, choose the least costly form of treatment.  In the allergy market, when 
choosing between prescription drugs only and allergy shots, the capitated physician 
treats patients with allergy shots, as these are the more cost-effective option for the 
insurance company.  Once Claritin moves the OTC market, the cost of antihistamines 
falls for insurance companies, as most no longer cover Claritin, and some drop 
coverage for all antihistamines.  After the availability of OTC Claritin, capitated 
physicians decrease the use of allergy shots since they are no longer the most cost-
effective.  In the acid reflux class, as well, capitated physicians are found to be more 
likely than FFS physicians to choose Zantac, the lowest cost form of treatment before 
Prilosec OTC.  By utilizing Zantac, capitated physicians are less likely to change their 
behavior in relation to prescription medications (Gastro Rx), since they are already 
using an OTC.  Instead, these physicians may substitute Prilosec OTC for Zantac.    
 Overall, the results of this study indicate that physicians under a capitated 
system are acting as agents for the insurance companies to shift the cost of therapy 
from the third party payer to the patient.  Even amongst FFS physicians, there is a 
decrease in the use of prescription drugs overall, after the availability of an OTC, 
leading to the conclusion that patients are brand loyal and follow the medications to 
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the OTC market, even though it may cost them more, as OTCs are generally not 
included in drug coverage plans. 
Policy Implications 
 The empirical results from this study suggest that capitation is an effective tool 
for aligning physician incentives with those of the insurance company when dealing 
with illnesses that are not life threatening.  In addition, the availability of an OTC may 
be an efficient mechanism to sort patients by severity.  When an OTC is available, 
both acute and chronic flare-up patients are less likely to be seen in physician offices.  
Both of these types of patients have symptoms that are short term.  While acute 
patients have had their symptoms for less than three months, chronic flare-up also 
consists of patients who are possibly having a temporary increase in severity.  The 
availability of an OTC allows these patients to self treat.  If the self treatment is 
successful, resources are saved including the time and cost of an office visit.  If the 
OTC treatment is not successful, the patient can at least receive some level of 
temporary relief until he/she is able to see a physician.  The downside of this, 
however, is that those patients that self treat, but actually should see a physician, may 
be delayed unnecessarily.  Also, there is the chance that patients could incorrectly 
diagnose themselves and thereby attempt self treatment with the wrong type of 
medication.  Finally, the availability of an OTC, because of more convenient access, 
increases the likelihood that patients will utilize these medications even when not 
necessary.     
Limitations of This Study  
 Severity.  While it was attempted to understand changes in severity for the 
entire sample of the data, it was not possible to directly measure it.  Without more 
detailed information on symptoms, diagnoses, and patient histories, the changes in the 
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severity of patient case-mix, if any, cannot be gauged before and after the availability 
of an OTC medication. 
 Clinical Effects.  The analyses for the two drug classes produce somewhat 
differing results.  While some significant changes in physician behavior are found 
under the allergy class, the results are weaker with the acid reflux class.  This 
difference could be the result of the differing characteristics of each category.  That is, 
antihistamines and other allergy drugs are generally considered as medications in 
which the quality of a patient’s life is improved, but the drug is not necessary for 
survival.  With acid reflux, however, conditions can worsen in patients causing further 
complications such as ulcers and even cancer.  For this reason, physicians may feel it 
necessary to maintain regular visits with acid reflux patients, so that they can continue 
to monitor the illness and prevent progression into something more serious.  
 Patient Drug Co-pays.  By using the NAMCS, it is not possible to determine 
how much patients actually pay out-of-pocket for their medications, which may 
influence physician incentives.  It is very likely that physicians make their medication 
choices based on what the patient requests or what is least expensive for the patient.  
Without knowing the cost each patient faces, this portion of physician incentives 
cannot be analyzed. 
 Extent of Capitation.  While the NAMCS does ask physicians whether or not 
they accept capitated payments and whether or not that particular patient visit was 
from a capitated plan, it does not ask the extent to which the physician is capitated.  
Under capitation some physicians can face plans in which they are minimally 
financially responsible for their decisions while others are fully financially responsible 
for their therapy choices.  There is a vast array of capitated contracts; however, using 
the NAMCS the degree to which each physician faces capitation cannot be 
determined.    
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 Strength of Sample.  The OTC switch of Claritin took place in December 2002, 
while Prilosec entered the OTC market in mid-2003.  The NAMCS data includes the 
years 1997 – 2004.  This allows only 2 years in the case of Claritin and 1 year in the 
case of Prilosec for analysis.  Because of the short time period available after the 
switch of these drugs, the analyses may not be capturing the full effects from the move 
into the OTC market.  While those patients that were already on Claritin and Prilosec 
most likely followed the drugs closely, other patients, new to these drug classes may 
not have been aware of the availability of these medications without physician 
approval.  Therefore, changes in patient case-mix could perhaps be captured more 
accurately with later years of data. 
Recommendations for Future Work 
 As the FDA allows more drugs to move from the prescription-only to the OTC 
market, further work can be carried on analyzing the effects of these switches and how 
they vary with the diagnosis class.  For even the drugs analyzed here, long term 
studies can be carried out to determine the true impact of the availability of OTC drugs 
on costs and patient access.   
Future research can also examine if patients are truly sorted by severity once 
an OTC is available, by utilizing data that captures the magnitude of the illness.  
Patient health outcomes with this sorting mechanism could also be examined, to 
determine if patients are better or worse off with access to more medications on the 
OTC market. 
 When examining physician prescribing behavior, a key factor for future work 
would be to incorporate the physician’s exposure to detailing.  In addition, more 
insight into the exact nature of physician reimbursement plans would be ideal since 
physicians are influenced by the incentives set up in these contracts. 
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 Finally, more information on patient characteristics would be optimal.  Such 
data would include factors such as the employment status of the patients, their exact 
health plans and drug coverage, and their education.  Patient information is important 
because physicians are not only influenced by their own incentives, but also the 
preferences of their patients.       
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APPENDIX 
TABLE A.1. ALLERGY PROBIT REGRESSION RESULTS – TOTAL INSURED 
NAMCS SAMPLE 1997 – 2000; 2003 – 2004 
Standard Errors in Brackets 
*significant at 10%  **significant at 5%  ***significant at 1% 
 1 2 3 4 5 
  
Allergy 
RX  Allegra Zyrtec Clarinex 
Allergy 
Shots 
Capitated Visit 0.024 0.083* -0.099* -0.061 0.205*** 
  [0.030] [0.050] [0.060] [0.059] [0.064] 
AllergyOTC -0.322*** -0.319*** 0.115  N/A 0.637*** 
  [0.045] [0.073] [0.076]   [0.097] 
Capitated Visit * 
AllergyOTC -0.061 -0.117* 0.075  N/A -0.505*** 
  [0.040] [0.062] [0.069]   [0.081] 
Private Insurance 0.134*** 0.235*** 0.071* 0.105 0.295*** 
  [0.029] [0.055] [0.042] [0.110] [0.069] 
Medicare 0.002 0.158** -0.048 0.037 0.180** 
  [0.039] [0.067] [0.061] [0.142] [0.087] 
Female 0.071*** 0.093*** 0.106*** 0.041 0.070** 
  [0.016] [0.026] [0.026] [0.059] [0.034] 
White 0.094 0.308 -0.093 -0.32 -0.168 
  [0.119] [0.237] [0.146] [0.254] [0.218] 
Black 0.083 0.255 -0.147 -0.149 -0.269 
  [0.121] [0.241] [0.152] [0.265] [0.225] 
Asian 0.143 0.444* -0.13 0.022 -0.091 
  [0.126] [0.245] [0.165] [0.280] [0.242] 
Hispanic -0.014 0.003 -0.074 -0.096 -0.001 
  [0.031] [0.049] [0.049] [0.115] [0.068] 
Age 0.007*** 0.027*** -0.013*** 0.014*** 0.009*** 
  [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.005] [0.003] 
Age^2 -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Acute 0.436*** 0.352*** 0.351*** 0.319*** -0.702*** 
  [0.027] [0.044] [0.044] [0.110] [0.079] 
Chronic Routine 0.268*** 0.165*** 0.268*** 0.229** 0.380*** 
  [0.029] [0.046] [0.046] [0.112] [0.045] 
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Table A.1. (Continued) 
Chronic Flare-up 0.452*** 0.307*** 0.420*** 0.356*** -0.250*** 
  [0.033] [0.054] [0.054] [0.128] [0.080] 
Pre/Post Surgery -0.239*** -0.184** -0.211** -0.462 N/A  
  [0.050] [0.076] [0.088] [0.294]   
Northeast 0.058** -0.036 0.007 0.039 0.486*** 
  [0.026] [0.041] [0.042] [0.095] [0.077] 
Midwest 0.092*** 0.034 0.085** 0.033 0.836*** 
  [0.025] [0.039] [0.041] [0.097] [0.073] 
South 0.189*** 0.105*** 0.166*** 0.142* 0.641*** 
  [0.023] [0.035] [0.036] [0.083] [0.072] 
New Patient -0.109*** -0.065* -0.022 -0.101 -0.967*** 
  [0.023] [0.035] [0.036] [0.086] [0.147] 
Physician Owner 0.128*** 0.125 0.066 0.443 0.303*** 
  [0.042] [0.076] [0.068] [0.318] [0.096] 
Physician is Employee 0.186*** 0.210*** 0.069 0.449 0.062 
  [0.044] [0.078] [0.071] [0.323] [0.104] 
MSA 0.017 0.012 -0.014 0.231** 0.027 
  [0.022] [0.036] [0.036] [0.114] [0.048] 
Time Trend 0.071*** 0.126*** 0.045*** -0.005 -0.063*** 
  [0.008] [0.014] [0.014] [0.058] [0.018] 
Observations 121363 121363 121363 41801 110621 
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TABLE A.2. ALLERGY PROBIT REGRESSION RESULTS – INSURED 
ALLERGY SAMPLE NAMCS 1997 – 2000; 2003 – 2004 
Standard Errors in Brackets 
*significant at 10%  **significant at 5%  ***significant at 1% 
 1 2 3 4 5 
  
Allergy 
RX  Allegra Zyrtec Clarinex 
Allergy 
Shots 
Capitated Visit 0.023 0.151* -0.083 -0.085 0.015 
  [0.057] [0.089] [0.094] [0.098] [0.132] 
AllergyOTC -0.458*** -0.484*** 0.181  N/A 0.709*** 
  [0.086] [0.130] [0.128]   [0.162] 
Capitated Visit *  
AllergyOTC -0.059 -0.201* 0.087  N/A -0.423*** 
  [0.076] [0.110] [0.112]   [0.156] 
Private Insurance 0.086 0.129 0.036 0.002 0.152 
  [0.055] [0.092] [0.073] [0.178] [0.108] 
Medicare 0.068 0.173 -0.074 -0.081 0.226 
  [0.080] [0.124] [0.116] [0.252] [0.144] 
Female 0.042 0.058 0.117*** 0.016 0.048 
  [0.031] [0.047] [0.045] [0.098] [0.057] 
White 0.259 0.457 0.138 -0.614* -0.294 
  [0.225] [0.427] [0.278] [0.361] [0.324] 
Black 0.304 0.506 0.018 -0.466 -0.529 
  [0.230] [0.432] [0.287] [0.385] [0.338] 
Asian 0.292 0.678 -0.064 -0.224 -0.175 
  [0.237] [0.439] [0.303] [0.405] [0.366] 
Hispanic 0.001 0.036 -0.101 -0.164 0.074 
  [0.057] [0.085] [0.081] [0.190] [0.109] 
Age 0.019*** 0.043*** -0.010*** 0.022*** 0.024*** 
  [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.008] [0.005] 
Age^2 -0.000*** -0.000*** 0 -0.000** -0.000*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Acute 0.086 0.181* -0.093 0.082 -1.783*** 
  [0.063] [0.102] [0.083] [0.203] [0.127] 
Chronic Routine 0.055 0.137 -0.089 -0.064 -0.07 
  [0.066] [0.106] [0.088] [0.215] [0.079] 
Chronic Flare-up 0.201*** 0.186 0.039 0.158 -1.168*** 
  [0.072] [0.114] [0.095] [0.228] [0.125] 
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Table A.2. (Continued) 
Pre/Post Surgery -0.494*** -0.324 -0.447** -0.247  N/A 
  [0.128] [0.202] [0.189] [0.419]   
Northeast 0.032 -0.143* -0.025 0.018 0.629*** 
  [0.050] [0.076] [0.072] [0.168] [0.119] 
Midwest 0.071 -0.007 0.07 0.157 1.118*** 
  [0.049] [0.072] [0.069] [0.160] [0.112] 
South 0.240*** 0.120* 0.142** 0.19 0.879*** 
  [0.043] [0.063] [0.061] [0.141] [0.109] 
New Patient 0.051 0.063 0.142** 0.063 -1.299*** 
  [0.042] [0.061] [0.059] [0.134] [0.191] 
Physician Owner 0.099 0.103 -0.001 0.28 0.356** 
  [0.078] [0.135] [0.112] [0.438] [0.180] 
Physician is 
Employee 0.126 0.228 -0.045 0.33 0.057 
  [0.082] [0.140] [0.119] [0.447] [0.191] 
MSA 0.084* 0.042 0.03 0.072 0.051 
  [0.044] [0.066] [0.063] [0.164] [0.082] 
Time Trend 0.096*** 0.184*** 0.050** 0.136 -0.037 
  [0.016] [0.026] [0.024] [0.097] [0.031] 
Observations 9692 9692 9692 3467 9410 
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TABLE A.3. ALLERGY MARGINAL EFFECT REGRESSION RESULTS – 
TOTAL INSURED NAMCS SAMPLE 1997 – 2000; 2003 – 2004 
Standard Errors in Brackets 
*significant at 10%  **significant at 5%  ***significant at 1% 
 1 2 3 4 5 
  
Allergy 
RX  Allegra Zyrtec Clarinex 
Allergy 
Shots 
Capitated Visit 0.001 0.001 -0.001* 0 0.001*** 
  [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] 
AllergyOTC -0.015*** -0.004*** 0.002 N/A  0.004*** 
  [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]   [0.001] 
Capitated Visit * 
 AllergyOTC -0.003 -0.002** 0.001 N/A  -0.001*** 
  [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]   [0.000] 
Private Insurance 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.001* 0.001 0.001*** 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] 
Medicare 0 0.003** -0.001 0 0.001* 
  [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] 
Female 0.004*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0 0.000** 
  [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
White 0.004 0.003* -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 
  [0.005] [0.002] [0.003] [0.004] [0.001] 
Black 0.004 0.005 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001* 
  [0.007] [0.006] [0.002] [0.001] [0.000] 
Asian 0.008 0.011 -0.002 0 0 
  [0.008] [0.010] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] 
Hispanic -0.001 0 -0.001 -0.001 0 
  [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] 
Age 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Age^2 -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Acute 0.026*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.003** -0.002*** 
  [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] 
Chronic Routine 0.015*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.002* 0.002*** 
  [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] 
Chronic Flare-up 0.033*** 0.006*** 0.010*** 0.004* -0.001*** 
  [0.003] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.000] 
      
 171 
Table A.3. (Continued) 
Pre/Post Surgery -0.010*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002*** N/A  
  [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]   
Northeast 0.003** -0.001 0 0 0.003*** 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Midwest 0.005*** 0.001 0.001** 0 0.007*** 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
South 0.010*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.001 0.004*** 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
New Patient -0.005*** -0.001* 0 -0.001 -0.002*** 
  [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] 
Physician Owner 0.006*** 0.002* 0.001 0.003* 0.001*** 
  [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] 
Physician is Employee 0.010*** 0.004** 0.001 0.005 0 
  [0.003] [0.002] [0.001] [0.005] [0.000] 
MSA 0.001 0 0 0.001*** 0 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] 
Time Trend 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0 -0.000*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Observations 121363 121363 121363 41801 110621 
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TABLE A.4. ALLERGY MARGINAL EFFECT REGRESSION RESULTS – 
INSURED ALLERGY SAMPLE NAMCS 1997 – 2000; 2003 – 2004 
Standard Errors in Brackets 
*significant at 10%  **significant at 5%  ***significant at 1% 
 1 2 3 4 5 
  Allergy RX  Allegra Zyrtec Clarinex 
Allergy 
Shots 
Capitated Visit 0.006 0.013 -0.008 -0.004 0 
  [0.014] [0.008] [0.009] [0.005] [0.003] 
AllergyOTC -0.108*** -0.036*** 0.019 N/A  0.019*** 
  [0.019] [0.009] [0.014]   [0.007] 
Capitated Visit * 
 AllergyOTC -0.015 -0.015** 0.009 N/A  -0.006*** 
  [0.018] [0.007] [0.012]   [0.002] 
Private Insurance 0.021 0.01 0.004 0 0.003 
  [0.013] [0.007] [0.007] [0.009] [0.002] 
Medicare 0.017 0.016 -0.007 -0.004 0.005 
  [0.021] [0.012] [0.010] [0.011] [0.004] 
Female 0.011 0.005 0.011*** 0.001 0.001 
  [0.008] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.001] 
White 0.059 0.028 0.012 -0.047 -0.008 
  [0.046] [0.019] [0.023] [0.040] [0.011] 
Black 0.085 0.059 0.002 -0.016* -0.006** 
  [0.071] [0.068] [0.029] [0.008] [0.003] 
Asian 0.083 0.094 -0.006 -0.009 -0.003 
  [0.074] [0.090] [0.027] [0.013] [0.005] 
Hispanic 0 0.003 -0.009 -0.007 0.002 
  [0.014] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.002] 
Age 0.005*** 0.004*** -0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
  [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Age^2 -0.000*** -0.000*** 0 -0.000** -0.000*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Acute 0.022 0.015* -0.009 0.004 -0.057*** 
  [0.016] [0.009] [0.008] [0.010] [0.006] 
Chronic Routine 0.014 0.012 -0.008 -0.003 -0.001 
  [0.017] [0.010] [0.008] [0.010] [0.001] 
Chronic Flare-up 0.054*** 0.017 0.004 0.009 -0.011*** 
  [0.021] [0.012] [0.010] [0.014] [0.002] 
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Table A.4. (Continued) 
Pre/Post Surgery -0.097*** -0.020** -0.031*** -0.009 N/A  
  [0.019] [0.009] [0.008] [0.012]   
Northeast 0.008 -0.011** -0.002 0.001 0.021*** 
  [0.013] [0.005] [0.007] [0.008] [0.006] 
Midwest 0.018 -0.001 0.007 0.008 0.053*** 
  [0.013] [0.006] [0.007] [0.009] [0.011] 
South 0.062*** 0.010* 0.014** 0.01 0.026*** 
  [0.012] [0.005] [0.006] [0.007] [0.005] 
New Patient 0.013 0.005 0.015** 0.003 -0.012*** 
  [0.011] [0.005] [0.007] [0.007] [0.002] 
Physician Owner 0.024 0.008 0 0.012 0.006** 
  [0.019] [0.010] [0.011] [0.015] [0.003] 
Physician is 
Employee 0.033 0.021 -0.004 0.02 0.001 
  [0.022] [0.014] [0.011] [0.032] [0.004] 
MSA 0.020** 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.001 
  [0.010] [0.005] [0.006] [0.007] [0.001] 
Time Trend 0.024*** 0.015*** 0.005** 0.007 -0.001 
  [0.004] [0.002] [0.002] [0.005] [0.001] 
Observations 9692 9692 9692 3467 9410 
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TABLE A.7. ACID REFLUX PROBIT REGRESSION RESULTS – TOTAL 
INSURED NAMCS SAMPLE 1997 – 2000; 2003 – 2004 
Standard Errors in Brackets 
*significant at 10%  **significant at 5%  ***significant at 1% 
 1 2 3 4 5 
  Gastro RX Nexium Prevacid Protonix Zantac 
Capitated Visit 0.009 -0.022 -0.003 0.093 0.107*** 
  [0.026] [0.067] [0.038] [0.075] [0.038] 
GastroOTC -0.123*** -3.181*** -0.125** -0.105 0.023 
  [0.042] [0.095] [0.059] [0.090] [0.075] 
Capitated Visit *  
GastroOTC 0.017 0.071 -0.003 -0.057 -0.164* 
  [0.051] [0.092] [0.073] [0.102] [0.092] 
Private Insurance -0.090*** -0.027 -0.098** -0.102 -0.128*** 
  [0.035] [0.093] [0.049] [0.092] [0.049] 
Medicare -0.043 -0.108 -0.06 -0.14 -0.100* 
  [0.039] [0.105] [0.057] [0.105] [0.057] 
Female -0.011 -0.074 0.01 0.062 -0.036 
  [0.018] [0.046] [0.026] [0.051] [0.027] 
White 0.096 -0.131 0.205 0.134 3.724*** 
  [0.144] [0.267] [0.240] [0.343] [0.098] 
Black 0.079 -0.119 0.189 0.03 3.770*** 
  [0.147] [0.276] [0.244] [0.355] [0.104] 
Asian 0.225 -0.037 0.352 0.272 3.832*** 
  [0.152] [0.300] [0.249] [0.364] [0.115] 
Hispanic 0.047 -0.069 0.021 0.239*** -0.026 
  [0.036] [0.096] [0.053] [0.078] [0.057] 
Age 0.039*** 0.037*** 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.013*** 
  [0.002] [0.006] [0.003] [0.006] [0.002] 
Age^2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Acute 0.181*** 0.134 0.199*** 0.052 0.101** 
  [0.033] [0.089] [0.048] [0.089] [0.046] 
Chronic Routine 0.211*** 0.155* 0.194*** 0.099 0.112** 
  [0.032] [0.086] [0.048] [0.086] [0.045] 
Chronic Flare-up 0.268*** 0.177* 0.293*** 0.043 0.141** 
  [0.038] [0.103] [0.056] [0.111] [0.056] 
Pre/Post Surgery -0.093** -0.064 -0.049 -0.134 -0.175** 
  [0.045] [0.125] [0.068] [0.132] [0.070] 
Northeast 0.070** 0.147* 0.047 -0.005 -0.012 
  [0.028] [0.081] [0.042] [0.075] [0.043] 
 181 
      
Table A.7. (Continued) 
Midwest 0.077*** 0.089 0.115*** -0.097 0.047 
  [0.028] [0.083] [0.040] [0.079] [0.042] 
South 0.108*** 0.307*** 0.084** -0.009 0.077** 
  [0.025] [0.072] [0.037] [0.068] [0.038] 
New Patient -0.138*** -0.194** -0.078** -0.105 -0.114*** 
  [0.028] [0.080] [0.040] [0.081] [0.043] 
Physician Owner 0.001 0.013 0.094 -0.026 -0.141*** 
  [0.043] [0.150] [0.070] [0.156] [0.054] 
Physician is 
Employee 0.091** 0.047 0.182** 0.088 -0.034 
  [0.046] [0.157] [0.073] [0.162] [0.058] 
MSA -0.067*** -0.139** -0.001 -0.116* 0.065* 
  [0.023] [0.062] [0.036] [0.069] [0.038] 
Time Trend 0.022*** 3.198*** 0.031*** 0.256*** -0.050*** 
  [0.005] [0.061] [0.007] [0.028] [0.008] 
Observations 121363 121363 121363 121363 121363 
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TABLE A.8. ACID REFLUX PROBIT REGRESSION RESULTS – INSURED 
ACID REFLUX SAMPLE NAMCS 1997 – 2000; 2003 – 2004 
Standard Errors in Brackets 
*significant at 10%  **significant at 5%  ***significant at 1% 
 1 2 3 4 5 
  Gastro RX Nexium Prevacid Protonix Zantac 
Capitated Visit 0.023 -0.002 0.007 -0.05 0.157* 
  [0.062] [0.141] [0.080] [0.154] [0.083] 
GastroOTC -0.113 -3.464*** -0.09 -0.177 -0.343** 
  [0.094] [0.198] [0.122] [0.177] [0.169] 
Capitated Visit * 
 GastroOTC -0.17 0.009 -0.145 -0.142 -0.139 
  [0.116] [0.195] [0.152] [0.216] [0.207] 
Private Insurance 0.014 -0.091 -0.011 -0.105 -0.057 
  [0.076] [0.177] [0.096] [0.179] [0.102] 
Medicare -0.003 -0.101 -0.051 -0.186 0.085 
  [0.088] [0.201] [0.115] [0.210] [0.124] 
Female -0.095** -0.14 -0.028 0.05 -0.022 
  [0.042] [0.097] [0.055] [0.106] [0.061] 
White 0.144 0.142 0.335 4.619*** 4.496*** 
  [0.291] [0.481] [0.446] [0.569] [0.215] 
Black 0.1 0.158 0.326 4.555*** 4.554*** 
  [0.298] [0.502] [0.455] [0.590] [0.233] 
Asian 0.312 -0.177 0.523 4.418*** 4.746*** 
  [0.306] [0.576] [0.461] [0.628] [0.237] 
Hispanic -0.022 0.063 -0.092 0.219 -0.078 
  [0.082] [0.170] [0.112] [0.171] [0.119] 
Age 0.039*** 0.035*** 0.027*** 0.024** 0.007 
  [0.004] [0.010] [0.005] [0.011] [0.005] 
Age^2 -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000*** 0 -0.000* 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Acute -0.002 -0.039 -0.038 0.191 -0.331*** 
  [0.085] [0.197] [0.109] [0.249] [0.104] 
Chronic Routine 0.243*** 0.068 0.129 0.401 -0.188* 
  [0.086] [0.199] [0.111] [0.249] [0.107] 
Chronic Flare-up 0.173* 0.18 0.131 0.12 -0.271** 
  [0.095] [0.218] [0.123] [0.284] [0.125] 
Pre/Post Surgery -0.085 0.035 -0.332 0.217 -0.444** 
  [0.138] [0.312] [0.206] [0.369] [0.206] 
Northeast 0.123* 0.183 -0.025 0.154 0.076 
  [0.069] [0.174] [0.090] [0.166] [0.098] 
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Table A.8. (Continued) 
Midwest 0.039 -0.133 0.017 -0.182 0.037 
  [0.067] [0.180] [0.084] [0.179] [0.095] 
South 0.147** 0.319** -0.064 0.017 0.061 
  [0.060] [0.154] [0.078] [0.153] [0.086] 
New Patient -0.225*** -0.390** -0.014 -0.139 -0.287*** 
  [0.059] [0.152] [0.073] [0.151] [0.094] 
Physician Owner -0.147 -0.086 0.282* -0.232 -0.262** 
  [0.101] [0.371] [0.166] [0.325] [0.129] 
Physician is Employee -0.098 -0.225 0.290* -0.133 -0.213 
  [0.108] [0.385] [0.172] [0.338] [0.138] 
MSA -0.045 -0.079 -0.058 -0.007 0.126 
  [0.054] [0.137] [0.071] [0.152] [0.083] 
Time Trend 0.018 3.510*** 0.023 0.321*** -0.026 
  [0.012] [0.121] [0.015] [0.052] [0.016] 
Observations 5386 5386 5386 5386 5386 
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TABLE A.9. ACID REFLUX MARGINAL EFFECT REGRESSION RESULTS – 
TOTAL INSURED NAMCS SAMPLE 1997 – 2000; 2003 – 2004 
Standard Errors in Brackets 
*significant at 10%  **significant at 5%  ***significant at 1% 
 1 2 3 4 5 
  
Gastro 
RX Nexium Prevacid Protonix Zantac 
Capitated Visit 0 0 0 0 0.002*** 
  [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
GastroOTC -0.004*** 0 -0.002** 0 0 
  [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
Capitated Visit * 
GastroOTC 0.001 0 0 0 -0.002** 
  [0.002] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
Private Insurance -0.003** 0 -0.001* 0 -0.002** 
  [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
Medicare -0.001 0 -0.001 0 -0.001* 
  [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
Female 0 0 0 0 0 
  [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
White 0.003 0 0.002 0 0.017*** 
  [0.004] [0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.001] 
Black 0.003 0 0.003 0 0.790*** 
  [0.006] [0.000] [0.005] [0.000] [0.028] 
Asian 0.01 0 0.008 0 0.862*** 
  [0.008] [0.000] [0.008] [0.001] [0.025] 
Hispanic 0.002 0 0 0.000* 0 
  [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
Age 0.001*** 0 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Age^2 -0.000*** 0 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Acute 0.007*** 0 0.003*** 0 0.001** 
  [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
Chronic Routine 0.008*** 0 0.003*** 0 0.002** 
  [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
Chronic Flare-up 0.012*** 0 0.006*** 0 0.002** 
  [0.002] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
Pre/Post Surgery -0.003** 0 -0.001 0 -0.002*** 
  [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
Northeast 0.003** 0 0.001 0 0 
  [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
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Table A.9. (Continued) 
Midwest 0.003*** 0 0.002*** 0 0.001 
  [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
South 0.004*** 0 0.001** 0 0.001** 
  [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
New Patient -0.004*** 0 -0.001** 0 -0.001*** 
  [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] 
Physician Owner 0 0 0.001 0 -0.002** 
  [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
Physician is 
Employee 0.003* 0 0.003** 0 0 
  [0.002] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
MSA -0.002*** 0 0 0 0.001* 
  [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] 
Time Trend 0.001*** 0 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.001*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Observations 121363 121363 121363 121363 121363 
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TABLE A.10. ACID REFLUX MARGINAL EFFECT REGRESSIONS – INSURED 
ACID REFLUX SAMPLE NAMCS 1997 – 2000; 2003 – 2004 
Standard Errors in Brackets 
*significant at 10%  **significant at 5%  ***significant at 1% 
 1 2 3 4 5 
  
Gastro 
RX Nexium Prevacid Protonix Zantac 
Capitated Visit 0.006 0 0.001 0 0.014* 
  [0.015] [0.000] [0.009] [0.001] [0.008] 
GastroOTC -0.026 0 -0.01 -0.001 -0.025** 
  [0.021] [0.000] [0.013] [0.001] [0.010] 
Capitated Visit * 
GastroOTC -0.038 0 -0.015 -0.001 -0.011 
  [0.024] [0.000] [0.015] [0.001] [0.015] 
Private Insurance 0.003 0 -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 
  [0.018] [0.000] [0.011] [0.002] [0.009] 
Medicare -0.001 0 -0.006 -0.001 0.008 
  [0.021] [0.000] [0.013] [0.001] [0.011] 
Female -0.023** 0 -0.003 0 -0.002 
  [0.010] [0.000] [0.006] [0.001] [0.005] 
White 0.033 0 0.032 0.017** 0.136*** 
  [0.063] [0.000] [0.035] [0.008] [0.010] 
Black 0.025 0 0.046 0.906*** 0.977*** 
  [0.077] [0.000] [0.077] [0.101] [0.006] 
Asian 0.085 0 0.086 0.922*** 0.972*** 
  [0.094] [0.000] [0.101] [0.096] [0.003] 
Hispanic -0.005 0 -0.01 0.002 -0.006 
  [0.019] [0.000] [0.011] [0.002] [0.009] 
Age 0.009*** 0 0.003*** 0.000* 0.001 
  [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] 
Age^2 -0.000*** 0 -0.000*** 0 -0.000* 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Acute -0.001 0 -0.004 0.002 -0.028*** 
  [0.020] [0.000] [0.013] [0.002] [0.009] 
Chronic Routine 0.061*** 0 0.016 0.004 -0.015* 
  [0.022] [0.000] [0.014] [0.004] [0.008] 
Chronic Flare-up 0.044* 0 0.016 0.001 -0.020*** 
  [0.026] [0.000] [0.016] [0.003] [0.007] 
Pre/Post Surgery -0.02 0 -0.030** 0.002 -0.027*** 
  [0.031] [0.000] [0.014] [0.005] [0.008] 
Northeast 0.031* 0 -0.003 0.001 0.007 
  [0.018] [0.000] [0.010] [0.002] [0.009] 
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Table A.10. (Continued) 
Midwest 0.009 0 0.002 -0.001 0.003 
  [0.016] [0.000] [0.010] [0.001] [0.008] 
South 0.036** 0 -0.007 0 0.005 
  [0.015] [0.000] [0.009] [0.001] [0.008] 
New Patient -0.050*** 0 -0.002 -0.001 -0.021*** 
  [0.012] [0.000] [0.008] [0.001] [0.006] 
Physician Owner -0.036 0 0.030* -0.002 -0.025* 
  [0.026] [0.000] [0.016] [0.004] [0.014] 
Physician is 
Employee -0.023 0 0.038 -0.001 -0.017* 
  [0.024] [0.000] [0.025] [0.002] [0.010] 
MSA -0.011 0 -0.007 0 0.01 
  [0.013] [0.000] [0.009] [0.001] [0.006] 
Time Trend 0.004 0 0.003 0.003*** -0.002 
  [0.003] [0.000] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] 
Observations 5386 5386 5386 5386 5386 
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